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This thesis aims to understand the determinants of household demand for schooling in rural 
Senegal. Using an original dataset including 504 households living in the North of Senegal and 
based on the results of a literature review on the determinants of schooling, it analyses in three 
empirical chapters what explains household behaviour when it comes to investing in education.  
The first empirical chapter explores determinants of schooling by fitting a logit model to 
estimate the likelihood of children being enrolled at school conditional on child, parent, 
household, school and community characteristics. It shows that the determinants of schooling 
for girls and boys must be analysed separately as the estimated coefficients are significantly 
different for the boy and girl subsamples. Girls’ education depends on family structure, notably 
the number of young children in the household, and the household’s income, whereas boys’ 
education depends on their mother’s education. This suggests that the opportunity cost of time 
may be a barrier for girls as they are usually required to help to take care of young children. 
However, the fact that the size of the area cultivated by the household is not statistically 
significant suggests that the need for child labour for agricultural work is not a barrier to 
schooling. Both girls and boys are affected by the availability of schools and the community 
social norms proxied by the share of children attending a Koranic school. Interestingly, girls 
and boys seem to benefit from living in a household with access to electricity and a robustness 
check using an instrumental variable approach shows that this result is not due to the 
endogeneity of the household’s access to electricity. Further robustness checks include 
different ways of measuring household income and parental education and alternative 
estimation methods. They confirm the conclusions of the main model. 
The second empirical chapter deals with the intergenerational transmission of schooling and, 
more specifically, the relative effects of mother’s and father’s education on the level of 
schooling attained by a child. The chapter starts with a review of different published studies 
from Sub-Saharan African countries where the effects of mother’s and father’s education were 
simultaneously estimated. The review finds that, on average, mother’s education is more 
important than father’s education in explaining the educational achievement of young children, 
whereas the opposite is true for older children. Using my dataset, I then replicate a study on 
the effects of parental education on a child’s level of schooling attained in Senegal that found 
a larger effect of father’s education than mother’s education, after controlling for the 
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endogeneity of education. Using a similar method, I also show that father’s education is more 
important than mother’s education in my sample but my results are sensitive to the estimation 
method used and age range of children included in the sample. Taking into consideration that 
the number of years of schooling are censored, that is children still enrolled at school have not 
achieved their final level of schooling, increases the importance of mother’s education relative 
to father’s education. Also, in line with my literature review and another published review, my 
results show that mother’s education is more important for younger children, whereas father’s 
education is more important for older children. 
The third empirical chapter attempts to shed light on the decision process of polygynous 
households regarding children’s education. It contributes to the limited literature on the intra-
household allocation of resources of polygynous households. First, it shows that despite the 
higher social status of their mother, children of senior co-wives do not enjoy more schooling. 
Secondly, the positive effect of other co-wives’ education on a child’s level of education 
suggests cooperation between co-wives in raising children. Finally, I test if, when it comes to 
decisions regarding schooling, polygynous households act as a single entity (unitary model) or 
as separate entities (collective model). I overcome the fact that I cannot account for unobserved 
heterogeneity of mother’s characteristics, which could explain differences in schooling 
achievement of siblings from different co-wives, by using an original method taking advantage 
of heterogeneous effects of additional brothers and sisters on a child’s education. My results 
show that, at least for girls, decisions regarding children’s education are made separately 
between co-wives. I argue that this finding suggests that husbands tend to equalise the number 
of educated children per co-wife. This is an important result for policies seeking to target 
children living in polygynous households. Moreover, this behaviour may have a detrimental 
effect on a child’s achievement as resources for education are less efficiently allocated than in 
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The aim of this thesis is to study the demand for schooling in Senegal and this first chapter will 
present the motivations of this research and the context of the study. In the first section, I define 
more precisely what education is, why it is important and the state of the education sector in 
developing countries. I also discuss in more detail government interventions in the education 
sector as this research is related to a body of research aimed at improving education policies. 
In the second section, I give an overview of the context of the research, notably the education 
sector in Senegal, as I believe that this information is important to understand the focus of my 
research. Finally, I conclude by presenting the aim of the thesis and the thesis structure.   
1.2 Education 
 What is education?  
Education is the process of receiving or giving instruction in order to learn new skills or 
knowledge. It is usually associated with schools or universities but education also takes place 
in an informal way in families or communities. Learning is not limited to formal academic 
knowledge and it also encompasses religion, technical and business skills, social skills etc. It 
includes all skills that will allow individuals to function normally in their communities and 
improve their productivity.   
By this wide definition, most humans receive some form of education, usually in their 
childhood. Hunter-gatherers teach their children what food to collect and how to hunt, farmers 
teach their children farming skills and, in many societies, children receive a religious education. 
However, as economies become more complex, tasks become more and more specialised and, 
thanks to the division of labour, only some individuals need to learn the necessary skills to 
perform a task. Educating children also becomes a more specialised task and teachers and 
schools start to emerge.  
Large and complex educational systems started to emerge in Prussia in the 16th century with 
the Protestant Reformation. Prussia was also the first state to use taxes to fund its education 
system and make education compulsory in 1763. During the 19th century, all Western countries 
expanded considerably their education systems and made education compulsory (Soysal and 
Strang, 1989). This is the example that most countries in the world now follow by funding 
education publicly and making, in most cases, primary education free and compulsory. Even 
 3 
when education is privately funded, governments usually closely control the curriculum taught 
in private schools. The aim of governments is to teach children useful numeracy and literacy 
skills that will make them more productive in the future and allow them to exercise their rights. 
This type of schooling, usually referred as formal schooling, is the main subject of this thesis.  
 Importance of formal education 
Every nation in the world, whatever their level of development or level of democracy, aims to 
provide some schooling for its citizens. Countries with very little capacity, such as Somalia or 
South Sudan, try to provide some schooling for their population and countries that are usually 
considered as dictatorships, such as Eritrea or North Korea, also have a publicly funded 
education system. Thus, despite the fact that there are still 263 million children out of school 
(UNESCO, 2016b), there seems to be a global norm that governments should provide formal 
education. There are two main reasons for this. First, education is seen as an engine for 
economic growth and, secondly, education is seen as a human right that should help individuals 
to exercise their rights and seize opportunities. 
1.2.2.1 Education and economic growth 
By making individuals more productive, education is an important tool to foster long-term 
economic growth. The link between human capital accumulation and economic growth was 
notably one of the main features of the models explaining economic growth developed by 
Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). Numerous studies have found an association between 
education outcomes and economic growth (Angrist and Krueger, 2001, Mankiw et al., 1992), 
although the magnitude of the effect has been disputed. Indeed, some authors claim that 
education is not able to generate endogenous growth and that the impact of human capital on 
economic growth is modest (Pritchett, 2001, Bils and Klenow, 2000, Blankenau and Simpson, 
2004). The lack of a clear association between schooling and economic growth in the literature 
can notably be explained by the difficulty of measuring accurately the accumulation of human 
capital (Cohen and Soto, 2007). Indeed, the quality of the data is still very poor in most 
developing countries and widely available indicators such as years of schooling do not capture 
education quality. Efforts to build more accurate global indicators of education and learning 
outcomes have helped to estimate the link between education and economic growth more 
precisely and the recent literature tends to show that education is an important factor fostering 
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economic development (Doménech, 2006, Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007, Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2012, Vandenbussche et al., 2006).  
1.2.2.2 Education as a right 
Although education can be primarily seen as an investment that makes individuals more 
productive and fosters long term economic growth, it can also help individuals to acquire other 
knowledge about the world and make them better equipped to participate in political life 
(Mayer, 2011, Persson, 2013) or to take care of their health and the health of their children 
(Conti et al., 2010, Eide and Showalter, 2011). More fundamentally, educated individuals have 
more opportunities and are more likely to fulfil their potential. Because of this, education is a 
right and has been included in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Children signed 
and ratified in 1990 by Senegal. 
 The Global Agenda on Education 
Because education is such an important factor for long-term economic growth, improving 
access and the quality of education in the world is at the core of the global development agenda. 
Thus, OECD countries’ official development assistance (ODA) to the education sector was 
about 12 billion US dollars in 2014, making up 7.4% of total ODA (Development Assistance 
Committee, 2016).  
In 2000, the international community agreed on eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
to be achieved by 2015, including the goal of universal primary education, that is to “ensure 
that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike will be able to complete a full course 
of primary schooling” (UNSD, 2008). There has been considerable progress in the number of 
children enrolled in school during the period 2000 to 2015, with the global adjusted primary 
enrolment rate reaching 91% from 83% in 2000 and the number of out-of-school children being 
nearly halved from 100 million to 57 million children (UNESCO, 2016b). However, concerns 
have been raised that improvements in school attendance were not sufficient and that education 
quality should also be improved (UNESCO, 2004). This led to the adoption of new global goals 
for the period 2015-2030 (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) that also focus on learning 
outcomes (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).  
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 Education in low-income countries 
According to data from the Institute for Statistics of UNESCO,1 at the global level, 
governments spend on average 4.9% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on education. This 
level of effort varies little between countries at different levels of development and low and 
middle-income countries spend on average 4.2% of their GDP on education, which makes up 
15.2% of their government budget. This is a considerable effort for very poor countries and it 
shows that education is seen as a priority for most countries in the world in order to foster their 
economic development. In most developing countries, governments have increased their 
efforts and are spending a larger share of their GDP on education compared to twenty years 
ago. Thus, Sub-Saharan African countries have increased the share of GDP invested in 
education by almost 30%, from 3.5% to 4.5%, an effort similar to countries from Latin America 
or from the East Asia and Pacific region (see Figure 1-1). South Asian countries have not 
increased their investment in education relative to their GDP in the past twenty years and, with 
less than 3%, this is the region of the world that invests relatively the least in education. 
However, thanks to strong economic growth the actual amount spent on education per capita 
has increased at the same rate in South Asia as in Sub-Saharan Africa and has doubled from 
2000 to 2015 (see Figure 1-2). 
 
1 Data accessed the 01/06/2018 from the UNESCO website: http://uis.unesco.org/  
 6 
 
Figure 1-1 Government expenditure on education, % of GDP 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Government expenditure per capita in international dollar (2011) 
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Despite the efforts made, Sub-Saharan countries are still far away from the rest of the world 
when it comes to the amount of schooling they provide to their population. Thus, according to 
UNESCO data, the primary completion rate in Sub-Saharan African countries has reached 
69.5% in 2016 from 53.5% in 1995, whereas, in the meantime, the primary completion rate in 
South Asia, the second lowest performing region, has increased from 68.7% to 93.3% (see 
Figure 1-3). Thus, the gap in school achievement between South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
has grown despite similar levels of investment in the education sector. If these trends continue, 
Sub-Saharan Africa will soon be the last region in the world where a relatively large share of 
the population does not even manage to complete primary schooling. This is a worrying trend 
and, given the fact government expenditures on education are already relatively high in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it suggests that there is not a lot of room to increase school participation by 
raising public spending, and that making public expenditures on education more effective 
should be a priority for these countries.  
 
Figure 1-3 Primary completion rate 
 Concerns about the quality of education 
The number of children enrolled in the school system and completing primary, secondary or 
tertiary education does not reflect fully the investment made in schooling as the quality of 
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education varies greatly from one country to another. Indeed, poorer countries often struggle 
to provide quality education. Comparing the quality of education between countries is hard and 
there is no international standardised metric to measure how much students learn; however 
estimates tend to show that students in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal, learn less than 
students from richer countries. Altinok et al. (2014) have constructed a database compiling all 
international standardised tests at primary and secondary level and linking tests together to 
make them comparable. They find considerable gaps in learning between developing and 
developed countries, with Sub-Saharan African countries having the lowest level of 
achievement in the world.  
 The case for public intervention in the education sector 
If education is a worthy investment for an individual, one could argue that government 
intervention is unnecessary as families should invest their resources in an optimal way and 
government intervention would only distort their behaviour. However, even from a private 
point of view, market failures can lead to an underinvestment in education. Thus, parents may 
be financially constrained and unable to borrow money to fund their children’s education. 
There is also some evidence that private returns to education are often underestimated by 
families, (Jensen, 2010, Nguyen, 2008). Parents may also be unwilling to invest in their 
children’s education as they may perceive that they will not fully benefit from this investment. 
Indeed, although children may support their parents later on, the amount parents expect them 
to transfer may not be large enough to justify the initial investment in their education.  
Moreover, parents may take into account that they might die before their children are able to 
support them, leading to different discount rates between them and their children. This might 
be a concern when the difference in age between parents and children is large or when life 
expectancy is short, which is the case for many fathers in Senegal who tend to have children 
later in life than women. This thesis is particularly interested in the choices made by parents 
regarding the education of primary school-aged children. At this age, government intervention 
might be seen as even more justified as children are totally dependent on their parents’ decision 
and financial support and cannot be expected to have the maturity to make long-term 
investment decisions.   
Government intervention is also justified by the fact that education may have positive 
externalities and private levels of investment may be insufficient. Lastly, government 
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intervention can be justified on the grounds that financing education, notably at the primary 
level, is a good way of redistributing money. It helps create a fairer society by putting all 
children on an equal footing and, from a political economy perspective, education spending is 
usually supported by voters.    
 The type of government interventions to increase education 
In most countries, governments take the lead to organise, administer and regulate the education 
sector. Governments can also take actions to improve educational outcomes. Education policies 
aiming to improve educational outcomes can be classified into two main categories: policies 
aiming to improve the quantity of schooling and those aiming to improve schooling quality. 
As poor schooling quality may deter parents from sending their children to school, some 
polices can be classified in both categories.  
Improving education quality is crucial and numerous studies have shown that student learning 
outcomes are very low in developing countries. The new global agenda puts more emphasis on 
the quality of education with the inclusion of learning assessment indicators in the SDGs 
monitoring framework.  However, in the poorest countries in the world, school participation 
rates remain low and are not progressing fast enough to ensure universal primary completion 
in the near future. Thus, according to projections from UNESCO (UNESCO, 2016a), it is 
expected that primary participation rates will be around 70% in 2030 in low-income countries 
and that, at this rate of progress, low-income countries will not reach the target of universal 
primary completion before 2088. This shows that interventions aimed at improving education 
participation are still needed and understanding barriers to schooling in low-income countries 
is important.  
In order to improve education participation, governments can intervene to increase the supply 
of education services and/or the demand for these services. 
1.2.7.1 Supply-side interventions 
Governments attempt to ensure that schooling infrastructures are built and that everyone has 
access to a school. Building enough schools to cover a low density and scattered population 
can be costly and challenging for poor countries. For instance, in Senegal, capital spending 
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makes up about 15% of total education expenditures.2 However making sure that children are 
close enough to a school is a necessary condition for their enrolment. Governments are not 
necessarily responsible for the construction of schools. Communities or even private or 
charitable funding can be used but when schools are lacking in poor communities the 
government has a duty to address this gap.   
Another supply-side intervention is to recruit and train more teachers. More teachers can be 
deployed in areas where they are lacking or help to reduce class sizes in other areas. In both 
cases, more teachers are likely to improve educational outcomes by either extending the 
educational services or improving the quality of education.  
There are several other interventions that can increase the supply of education services and the 
coverage of population that has access to them. For instance, better roads or public transport 
can help students who live in remote areas to access distant schools. The creation of boarding 
schools or even mobile schools for pastoralist communities can also help mobile populations 
or populations living in very remote areas to access education services. In all cases, the 
assumptions behind those policies is that a lack of physical access to school is the main barrier 
to schooling. This still appears to be the case in Senegal and this thesis will consider supply 
and demand for schooling, but one argument of this thesis is that the main binding constraint 
to raising educational attainment in Senegal is on the demand side.   
1.2.7.2 Demand-side interventions 
Demand-side interventions assume that schooling participation is insufficient because demand 
for it is too low or constrained. Demand for education can be too low because of social norms, 
which for instance prevent girls from being educated, or too low returns from education, either 
real or perceived, compared to its costs.  
Non-governmental organizations and governments often run campaigns to promote children’s 
education, notably girl’s education, with the aim that it will change social norms. Social norms 
are a powerful barrier preventing children from going to school but they will not be the main 
emphasis of this thesis, which will focus on economic barriers to schooling.  
 
2 Data accessed the 01/06/2018 from the UNESCO website: http://uis.unesco.org/ 
 11 
Interventions that aim to reduce economic barriers usually try to reduce the direct costs and 
opportunity costs of education and/or to make it more valuable. One such policy is the removal 
of user fees that has been implemented, at least at primary level, in most countries in the world. 
For students at the secondary and tertiary level, scholarships and bursaries can be a good way 
to alleviate the costs of schooling for poor students.  However, the cost of education is not 
limited to the financial cost to families and policies that would reduce the opportunity cost of 
time of children, such as banning child labour or agricultural mechanization, may also help 
reduce economic barriers to schooling.  
Improving the quality of schooling might also be a good way to boost demand if families 
perceive that education is not worth it because of its low quality. Moreover, improving quality 
may help reduce grade repetitions that can be seen as a bad signal by parents and lead to drop-
outs (Pierre, 2009). Even if the quality of schooling is good, parents may be reluctant to send 
their children to school if they perceive that returns to education are low. Policies that foster 
economic opportunities for skilled labour can then help increase the demand for education. 
This is particularly true for girls’ education, which is sometimes seen as a waste of time given 
limited opportunities for women in the job market in developing countries.  
Another possibility is that the demand for education is low because families are financially 
constrained and are unable to borrow to fund their children’s education. In this case, poverty 
prevents households from investing in the future of their children with the risk that the next 
generation will remain poor. Reducing financial constraints might be a good strategy to break 
this poverty trap. This is one of the goals of cash transfers that could be effective in increasing 
the demand for education if families are financially constrained. Cash transfers are sometimes 
coupled with a condition that children should attend school, which should in theory make them 
more effective at raising schooling but may fail to help the poorest households for whom the 
cash transfer is not sufficient.  
1.3 The Senegalese context 
 Overview 
Senegal is a western African country with 14.7 million inhabitants in an area of 196,722 km2 
bordered by Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. The capital city of 
Senegal, Dakar, is the main urban centre with 3 million inhabitants (CIA, 2018). The climate 
is tropical with a dry season lasting nine months and a humid season of three months. Rainfall 
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is moderate in the north of the country (about 600mm) but is much higher in the south (about 
1500mm) (Le Borgne, 1988). 
 History 
Senegal is a former French colony and became independent in 1960. After independence 
Senegal was run by socialists under a presidential regime for 40 years. In 2000, the election of 
a liberal, Abdoulaye Wade, was the first political change in Senegal. Since the introduction of 
multipartism in 1974, Senegal has been considered a democratic and stable state. For instance 
the Polity IV score for Senegal is eight, one of the highest scores in Africa (Polity IV, 2008).3 
Senegal is one of the most peaceful countries in West Africa despite some tensions near the 
north and south borders. In the south, the Casamance region has experienced a separatist 
rebellion since 1982 which has led to about 1,000 deaths (El Yessa, 2009). In the north, 
Mauritania and Senegal had a dispute over grazing rights in 1989. This led to two years of 
tensions and most of the Mauritanians living in Senegal were expelled while 70,000 black 
southern Mauritanians were forced into exile in Senegal because of their supposed link with 
Senegal. 20,000 of them are still living in the north of Senegal (El Yessa, 2009), notably in the 
area where the data used in this thesis have been collected.  
 Economic indicators 
Senegal is classified as a least developed country by the United Nations.4 With a Human 
Development Index of 0.49 in 2015, Senegal is ranked 162 out of 188 countries in terms of 
human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). In 2011, it was 
estimated that 38%5 of the population live on less than US$1.90 per day. However, the 
economic situation has been improving over recent years. Since 2000, GNI per capita in 
purchasing power parity has increased from US$1,490 to US$2,480 in 2016.5 
Senegal has very few mineral and oil resources. The main industries are tourism, fishing and 
the cultivation of groundnuts. The agricultural sector employs 53% of the labour force6 but it 
 
3  Countries are ranked on a scale of -10 to 10. -10 describes a full autocracy and 10 a full democracy. 
4 UNDP: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldcs-at-a-glance.html  
5 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=SN  
6 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. 2017.  
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represents only 17% of GDP.7 The industrial sector represents 23% of GDP;8 the industries are 
mainly located around Dakar and Thiès. Finally, migrant remittances are very important in 
Senegal; in fact, they are higher than foreign aid. In 2016, it was estimated that they represented 
13.7% of GDP9 whereas ODA made up 5.2% of the GNI the same year.10  
 Population 
1.3.4.1 Indicators 
Senegal has a young and rapidly growing population. More than half of the population lives in 
rural areas but more and more people over time are migrating to urban centres. Thus, the share 
of the population living in rural areas has decreased from 57% in 2008 to 53% in 2018.11 The 
fertility rate is 4.8 children per woman and 41% of the population is younger than 14. At 56 
years, life expectancy is relatively high by African standards but the infant mortality rate 
remains high with 95 deaths per 1,000 live births.5 The high fertility rate puts pressure on the 
education system which has to expand rapidly. For instance, it is estimated that the share of the 
population aged between five and nineteen has increased from 3.9 million in 2000 to 5.6 million 
in 2015.12 The high fertility rate is notably due to a low use of contraception; only 12% of 
women use modern contraception.13 Lack of access, notably for younger women, plays a role 
with 19% of young married women having unmet need for contraception (Sidze et al., 2014). 
Also, very few women have the final say in their contraception use with only 6% of them who 
report making the decision about contraception alone, while husbands make the decision for 
them in 80% of cases (Sougou et al., 2020). It has been shown in other contexts that that the 
demand for contraception is different for women and men, with women less likely to use 
contraception when their husband is involved (Ashraf et al., 2014), and the fact that most 
women in Senegal cannot chose their contraception use freely probably partly explains high 
fertility rates.  
 
7 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=SN     
8 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=SN  
9 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SN  
10 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS?locations=SN  
11 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=SN 
12 Source of figures: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2017. 
13 World Bank development indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONM.ZS  
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1.3.4.2 Languages and ethnicity 
There are about 20 different ethnic groups in Senegal. People from the same ethnic group share 
the same language, family names and habits and they usually live in the same area. For instance, 
Wolof people, the main ethnic group representing 45% of the population, are more prevalent 
in Dakar and in the centre west of Senegal. Fula people (about 25% of the population) usually 
live in the north whereas Serer people (about 15% of the population) live in the centre. 
Nonetheless, it is common to find more than one ethnic group living in the same community 
and inter-ethnic unions are common. The Wolof language is often used as a bridge language 
between different ethnic groups. 
1.3.4.3 Polygyny14 
Senegal has one of the highest polygyny rates in West Africa. Half of the women live in a 
polygynous union. Polygynous unions are accepted by Islam and they are legal. In Senegal, 
husbands and co-wives usually live together. Islam allows men to have up to four wives but, 
because of levirate, a custom whereby a widow marries her late husband’s brother, some men 
may have more wives (Garenne and Van de Walle, 1989). Polygyny is more common in rural 
areas and tends to be less accepted by young and educated people. Because of polygyny, 
women tend to marry earlier than men and few of them are single after the age of 25. For 
instance, in my dataset, less than 2% of men have ever been married at the age of 20 whereas 
more than 40% of women are already married. At the age of 30, the figure is 50% for men and 
95% for women. 
1.3.4.4 Polygyny and fertility 
Because of early unions and levirate, women tend then to be in a marital relationship during 
most of their adult lives. This leads to a high exposure to childbearing risks and to potentially 
high fertility. Nonetheless, studies have concluded that fertility is lower for women in 
polygynous unions than in monogamous unions. Indeed, preferences of husbands for a specific 
wife may lead to lower frequency of sexual intercourse with his other wives, and thus to lower 
fertility. However, polygyny has a positive impact on fertility because spreading the high 
 
14 Polygamy is the general term than can apply to the case of a woman having more than one husband (also 
referred as polyandry) or to the case of a man having more than one wife (polygyny). As in Senegal, polygamy 
is restricted to men having more than one wife, I use the term polygyny in this thesis.   
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childbearing risks over more wives prevails over the lower fertility of wives in polygynous 
unions (Lardoux and Van de Walle, 2003). 
1.3.4.5 Polygyny and wealth 
Larger families are seen as a resource in Senegal, especially in rural areas where households 
depend on family labour for agricultural work. Larger families provide more security and 
greater support to dependant household members. To marry another wife may then be seen as 
a strategy to increase the wealth of the household. Nevertheless, since men usually pay a bride 
price,15 only richer men can afford to have an extra wife. Wealth is, then, both a determinant 
and an outcome of polygyny (Lardoux and Van de Walle, 2003). 
 Religion 
Senegal is officially a secular State. Islam is the dominant religion in Senegal accounting for 
about 96% of the population (CIA, 2018). Islam was introduced into Senegal as early as the 
11th century and massive conversion took place in the 19th century during the war against the 
French colonizer. In Senegal, Islam is organised around brotherhoods headed by a religious 
leader (khalifa). There are three main brotherhoods: Tijanyyah (49% of the population), 
Muridiyyah (32%) and Qadiriyyah (9%), the remainder of the population being from another 
Muslim brotherhoods (6%) or Christian (4%) (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la 
Démographie, 2008b). Muridism is the most politically and economically active brotherhood 
and is mainly present in urban centres and among Wolof speakers. Tijanis are found throughout 
Senegal but they are more present in rural areas and in the north of Senegal. Brotherhoods are 
known to have links with political power, and affiliation to a brotherhood may influence 
employment opportunities, political views or even migration opportunities of an individual. 
The rest of the Senegalese population are mainly Catholic and are found in Casamance (south-
west of Senegal). 
 
15 The bride price is as an amount of money or other form of wealth paid by a groom or his family to the parents 
of the woman he is about to marry Dalton (1966).   
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1.3.5.1 Koranic schools 
Since the public education system does not teach religion, Islam is taught in Koranic schools.16 
According to André & Demonsant (2009), Koranic schooling may start at the age of three to 
five. Students, called Talibés, are then taught part of the Koran by heart. The most successful 
students may proceed to the secondary level where they are taught “Islamic Science” and then 
some of them may enter Islamic universities. The purpose of Koranic schools is to train 
children to be good Muslims by transmitting them values of obedience, respect and submission. 
Koranic schools are run by an Islamic master called “Marabout”. Most of the Talibés live with 
their parents and, in some cases, they may even attend a formal school and restrict their Koranic 
studies to school holidays. Nonetheless, some parents foster their children to a Marabout 
because it is believed that children learn more when they are far away from home. In this case, 
since Koranic schools usually charge tuition fees, students have to beg for food and money to 
pay for their living. Many abuses have been reported by children’s rights organisations, and 
UNICEF estimates that 100,000 children beg in the streets in Senegal, most of them being 
malnourished and in poor health.17 
It is not known precisely how many children attend this type of school. André & Demonsant 
(2009) note that 60% of boys and 50% of girls have ever enrolled in a Koranic school in 
Senegal. Most of them attended for less than three years. 
 Formal Education 
Despite the fact that only a small part of the population speaks French in their daily life, the 
sole language of instruction at school is French.18 In 1991, a law was passed to make education 
compulsory and free for children between the ages of seven up to 12.19 In 2004, the age interval 
 
16 There are some private schools called “franco-arabe” that include Islam in their teaching. Nonetheless, this 
type of school is very rare and no child in my dataset attends a private school. 
17 UNICEF website: https://www.unicef.org/protection/senegal_34961.html  
18 The Ministry of Education plans to introduce ethnic languages in the curriculum (PASEC, 2009). 
19 Loi 91-22 du 16 février 1991 
http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/7e634d754261abefab501f386836f84bb36fcaa4.pdf  
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was extended to six to 16.20 Nevertheless, this law is not strictly enforced and states that this 
obligation is not binding if there is no public school available in the area. 
Pre-primary schools are still very rare in Senegal and usually children enter school at the age 
of six or later. The education system is divided into three layers (PASEC, 2009): 
• The first layer is called “école primaire” (primary school) and lasts for six years, 
theoretically from the age of six21 to the age of 12.  
• The second layer is called “collège” (lower secondary). Students enter it at the age of 
12 and finish it at the age of 16. 
• Finally, the third layer is called “lycées” (upper secondary) and lasts for three years. 
At the end of every layer, students have to pass an examination in order to enter the next layer. 
The final exam at the end of “lycées” is called “baccalauréat” (A-level) and this is required to 
enter a university. Public schools are tuition free until the end of lower secondary in contrast 
to Koranic schools; however, parents have to pay for schooling materials22 and transportation 
costs and families may be asked to provide a financial contribution to the school from the 
community although schools are not normally allowed to charge those fees (Kattan and 
Burnett, 2004). Since there are few secondary schools in Senegal and they are concentrated in 
the main urban centres, households living in rural areas are sometimes obliged to pay high 
transport costs or to foster their children if they want them to pursue their education. 
Primary schools are usually open from eight the morning to four the afternoon, Monday to 
Friday, and students have a one and a half hour lunch break, making it possible for students to 
travel to and from school during daylight all year. At middle school and high school, the 
timetable may vary depending on classes and students may finish school at six or seven, which 
can make returning from school in the dark more dangerous, especially for girls.    
 
20 Loi 2004-37 du 15 décembre 2004 : 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/75283/78245/F1277535961/SEN-75283.pdf   
21 Children who start school at a later age need to start in grade one and should progress at the same pace as 
other children.   
22 Schooling material includes pencils and exercise books. Books are normally provided by the school but they 
are often missing and parents may have to buy them. 
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About 13% of students attend a private school in Senegal (PASEC, 2009) and almost all the 
private schools are located in urban areas. 
1.3.6.1 Education indicators 
In 2000, in the framework of the MDGs, Senegal made the commitment to reach universal 
completion of primary school education by 2015. With a primary completion rate of 58.7% in 
2015, Senegal was a long way from achieving this target. However, new commitments have 
been made in the framework of the SDGs to achieve universal education by 2030. Despite 
failing to achieve the MDG target Senegal has more than doubled its spending on education 
since 2000; public spending on education represents 7.1% of the GDP in 2015, whereas they 
represented 3.2% of the GDP in 2000.23 However, despite the government’s commitment and 
an increase in the primary completion rate from 39% in 2000 to 59% in 2016, Senegal is not 
on track to achieve universal primary education by 2030. Actually, the rate of progress has 
slowed down considerably and the primary completion rate has only increased by two 
percentage points since 2008. The main reason for the failure to complete primary school is 
dropping out rather than a failure to enter the school system. Indeed, even though the gross 
intake ratio in the first grade of primary school has been more than 95% since 2006, meaning 
than almost all children enter primary school, only 62% of those who have started school 
eventually reach the last grade of primary school. 
Enrolment rates are much lower at the secondary level and the gross rate of enrolment at the 
secondary level has not increased as rapidly as at the primary level for the last 40 years (see 
Figure 1-4) reaching 48% in 2016. One reason for this poor performance is the relatively low 
number of students who have completed primary school who manage to transition to secondary 
school. The transition rate to lower secondary school progressed rapidly from 65% in 2005 to 
95% in 2010, before dropping again to 77% in 2015. Changes in the transition rate closely 
match changes in the success rate in a national exam that students need to pass to enter lower 
secondary school (53% in 2006, 94% in 2010 and 70% in 2015) showing that lack of eligibility 
in secondary school remains a barrier (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 
2018). Moreover, even for students who have passed the exam, insufficient education offer 
might still be a constraint. At the secondary level, despite huge efforts by the Senegalese 
 
23 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=SN  
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government, which doubled the number of secondary teachers between 2000 and 2005, the 
offer of education remains insufficient, especially in rural areas. In my dataset, discussed in 
chapter three, 23% of the children live 10 kilometres or more from a lower middle school and 
78% 10 kilometres or more from an upper secondary school. This situation is worsened by the 
fact that the cost of education increases at this level since parents usually have to pay for 
schoolbooks. 
 
Figure 1-4 Primary and secondary gross enrolment in Senegal 
 
1.3.6.2 Gender disparities 
Female education has risen much faster than male education. In 2016, there were 112 girls per 
100 boys at the primary level, whereas there were 87 per 100 boys in 2000. Similarly, at the 
secondary level the gender parity index went from 65 girls for 100 boys in 2000 to 101 girls 
for 100 boys in 2016. It is interesting to note that this primary school level gender parity index 
varies considerably from one region to another as shown in Figure 1-5. 
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Figure 1-5: Gender parity index at primary school level in Senegalese regions (girls per 100 
boys) 
Thus, the north-east regions of Senegal favour girls over boys whereas the south of the country 
follows an opposite pattern. The two regions where the ratio is above 130 correspond to 
religious centres of the two main brotherhoods (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la 
Démographie, 2008a). It could be due to the fact that families favour Koranic schooling for 
their sons in these regions and shows that religious preferences might be a factor in the demand 
for schooling.  
1.3.6.3 Quality 
The quality of education is low in Senegal according to Western standards but Senegal is 
slightly above the African average. Thus, in a survey by PASEC and Confemen (2009) on the 
French skills of 5th grade students, Senegalese students obtained an average of 42/100 whereas 
the average of 11 other African French speaking countries was 39.5. 24,25 Likewise, the 
proportion able to read and write after six years of schooling is 69.1% in Senegal, which is 
slightly lower than the French-speaking African country average of 72% and is still very low 
 
24Countries included are Mauritania, Chad, Benin, Cameroon, Madagascar, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Congo, 
Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Comoros. The range of the scores is [21.2; 61.3]. 
25Five French schools were surveyed with similar tests. The average was 80. 
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compared to developed countries where the proportion is close to 100% (Pôle de Dakar, 2010). 
Moreover, the repetition rate is high in Senegal: about 12% of students repeat every year. Thus, 
at the beginning of the 5th grade more than 50% of students have repeated at least once. This 
high rate is not uncommon for French speaking African countries but it is costly for the 
government and households and it increases the likelihood of quitting school (Pierre, 2009). 
The low quality of education in Senegal may be due to the difficulty of teaching French to 
children who are not native speakers (only 5% of children speak French at home (PASEC, 
2009). Indeed, despite the fact that some teachers are able to communicate in the local 
language, French remains the language of instruction and the curriculum and text books are all 
in French. Moreover, the government fails to provide text books to all the children and to 
reduce class size: 40% of students do not have a French text book in 5th grade and there is an 
average of 51 students per teacher (PASEC, 2009). 
1.4 Aims of the thesis and structure 
 Aims of the thesis 
This thesis aims to shed light on the decisions made by families to provide a formal26 education 
for their children in Senegal. The thesis will notably explore socio-economic determinants of 
the household demand for schooling, such as gender, household’s wealth and parental 
education and estimate what factors may limit schooling. Moreover, given the complexity of 
family structure in Senegal, where men are often married and live with more than one wife, 
one aim of this thesis is also to explore how these living arrangements may impact children’s 
education, notably by studying intra-household allocation in polygynous households. The 
ambition of this research is to provide a better understanding of barriers to schooling in Senegal 
by focusing on decisions made at the household level. 
 Thesis structure 
In the second chapter, I will review the current literature on determinants of schooling in 
African countries and Senegal. As this thesis uses primary data that I helped collected in the 
north of Senegal, I will then describe in the third chapter the data collection process, data 
quality and the survey area. Chapter Four will develop a theoretical model of the household 
 
26 Decisions regarding Koranic schooling are not part of the focus of the thesis.  
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demand for schooling, based on the findings of the literature review, and test this model 
empirically. Chapter Five will review extensively the relationship between parental education 
and schooling and, notably, the relative importance of mother’s and father’s education on a 
child’s achievement. To do so, I compile the findings on parental education in African countries 
and assess the relative weights of mother’s and father’s education. I then replicate with my data 
the findings of a paper on parental education in Senegal. Chapter Six explores the issues of 
intra-household bargaining in polygynous households. It tests if decisions regarding children’s 
schooling can best be described by a unitary model, where the household can be seen as a single 
economic entity, or by a collective model where wives in the household act like separate 
economic entities. Chapter Seven summarises the findings and concludes the thesis.    
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Chapter 2: Literature review
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2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the literature on the microeconomic determinants of schooling. Since 
my thesis explores the determinants of schooling in rural Senegal, I focus this literature review 
on papers dealing with a similar context. All the empirical papers are based on data from 
developing countries and, in most cases, from an African country. Thus, the reviewed literature 
includes issues that are closely linked to the Senegalese context, such as child labour, access 
to primary school or gender norms. Indeed, in richer countries, unlike in Senegal, access to 
primary school is usually not a prevailing issue; instead, the literature from developed countries 
focuses more on high school dropouts or access to university and the findings cannot be easily 
transposed to the Senegalese context.  
In the section 2.2, I introduce the conceptual economic framework used by economists to 
explain investment in schooling and I go through the different factors that may explain 
investment in schooling and the findings in the literature. In section 2.3, I look in detail at the 
different published studies that explore the determinants of schooling in the Senegalese context 
and I discuss the similarities and differences compared to studies from other African countries. 
In section 2.4, I discuss the methodology used in the literature to estimate the determinants of 
schooling, notably the choice of indicators and the statistical models used. I conclude with a 
tabular review summarizing the findings and methodology of the key papers reviewed in this 
chapter in Appendix 2.1. 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
In a traditional economic framework, education is often considered as an investment and 
parents, caregivers or grown-up children are expected to make rational decisions about the 
decision to invest in schooling. Hence decisions about schooling are considered to be the result 
of a comparison between direct and indirect costs of schooling and expected benefits of 
education (Becker, 1994). Assuming no financial constraint, the decision to invest in schooling 
will be made when the net present value of investing in schooling is positive, that is to say 
when the discounted value of the additional productivity due to schooling is superior to the 
discounted costs of schooling. In this framework, policies that decrease the cost of schooling 
and/or increase its expected benefits are expected to increase schooling participation. This 
model is a good starting point to understand determinants of schooling decisions at the 
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household level and this section details the different determinants of the costs and benefits of 
schooling and what the findings are in the literature.  
 Factors affecting the demand for schooling 
2.2.1.1 Tuition fees and schooling costs 
Direct costs of schooling include tuition fees and other fees related to schooling, such as the 
purchase of schooling materials, transportation costs or accommodation and additional money 
needed to have children eating outside the household. In Africa, nowadays, most governments 
try to reduce direct costs of schooling by abolishing tuition fees in public schools, particularly 
at the primary school level (Tomasevski, 2006). However, families usually still must pay fees 
for uniforms or textbooks or make an informal financial contribution to the school. Some of 
these fees should not be charged but are still collected by schools and communities, and 
sometimes fees are paid because the government fails to provide school material or textbooks 
(Kattan and Burnett, 2004). 
According to a study of 15 African countries, education expenditures make up on average 4.2% 
of total household spending (Foko et al., 2012). Tuition fees make up more than half of 
education spending and the share of education spending is on average twice more for 
households in the richest quintile compared to those in the poorest quintile, suggesting that 
education is a superior good or that poor households are financially constrained. Direct costs 
usually increase at middle school (that is usually from age 13) since parents have to pay for 
textbooks, higher transportation costs and sometimes tuition fees and the same study estimates 
that the cost of enrolment for families is 4.8 and 8.7 times greater for children enrolled in lower 
secondary school and upper secondary school respectively compared to children enrolled in 
primary school. Senegal was not included in the study and figures cannot be easily compared, 
but evidence tends to show that Senegalese households contribute less to education than other 
African households. Thus, according to a study of the Senegalese statistical institute (2013), 
Senegalese households spend on average 2.4% of their household expenditure on education, 
with considerable variation between households living in the capital city Dakar (4.5%) and 
households living in rural areas (0.6%). Indeed, in Senegal, school fees have been abolished 
for the first ten years of education, which consists of six years of schooling at the primary level 
and four years at the lower middle level, and there are normally no fees asked for uniforms or 
textbooks.   
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Direct costs of education may not be a substantial share of household expenditures, but they 
may become a barrier to education for poor households, households with a large number of 
children and/or households with seasonal incomes and lacking cash when they have to buy 
school materials or pay school fees. Evidence on the effects of reducing direct costs of 
schooling in poor countries tends to show that reducing costs to education usually raises the 
amount of schooling children receive, especially when school participation rates are low and 
direct costs relatively high. In Uganda, Malawi, Lesotho and Kenya, important increases in 
school enrolments followed the abolition of school fees (Grogan, 2009). However, these 
increases also included teenagers and adults who may have enrolled following the fee abolition 
and the change in enrolment before and after tuition fee removal may not be a good estimate 
of the causal impact of this policy. 
There are only a few studies that aim to rigorously measure the impact of fee abolition in 
developing countries. Among them, Deininger (2003) finds that enrolment increased in Uganda 
after the removal of schooling fees but the quality of schooling decreased. Grogan (2009) uses 
a regression discontinuity method, comparing children who were just below nine years old and 
just above nine years old when Uganda abolished schooling fees and finds that it led to an 
increase of 3% in the probability of children starting at age nine. Lucas and Mbiti (2012) 
estimate the causal impact of free primary education in Kenya using variation in pre-program 
dropout rates. They find that free primary education led to an increase in the number of students 
taking the final primary school exam and a decrease in test scores, which they attribute to 
student composition and peer effects rather than to a deterioration of teaching quality. Using 
the staggered implementation of a tuition waiver program for girls to construct a plausible 
counterfactual, a recent study in Gambia, (Blimpo et al., 2016), finds an increase in access to 
secondary school for girls and boys and also improved English test scores. However, in South 
Africa, Borkum (2012) found that a school fee abolition program led to a modest increase in 
secondary enrolment among poor households but no substantial increase for richer households 
or at the primary level where school participation was already high and costs of schooling 
relatively low. Similarly, it was found that in Madagascar poor households are more sensitive 
to school costs than rich households (Glick and Sahn, 2006).  
There have also been three rigorous studies in Kenya estimating the impact of reducing direct 
schooling costs on school participation (Kremer et al., 2003, Evans et al., 2008, Duflo et al., 
2015). The studies estimate the impact of an education subsidy, notably providing free school 
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uniforms, on education, health and early pregnancy indicators. All three studies are randomised 
control trials and have strong internal validity; they find that schooling participation increases 
following the education subsidy. Thus, Duflo et al. (2015) find a three percentage points 
reduction in drop outs three years after the project and a three percentage points reduction in 
teenage pregnancies. Evans et al. (2008) find a 44% reduction in absenteeism and an increase 
of 0.25 standard deviations in test scores. Kremer et al. (2003) estimate that a policy like the 
program financed by a small increase in class size could increase years of schooling by 17% 
without affecting learning achievements.  
All these studies show that the direct costs of schooling are a real barrier to education in very 
poor countries and that enrolment can be improved with policies and programs that reduce 
these costs. Overall, the increase in school participation due to the reduction in school fees does 
not seem to lead to a decrease in schooling achievement. However, it is worth noting that the 
reported effects are often small and the elimination of direct costs of schooling does not seem 
sufficient to reach very high levels of school participation. 
2.2.1.2 Distance to school and provision of schooling 
Distance to school can also be considered as a direct cost of schooling. First, travelling a long 
distance can induce direct costs to pay for transportation and other associated costs such as the 
cost of eating away from home. Secondly, distance also induces indirect costs of schooling 
because of the opportunity cost of time of students travelling to school. Distance is found to be 
negatively associated with school attendance in Kenya (Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu, 2007) in 
Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994) in Tanzania for girls (Burke and Beegle, 2004) and 
Madagascar (Glick and Sahn, 2006) and the effects found tend to be relatively large. Also, 
travelling a large distance may not be physically possible for very young children and it is 
found that distance increases the risk of late entry to schooling in Tanzania (Bommier and 
Lambert, 2000). In his study of 21 poor countries using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) 
data, Filmer (2007) casts doubt on the fact that reducing distance to school could be a successful 
policy to increase school participation. His findings are that although distance influences 
school enrolment, the effect is small and a massive reduction in distance to school would not 
increase enrolment rates dramatically.  
However, these surveys do not correct for the potential endogeneity of distance and so it is 
uncertain if the effect of distance on education is causal or not. Indeed, parents who have high 
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preferences for education may be willing to move to areas where education availability is better 
or to foster their children to families who live closer to a school. Also, the spatial distribution 
of schools in a country is not random and communities with high preferences for education 
may be able to increase the local supply of schooling. In his study, Filmer (2007) uses panel 
data for three countries and finds that adding geographical fixed effects has a small and 
ambiguous effect on the estimated coefficient between distance and enrolment and concludes 
that cross-sectional estimates are not likely to underestimate the causal effect of distance on 
enrolment. 
One way to estimate the causal impact of distance would be to find a valid instrumental variable 
for distance, that is a variable that explains distance to school but that is not correlated with 
schooling investment, but I have not found any studies that use such an identification strategy 
to shed light on the causal impact of distance on school investment. Another way to estimate 
the causal impact of distance on schooling investment is to rely on the evaluation of the impacts 
of projects that aim to mitigate the effect of distance or to reduce distance by increasing school 
availability. For instance, Duflo (2001) uses an instrumental variable approach to estimate the 
impact of a school construction program in Indonesia in the 1970’s. The instrumental variable 
used is the interaction between the year of birth of the individual and the intensity of a school 
construction program in their region of birth. The rationale for this instrumental variable is that 
the interaction variable is exogenous after controlling for main effects. According to the results, 
there was an important impact of this school construction program on school enrolment and 
wages, suggesting that school availability was a barrier to schooling. In another study, 
Muralidharan and Prakash (2013) find that a program that gives bicycles to girls in India 
increases age-appropriate enrolment by 30%. In this study, endogeneity is controlled for with 
a triple difference estimator using communities not benefitting from the program and boys as 
controls to estimate the causal impact of the program. It is worth noting that this program was 
found to be more cost effective than a comparable cash transfer and the authors hypothesise 
that this is due to a positive externality of girls travelling in groups. In Afghanistan, the result 
from a program evaluation using a randomized control trial approach found that the 
construction of schools in villages where there were none increased formal enrolment by 42 
percentage points and test scores by 0.51 standard deviations and reduced gender disparity in 
enrolment by 21 percentage points, suggesting a very strong barrier to education due to distance 
especially for girls (Burde and Linden, 2013). Similarly, in Burkina Faso, another randomised 
control trial evaluating the effectiveness of the construction of girl friendly schools found an 
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increase in enrolment of 20 percentage points, the increase being five percentage points greater 
for girls than for boys, and an increase in tests scores of 0.45 standard deviations (Kazianga et 
al., 2013).  
The evidence on the link between distance and schooling investment is not conclusive as there 
is a lack of studies that focus on the impact of distance on schooling and distance to school is 
usually treated as a control variable and rarely as the main variable of interest. Evidence tends 
to suggest that girls are more impacted by distance than boys, but it is not clear if the impact 
of distance is large enough to justify large school construction programs. On the one hand, the 
results of programs that mitigate the impact of distance or increase school availability suggest 
that the impact of distance on enrolment is strong and that these programs are cost-effective, 
but it is likely that these programs were implemented in contexts where they were the most 
needed and their impact may not be easily transposed to other contexts. On the other hand, the 
large study of Filmer (2007) suggests that distance is not a major barrier to schooling, 
especially because of the relatively low number of children who are affected by living far away 
from a school, but the absence of a valid identification strategy casts doubt on the validity of 
his results.  
2.2.1.3 Opportunity cost of schooling 
Indirect costs of schooling, mainly the opportunity cost of schooling, are the second category 
of costs incurred by households. Children who are going to school are not able, or are less able, 
to contribute to household chores and/or to be engaged in productive labour. The opportunity 
cost of schooling is expected to vary according to the location, age and gender of children. 
Thus, the opportunity cost of schooling is expected to be greater among rural households that 
mainly rely on family labour. Also, since older children are more productive than younger 
children, the opportunity cost of schooling should increase with age. Moreover, according to 
traditional work performed by boys and girls in the household, the opportunity cost of 
schooling may have different determinants from one gender to another. For instance, if boys 
are expected to help in the fields their opportunity cost will be greater in rural households, 
whereas, if girls are expected to take care of children their opportunity cost of schooling will 
depend on the number of young children in the household. Access to basic services may also 
change the opportunity cost of schooling by increasing the efficiency of household chores 
production in the household. For example, access to tap water frees households from the need 
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to fetch water and access to electricity frees them from the need to collect firewood. For 
instance, Guarcello et al. (2004) analyse the impact of access to water and electricity on child 
labour and school attendance in rural and urban areas in Yemen, El Salvador, Morocco, 
Guatemala and Ghana. They match households with their closest neighbour to correct for the 
endogeneity of water and electricity access and find that water and electricity access decreases 
the likelihood of child labour and increases the likelihood of school attendance in all countries, 
with a stronger effect in rural areas and for young children. 
The opportunity cost of schooling cannot be measured directly but the literature on the impact 
of child labour on education shows that households consider the opportunity cost of schooling 
when deciding to send their children to school or not. Thus, Cockburn (2001) finds that child 
labour has a detrimental effect on education in rural Ethiopia, notably because there is no labour 
market for farm work. Similarly, following the introduction of an education subsidy, Ravallion 
and Wodon (2000) find that there is a substitution effect between schooling and child labour 
in Bangladesh. Ray and Lancaster (2004) provide compelling evidence that child labour 
negatively affects education in seven countries (Portugal, Sri Lanka, Panama, Belize, 
Cambodia, the Philippines and Namibia). They show that child labour is detrimental when it 
exceeds a certain threshold (about 12 hours a week in Sri Lanka for instance). The study uses 
household access to water and electricity as an instrument for child labour. However, the 
validity of the instrument can be questioned as water access can have a direct effect on child 
labour through the health status of children for instance.  
2.2.1.4 Expected benefits of education 
There is also ample evidence that families take into account the future benefits of schooling 
along with the costs when making schooling decisions. Benefits of education primarily include 
additional earnings that educated individuals can secure later in life. There can also be other 
potential monetary benefits of education for families in Senegal. Thus, Platteau and Gaspart 
(2007) have shown that, in rural Senegal, bride prices (that is the price paid by the family’s 
groom to the family bride for a marriage) are 42% higher for women who have some education 
compared to women with no education. There can also be non-monetary benefits of education 
that parents value, such as the fact that education tends to increase political participation 
(Kuenzi, 2006) or that educated individuals have better health outcomes (Conti et al., 2010). 
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One strategy for parents to increase the benefits of education is to invest more in children who 
can be expected to acquire more skills in school. For instance, Akresh et al. (2010) find that in 
Burkina Faso children with higher cognitive abilities are more likely than their siblings to be 
enrolled in school and less likely to be engaged in child labour. The authors correct for the 
potential endogeneity of cognitive abilities by using rain shocks when children were in utero. 
The fact that parents invest more in children with greater ability might also be one of the 
reasons why better child health is usually found to increase schooling (Glewwe and Miguel, 
2007, Field et al., 2009, Schultz, 1999).  
Families are also sensitive to the perceived quality of the schools where they send their children 
and when school quality is perceived to be higher, there is more investment in schooling. Thus, 
Glick and Sahn (2006) find that in Madagascar poor school quality measured in terms of the 
student-teacher ratio, building condition and the use of multigrade27 teaching, decreases the 
demand for schooling. School quality can also have an indirect effect on school participation. 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) find that enrolment in middle school in Ghana is not explained by 
school quality measured in terms of school characteristics but that reading and mathematics 
test score results are affected by school quality and that better test scores allow children to stay 
in school longer. However, these studies do not correct for the potential endogeneity bias 
stemming from the fact that families can have an impact on school quality through their 
political actions or choice of residence. Case and Deaton (1999) use the fact that in South 
Africa black households had little control on the place they could live and on funding decisions 
in education to estimate the causal impact of class sizes on educational outcomes. They find a 
strong effect of school quality, measured by the pupil-teacher ratio, on enrolment, educational 
achievement and test scores.  
Interestingly, there is some evidence that returns to education are underestimated by parents 
and students and that this may explain why schooling participation is low in some countries 
despite high returns to education. Two studies using experimental designs find that providing 
information on returns to education to students and families raises schooling participation. 
Jensen (2010) finds that in the Dominican Republic the perceived returns to secondary 
schooling are low and that students who are given information about the true returns to 
 
27 Multigrade teaching is the case when the same teacher teaches different grades at the same time, usually in the 
same classroom.  
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secondary schooling complete 0.20-0.35 more years of education. In another study, Nguyen 
(2008) provides statistics on the average earnings for different educational levels to parents 
and students in Madagascar. In schools assigned to the treatment, test scores increased by 0.2 
standard deviations and attendance by 3.5 percentage points, suggesting that families increased 
their investment in education after having received the information.  
 Factors shifting the household demand for schooling 
Costs and benefits have a direct effect on the demand for schooling. There are also several 
factors that do not directly impact the costs and benefits of schooling but can shift the demand 
for schooling through their effect on household preferences for education.  
2.2.2.1 Household income 
If direct and indirect costs of schooling are greater than the perceived benefits of schooling, 
households will be unwilling to send their children to school. Nevertheless, even if households 
consider that the benefits of schooling are greater than the costs, they may still be unable to 
send their children to school because of the lack of access to financial markets. In this case, 
poorer households may face a greater barrier to schooling as they are more likely to be 
financially constrained. Thus, the relationship between schooling and household income can 
be expected to be non-linear, with the effect of income being greater for poor households. This 
non-linearity may, as well, stem from the fact that child labour tends to be more common 
among households below the subsistence level because they are forced to make their children 
work, whereas, if their income is above the subsistence level, parents may stop making their 
children work or decide their amount of work in accordance with their preferences for 
children’s leisure and schooling (Basu and Van, 1998). 
A household’s income is usually measured as household expenditures and it appears in the 
regression in logged form. The rationale for using a logarithmic function to transform 
expenditures is to consider the non-linear relationship between income and investment in 
schooling. There are several reasons for using expenditures instead of income. First, in 
developing countries, income often comes from farming and is highly seasonal and surveys 
would need to have a long recall period to be able to measure annual income precisely, which 
can be an issue as measurement error may increase with long recall periods. Secondly, self-
employment, usually in the informal sector, is widespread in developing countries and it is 
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difficult to measure precisely income coming from self-employment, especially when it can be 
mixed with personal consumption (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). In published studies, a 
household’s per capita expenditure is generally found to have a positive impact on school 
participation in various African countries: Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994, Canagarajah and 
Coulombe, 1997), Cote d’Ivoire (Tansel, 1997, Grootaert, 1999), Guinea (Glick and Sahn, 
2000), Madagascar (Glick and Sahn, 2006), Zambia (Nielsen, 2001), Tanzania (Bommier and 
Lambert, 2000, Burke and Beegle, 2004), Uganda (Deininger, 2003) and Kenya (Kabubo-
Mariara and Mwabu, 2007). In some surveys, household expenditures is not available and, in 
this case, it is common to use a proxy for income based on household asset ownership (Filmer 
and Pritchett, 2001). The relationship between income and school participation is not affected 
by the way income is measured and similar results are found in studies using an asset-based 
indicator in Nigeria (Lincove, 2009) and in Ghana (Blunch and Verner, 2001). It is worth 
noting that some studies find a greater elasticity with respect to household income for girls’ 
schooling than for boys (Glick and Sahn, 2000, Lincove, 2009), suggesting a preference for 
educating boys in households that are financially constrained. 
One potential issue with household income as an explanatory variable is that results can be 
biased due to endogeneity. One potential source of endogeneity is measurement error in the 
measure of a households’ expenditures. This source of endogeneity will tend to bias 
coefficients toward zero. Another potential source of endogeneity is the fact that households 
who decide to send their children to school lose the potential earnings of children. This is a 
case of reverse causality and it would also tend to bias the coefficient associated with 
households’ expenditures downward. Finally, the endogeneity of households’ expenditures 
might also come from omitted variables as richer households might have different 
characteristics than poorer households. For instance, rich parents might have better cognitive 
abilities, be more conscientious or have more human capital. As long as these variables are 
correlated with the household’s expenditures and schooling investment, this will lead to a 
correlation between the error term and household expenditures and bias the coefficient 
associated with household expenditures. The potential omitted variables that could explain this 
endogeneity bias are more likely to be positively correlated with household expenditures and 
investment in schooling and, therefore, the coefficient associated with household expenditures 
is likely to be biased upwards. Only two of the published studies explicitly explore the potential 
endogeneity of household expenditures. Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) cannot reject the 
exogeneity of household expenditures in Ghana. Tansel (1997) finds that in Ghana and Côte 
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d’Ivoire correcting for endogeneity, using business assets, value of land, unearned income of 
the household and dowry as instrumental variables, decreases the coefficient associated with 
household expenditures implying an upward endogeneity bias.  
Another way of estimating the link between a family’s income and schooling investment is to 
look at the impacts on education of programs that give cash to families unconditionally. These 
programs give money to households but do not require households to comply with specific 
conditions to receive the grants. They are therefore good experiments to estimate the effect of 
household income on school investment. In their systematic review of the effectiveness of 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers, Baird et al. (2013) estimate the pooled odds ratio 
of eight unconditional cash transfer programs on enrolment to be 1.23, that is a 23% increase 
in the odds of being enrolled, and 1.42 for the five programs reporting on attendance and no 
effect on test scores for the three programs reporting on this indicator. Studies included come 
from South Africa, Brazil, Malawi, Kenya, Morocco, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso. The 
average amount of transfer varied from 1.58% of household income in Burkina Faso to 100% 
in a program in South Africa. Interestingly, the impact of a program was not correlated with 
the size of the grant; however, because of the small sample size of programs and different 
contexts it is hard to draw any conclusion from this absence of correlation. 
Although a positive impact of a household’s income on schooling is often interpreted in 
published studies as a financial constraint for poor households, it is important to note that there 
are alternative interpretations. One is that richer households are able to access assets and 
services that reduce the time dedicated to household chores and therefore reduce the 
opportunity cost of sending children to school. For instance, fetching water can take a 
considerable amount of time and access to tap water frees up this time. There are also other 
indirect effects of household wealth on school participation. Richer households generally have 
access to cleaner water, better nutrition and health care, which will have an impact on the health 
and cognitive development of children and ultimately on the amount of schooling they get.  
2.2.2.2 Parental education 
Parental education is often found to have a positive impact on the demand for schooling. The 
education of parents may increase children’s education through several channels. First, 
education may shape parents’ preferences for education and increases the value that parents 
put on their children being educated. Also, education may improve parents’ efficiency to 
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educate their children. Hence, more educated parents may help their children and decrease the 
probability of schooling failure. Education should then improve school retention. Finally, if 
education improves women’s autonomy and if women have a greater preference for children’s 
education, then the mother’s schooling should have a relatively greater impact than father’s 
education. The literature in Africa usually finds that greater parental education is associated 
with more investment in schooling, but it is unclear on the relative importance of mother’s and 
father’s schooling. Studies in Nigeria (Lincove, 2009) and Ghana (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 
1997) find a stronger effect for mother’s schooling and a study in Kenya (Kabubo-Mariara and 
Mwabu, 2007) finds a greater impact of father’s schooling. A common pattern found across 
Africa is that mother’s schooling is more important for girls and father’s schooling more 
important for boys (Glick and Sahn, 2000, Burke and Beegle, 2004). It may be consistent with 
the assumption that schooling increases bargaining power in the household and that women 
have a greater preference for girls’ education than men (Behrman, 1997).  
2.2.2.3 Norms and preferences 
This simple framework can be extended to understand other important determinants of 
schooling. Culture and norms interact with decisions on schooling as they can modify the 
perceived costs and benefits of education. For instance, deciding to send girls to school may 
not be a good investment in cultures in which women are not expected to enter the labour 
market. Norms can also influence the type of household chores children are supposed to do and 
then have an impact on the opportunity cost of sending these children to school.   
2.2.2.4 Gender 
In Africa, girls usually receive less schooling than boys, although the gap is slowly closing. 
Thus, the difference in primary completion rates between girls and boys has been reduced from 
15 percentage points in 2005 to 4 percentage points in 2015.28 There are many reasons why 
boys may be favoured over girls. In many traditional societies, when girls marry, they leave 
the household and move in with their husband’s family. They control a smaller share of income 
than males and tend to have fewer opportunities in the labour market and they are not expected 
to support their own family after they marry. Thus, investing in the education of girls may be 
 
28 Source: World Inequality Database on Education (WIDE). UNESCO. https://www.education-inequalities.org/  
Accessed 05/02/2018.  
 36 
seen as a loss; parents may prefer to invest in boys who should provide a better return on 
investment and it is usually found that households invest more in the schooling of boys (Lloyd 
and Gage-Brandon, 1994, Garg and Morduch, 1998, Morduch, 2000).  
Girls can also face more barriers than boys in accessing schooling. For instance, as we have 
seen, they are usually more sensitive than boys to the distance to school as safety when 
travelling to school is a greater issue for them. Gender norms may also prevent them from 
travelling alone outside their neighbourhood. They are also more likely to be affected by the 
presence of young children in the household as they are often expected to help with childcare. 
Most of the published studies look at the determinants of schooling separately for boys and 
girls to take these differences into account. Studies that specifically estimate the difference 
between girls and boys usually find that in African countries households favour boys and that 
the gender preference is greater when children are older (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1997, 
Grootaert, 1999, Blunch and Verner, 2001). Since these studies control for distance to school 
or household composition, the observed disadvantage of girls vis a vis boys is likely to come 
from preferences of households towards boys or from the difference in expected returns of 
education for families between girls and boys. 
2.2.2.5 Household composition 
A household’s composition is also important in explaining the household’s investment in 
schooling. Becker and Lewis (1973) have developed a theoretical model predicting that 
households with more children will invest less in the education of each child. However, this 
theoretical model might not always be relevant in the context of African countries. Indeed, 
when child labour is widespread and starts at a relatively young age (for instance 40% of boys 
in rural areas are economically active at the age of 11 in Senegal (ILO et al., 2010)), children 
become a source of income for households. In this case, many siblings might be advantageous 
if they are old enough to bring additional resources into the household. Thus, households with 
a relatively large number of young children are more likely to have fewer resources to invest 
for each child, whereas households with a relatively large number of adults or older children 
would be relatively richer and able to invest more in each child. In the literature, a common 
finding in Africa is that the impacts of older and younger siblings are different. Chernichovsky 
(1985) finds a positive effect of the number of school-aged children on the likelihood of going 
to school in Botswana but a negative effect of the presence of a baby in the household, Lincove 
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(2009) finds a similar result in Nigeria and Lloyd and Blanc (1996) find a negative impact for 
the number of siblings under five in four of the seven African countries studied but a positive 
impact of school-aged children in six of those countries. Moreover, the effect may differ 
between boys and girls. Lloyd and Blanc (1996) and Sackey (2007) find a positive effect of 
older siblings on boys’ education but a negative effect of the youngest siblings on girls’ 
education in Ghana. Finally, Glick and Sahn (2000) find a stronger negative effect for the 
number of young siblings for girls. 
An important limitation of splitting the number of siblings by age (Chernichovsky, 1985, Lloyd 
and Blanc, 1996, Glick and Sahn, 2000, Sackey, 2007) or relative to the child’s position in the 
sibship (Lloyd and Gage-Brandon, 1994) is that, in the absence of any attempt to control for 
birth order, we cannot disentangle the effect of sibship size and the effect of birth order (Lu, 
2005). Thus, the positive effect of the older siblings may be an artefact and hides a positive 
effect of birth order. Nevertheless, Lu (2005) finds similar results whether she splits her dataset 
between older and younger siblings or if she considers it as a whole for white households in 
South Africa. Moreover, her results do not change significantly when she estimates the model 
for different rank of birth.  
Another common finding is that brothers are more harmful than sisters for the achievement of 
other siblings as parents may be more willing to invest in boys than girls. Thus, the number of 
sisters has a positive and statistically significant effect on child health outcomes in Ghana (Garg 
and Morduch, 1998) and in Tanzania on schooling outcomes (Morduch, 2000). In another 
study, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) use a bivariate probit model to estimate the 
determinants of schooling and labour of children and they find a positive effect of the number 
of female siblings on schooling in Ghana. Furthermore, Buchmann (2000) finds a negative 
effect of the number of brothers on girls’ enrolment in Kenya. 
Finally, the effect of the number of adults in the household is unclear. Most studies find no 
effect of the number of adults on schooling, suggesting that other adults in the household may 
not pool their resources with parents to help them invest in their children’s schooling. Two 
studies find a small association between children’s schooling and the number of adults: 
Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu (2007) find a negative impact in Kenya, whereas Glick and Sahn 
(2006) find a positive impact of the number of women on girls’ schooling. 
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2.2.2.6 Uncertainty and diversification 
Returns to formal education are uncertain and households might not be able to estimate 
precisely what will be the gains from education in the long term. Especially in rural households 
that rely on farm work, investing in education can be at the expense of acquiring farming skills. 
One strategy for households to cope with uncertainty is to diversify their investment by sending 
some children to school while other children work in the field and learn by doing. To test this 
hypothesis, Lindskog (2011) uses panel data including rural Ethiopian households. The author 
estimates the sibling dependency on the probability of entering school, which is how the 
probability of entering school is influenced by the investment made on other siblings. The 
findings show that this dependency is stronger in more risk-averse households, suggesting that 
a diversification strategy plays a role in schooling investment.   
2.2.2.7 Altruism and old age support  
Education is not a typical good in the sense that, usually, parents make the decisions about 
education and bear the financial costs whereas the ones who will enjoy the benefits of education 
are their children. Since children cannot borrow money, they are dependent on the decisions of 
their parents. However, parents may receive some benefits from the education of their children. 
First, parents care about their children’s wellbeing, that is their utility function depends 
positively on the future wellbeing of their children (Becker, 1981). Secondly, in most African 
countries there is no old age support and children are expected to support their parents later in 
life (Glick and Sahn, 2000). In this context, parents can benefit from the education of their 
children through remittances when they are older. It is notably often argued that parents invest 
less in the education of girls because in most societies they are not expected to take care of 
their parents financially later in life (Sackey, 2007). However, in both cases, parents are likely 
to receive fewer benefits from education than their children will, which can lead to an 
underinvestment in education compared to what would be privately optimal for children.  
The fact that families underestimate returns to education and that parents do not benefit fully 
from education investments are two of the arguments made in favour of conditional, rather than 
unconditional, cash transfers to raise schooling investments (Baird et al., 2013). Also, the fact 
that conditional cash transfers have more impact on schooling outcomes than unconditional 
transfers suggests that addressing financial barriers is not enough to raise educational 
attainment and that there are other factors that need to be addressed.  
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2.3 Literature on the demand for schooling in Senegal 
Results for studies on Senegal are like those for the rest of Africa. Diagne (2005) estimates a 
sequential probit on a nationally representative sample of 1,500 individuals aged between 6 
and 19 to model the decisions of schooling. He finds that girls are less likely to enter primary 
school and complete it, suggesting that there is a gender bias in Senegal. Similar to studies in 
other countries, he shows that the characteristics of the household head are important: the level 
of education, his or her age, and being a female have a positive impact on the enrolment of 
children. Nonetheless, literacy of the household head is found to have a negative impact on 
enrolment but a positive impact on the completion of primary school conditional on being 
enrolled. At the household level, wealth, measured by the assets owned by the household, also 
has a positive impact on schooling and completion, whereas household size has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of being enrolled. Finally, the proximity of a primary school is 
important for enrolment but not for the completion of primary schooling. 
Dumas and Lambert (2010) look at the impact of family background, how this impact varies 
according to the child’s age and the differences in preferences for education by using the 
“Éducation et Bien-Etre des Ménages au Sénégal” (EBMS) 2003 survey coupled with the 
1995-2000 Senegal PASEC survey. The authors argue that parental schooling may be 
endogenous. Indeed, if individuals inherit preferences for schooling from their parents, parents’ 
and children’s schooling may be correlated with preferences for schooling in their family and, 
as long as preferences for schooling are unobserved, this may bias the estimates. Moreover, 
parents with higher cognitive skills may have achieved a greater grade and may be better at 
helping their children at school. For the same reason, parents’ ability may be correlated with 
income and children’s achievement leading to the endogeneity of income. Finally, if wealth is 
measured with error it may lead to endogeneity. To overcome these issues, the authors use the 
infrastructure (primary school, upper secondary school, health care centre) available in the area 
where the parents lived when they were ten years old and the health of grand-parents and if 
they were alive when the parents were ten as instruments for parents’ schooling. In addition, 
they use whether parents were the first son for men and the first daughter for women among 
their siblings as instruments. They find that, without correcting for endogeneity, the effect of 
father’s education is underestimated, and the effect of mother’s education and wealth are 
overestimated in the enrolment estimates. However, they do not reject the exogeneity of 
mother’s education and wealth in the achievement estimates. According to their results, father’s 
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education is then more important than mother’s education to explain enrolment and 
achievement in Senegal, which may be explained by the fact that men usually take decisions 
for the household. Wealth is not statistically significant after controlling for endogeneity, but 
it is worth noting that the authors use an asset-based indicator to proxy wealth that could 
measure household wealth with less precision than household expenditures. Moreover, an 
asset-based indicator may not be a good measure of wealth as decisions to own durable assets 
may be correlated with decisions about investment in human capital. Then, the authors look at 
the timing of the impact of family background by controlling with a scholar test taken by the 
children at the beginning of their schooling. They find that the impact of the control variables 
remains the same, notably father’s education, which is the only one to be statistically 
significant, and that the impact of parental education continues to take place after the entry at 
school. Finally, the authors look at the relationship between the number of repetitions and 
family background. They find that, after, controlling for endogeneity, family background has 
no impact on the number of repetitions. Their results suggest that better off and more educated 
parents are not more efficient at raising their children, and differences of achievement between 
children of different family background stem from differences in preferences toward education. 
In another study, Bonsang and Faye (2005) use a multinomial logit model to assess the 
determinants of children’s time allocation between schooling, working and house working. 
They use a sub-sample of children aged between 10 and 15 from the “Enquête Sénégalaise 
Auprès des Ménages” (ESAM-I) 1995 household survey. Similarly to Diagne (2005), they find 
a positive impact of the household head’s schooling on school attendance, with a greater impact 
for girls, and that total household income is positively correlated with school attendance, 
suggesting that Senegalese households are financially constrained in their schooling 
investment. Basic services improve school access as well: direct access to water increases the 
likelihood of being enrolled for boys and girls and access to electric lightning has a positive 
effect only for boys, whereas to own an electric gas cooker has a positive effect only for girls. 
This is consistent with traditional child occupations in Senegal where girls help to cook and 
boys have to fetch wood. Finally, the number of very young and young children is not found 
to be negatively correlated with school attendance, whereas the number of adults living in the 
household decreases the likelihood of working but does not increase the likelihood of going to 
school. These results show that the opportunity cost of time of children in Senegal seems to be 
more affected by household chores, such as fetching water or collecting wood, than childcare 
duties.  
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André and Demonsant (2009) study the determinants of Koranic schooling in Senegal by using 
the 2003 EBMS survey coupled with the 1995-2000 Senegal survey of the “Programme 
d’Analyse des Systemes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN” (PASEC). They find that up to 60% of 
children attended a Koranic school at some stage. The number of years of Koranic schooling 
is usually low; only 15% of girls and 27% of boys attended Koranic schooling for more than 
three years. Surprisingly, children who attend Koranic schooling are also more likely to attend 
formal schooling. Nevertheless, this correlation may come from the fact that parents with a 
greater preference for Koranic schooling may have, as well, greater preferences for formal 
schooling and may also be less financially constrained. Once the endogeneity bias is controlled 
with the number of schools available in the community when the child was ten, the impact of 
Koranic schooling on formal schooling appears to be negative for boys, meaning that there is 
a substitution effect between Koranic and formal schooling. Koranic schooling is also 
positively correlated with household wealth, suggesting that Koranic schooling is not a 
substitute for formal schooling for poor households, and negatively correlated with father’s 
education. For boys, Koranic schooling is negatively correlated with the number of same-father 
brothers, which could be due to the fact that households aim to have at least some of their sons 
with a Koranic education to become an imam later in life. This would be similar to the 
diversification strategy described by Lindskog (2011) in Ethiopia where households aim to 
diversify the education of their children between the formal and informal sector. The presence 
of Koranic schooling also varies a lot from one ethnicity to another and Koranic schooling is 
almost absent for Serere and Dioola.  
Glick and Sahn (2010) analyse the impact of early achievement on the grade attained by a 
sample of 15-year-old Senegalese children in the 2003 EBMS survey coupled with the 1995-
2000 Senegal PASEC survey. They use an ordered probit with school random effects to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity and they find that early achievement, measured by French and 
math tests in second grade, has a positive impact on the grade attained. This effect is stronger 
for children living in rich households and for girls. Moreover, household wealth and father’s 
education have positive impacts on the grade attained whereas mother’s schooling is not 
statistically significant. Repetitions are found to have a negative impact on dropouts before the 
fifth grade even after controlling for schooling availability. This is consistent with the results 
of Pierre (2009) who finds that repetitions increase the likelihood of dropouts by 5% after 
controlling for endogeneity of repetitions. 
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Filmer (2000) uses DHS data from 41 countries, including Senegal in 1992/93, to analyse the 
determinants of enrolment among 6 to 14 year-old children. In Senegal, children from the third 
and fourth wealth quintile are 15% more likely to be enrolled than children from the first and 
second quintile and children from the richest quintile are 19% more likely to be enrolled than 
the children from the two poorest quintiles. It is worth noting that the effect is smaller in rural 
areas with, respectively, 7% for the children from the third and fourth quintile and no 
statistically significant differences for the children from the richest quintile with the poorest 
children. Males are 20% more likely than females to be enrolled and household wealth does 
not reduce disparities between males and females. The average years of schooling of men and 
women in the household are statistically significant: an additional year of female average 
schooling increases the probability of being enrolled by 3.9% and for male schooling the 
increase is 3.6%. Finally, the presence of a primary school and/or a middle school in the 
community does not increase the probability of being enrolled in rural areas. It makes Senegal 
a special case, as access to education is an important determinant of enrolment in six of eight 
of the western and Central African countries covered by the DHS over the same period. In a 
separate study on the same dataset, Filmer (2007) estimates the correlation between distance 
to a primary school and enrolment and finds a surprising positive correlation for Senegal, which 
suggests that children living further away from a primary school are more likely to be enrolled, 
whereas the presence of a middle school has no effect. Senegal is the only country in the study 
where distance to a primary school is positively correlated with enrolment and Filmer does not 
explain this result. It is not clear what could drive this result.  
Overall, the results of the different studies in Senegal suggest that, similar to other African 
countries, parental education, especially father’s education, plays an important role in 
schooling achievement. Gender is also a determinant of schooling and all studies find that girls 
receive less schooling than boys. Moreover, all studies find that education is correlated with 
household wealth but the study by Dumas and Lambert (2010) suggests that this may be due 
to endogeneity bias. The presence of Koranic schooling is not unique to Senegal but, thanks to 
André and Demonsant (2009), its consequences on formal schooling are better understood than 
in other contexts and, overall, the substitution effect with formal schooling is not important. 
Finally, the effect of availability of schools, measured by distance, is contentious in Senegal 
with different studies finding opposing effects. 
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2.4 Methodology 
 Choice of indicators of investment in schooling 
A large number of indicators is used in the literature to proxy household investment in 
schooling. In theory, the ideal indicator would be the one that precisely captures the final 
investment in human capital, that is the skills acquired through schooling at the age individuals 
are expected to have completed their investment in schooling (usually young adults). The 
number of years of schooling or the highest level of schooling completed could be a potential 
candidate, but it does not capture how much learning students have acquired. A standardised 
test score, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in OECD 
countries, could in theory capture the learning achievement and skills of students. However, 
test scores can only measure a subset of the total learning achievement of students and it is 
conceptually impossible to measure the extent of learning achievement and skills with a single 
measure. Moreover, test scores measure learning but, in practice, this can be quite different 
from scholastic achievement and, for this reason, they may not truly reflect the private return 
to schooling. Indeed, it may be difficult for employers to assess innate abilities of workers and 
they may be willing to pay more for workers with more schooling if they think that schooling 
is correlated with greater innate abilities. In this model, the returns to schooling do not arise 
from the additional skills acquired through schooling captured by test scores but through the 
selection process of schooling. This model could help explain the puzzle that private returns to 
schooling are often found to be high but that social returns to schooling are found to be low or 
even nil by some studies (Pritchett, 2001).  
Researchers are also constrained in their choice of indicators by data availability, especially in 
developing countries. Because of cost considerations, there are very few surveys that collect 
data on test scores in Africa along with data on household and individual characteristics. Even 
reliable data on school attendance can be difficult to collect, as it requires that surveyors match 
children in households with their administrative records in schools. Finally, by focusing on 
schooling investment of young adults, researchers can have a reliable estimate of the total 
amount invested in schooling but the decisions that led to this investment in schooling would 
have been made 15 to 20 years ago, which may lead to conclusions that are no longer relevant. 
Moreover, there is a lack of reliable cohort surveys in African countries that would link 
schooling achievement of young adults with their past circumstances, which limits drastically 
potential analysis.    
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For all these reasons, most of the studies include indicators that can be seen as a proxy for the 
total investment in schooling. School enrolment is one of the most widely used indicators. 
However, it is also very weakly correlated with total investment in schooling as children who 
are enrolled may not attend school regularly and if they do attend school, they may not acquire 
skills. Attendance, or its inverse absenteeism, is superior to enrolment data but it is less often 
available in surveys and, because it is difficult to measure accurately, it can decrease the 
precision of statistical analysis. In a number of African countries, late entry is an issue and can 
lead to a lower number of years of schooling (Bommier and Lambert, 2000) and several studies 
use an indicator such as late entry or the age-appropriate enrolment. Dropping out of school is 
also a commonly used indicator and, in contexts where most children start schooling, it can be 
a relevant indicator to understand what prevents students from pursuing their schooling.   
 Statistical models used to investigate the determinants of schooling in the literature 
In most cases the outcome of interest in the estimation of the determinants of schooling is a 
binary variable such as enrolment, attendance or completion of an educational level. In these 
cases, econometric studies use a probit or a logit estimator to estimate the determinants of 
schooling. Continuous variables, such as the number of years of education and the number of 
levels of education completed, are also widely analysed. In this case researchers sometimes use 
an ordinary least squares estimator, but most studies use an ordered probit model to explicitly 
take into account the cumulative process of the number of years of schooling.  
One issue with estimating the demand for education for children is that estimates may be biased 
because of censoring. Censoring happens because, in most surveys, children are not observed 
when they are old enough to have completed their education. For instance, children may not 
be enrolled at the time of the survey but may enrol at a later age. For this reason, the choice of 
the age interval of the children is important. For instance, when estimating the determinants of 
school enrolment, if we observe children who are too young, some of them who are not enrolled 
might enrol later and the estimates may confound non-enrolment with late entry at school. To 
avoid this issue, some studies restrict their sample to children aged more than 10 because it is 
unlikely that a child who is going to school would enrol after ten. Because children can still be 
enrolled at school at the time of the study and have not completed their education, censoring is 
also an issue when using continuous variables such as the number of years of schooling. In this 
case, censoring will bias the coefficient of variables of interest downward unless a censored 
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model is used (Greene, 1981) and some papers use a censored ordered probit to take into 
account the censored nature of the number of years of education (McKenzie and Rapoport, 
2011).  
Bommier and Lambert (2000) explore the issue of censoring in more detail in their study that 
looks at the determinants of late entry and the number of years of schooling. Because these two 
variables are likely to be censored in their case and because the decisions about age of entry at 
school and number of years of schooling are likely to be taken jointly, they argue that the error 
terms in their two regressions will be correlated and that they need to estimate the two models 
simultaneously. Thus, they model explicitly the link between late enrolment and number of 
years of schooling with a joint estimate of a probit with late enrolment as a dependent variable 
and an ordered probit with number of years of schooling as the dependent variable. However, 
their results with and without the joint estimator are similar. 
Another potential issue when estimating determinants of schooling is to consider the fact that 
parents take the joint decision of sending their child to school and making her work. Not 
considering the fact that the demand for child labour has an impact on schooling decisions 
might bias the coefficients associated with the determinants of schooling. Some studies 
explicitly treat the joint decisions of parents between a child’s schooling and working. There 
are several methods to take into account the interdependency between the decisions of sending 
a child to school or sending her to work: 
• A multinomial logit assumes that parents’ choices are simultaneous and independent, 
i.e. the odds do not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of an additional category 
(Bonsang and Faye, 2005, Grootaert, 1999). 
• Ordered probit may be used if we make the assumption that parental decisions are 
sequential rather than simultaneous. For instance, parents may first choose if a child 
goes to school or not and then if he or she works or not. 
• A third alternative that requires fewer assumptions about the decision-making process 
is a bivariate probit. Errors are allowed to be correlated and the interdependency 
between schooling and working is taken into account (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 
1997, Nielsen, 2001). 
Most studies use data from surveys that have a hierarchical structure. For instance, children are 
nested in households that are nested in villages. In order to take into account the structure of 
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the data and the fact that observations within the same group will be correlated, studies usually 
use robust clustered standard errors to estimate the statistical significance of their estimates. 
Moreover, the use of fixed effects, for instance village fixed effects, is a way to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity of different groups. Another way of controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity at the household or village level is to use a multilevel modelling approach (Glick 
and Sahn, 2000, Glick and Sahn, 2010). 
Most of the studies are based on observational data and it is often hard to establish causality. 
The effects found are mostly based on structural models of household behaviour and it is not 
always clear that the estimated effects reflect causal effects and not just correlations. Few of 
the studies use statistical methods that make it possible to retrieve a causal effect such as 
instrumental variables. There are a few studies that use an instrumental variable methodology, 
such as André and Demonsant (2009) to estimate the causal impact of Koranic schooling on 
formal schooling, Pierre (2009) to estimate the causal impact of repetitions on dropouts, and 
Dumas and Lambert (2010) to estimate the causal impact of parental education and household 
wealth on educational outcomes. However, the scope is limited by the availability of valid 
instrumental variables. Another way to estimate the causal impact of a variable is to look at the 
results of randomised control trials. These trials are often done in the framework of program 
evaluation and can give a causal estimate of certain interventions, such as cash transfers, school 
construction, improvement in schooling environment, teacher training or providing 
information about returns of education (Petrosino, 2012).  
2.5 Conclusion 
Evidence on the determinants of schooling and decisions made by families for their children’s 
education in African countries and in Senegal is still limited. Studies have found conflicting 
results on the role of distance to school, household wealth or parents’ education. Chapter Four 
of this thesis will seek to test these different determinants in rural Senegal. It will also include 
numerous robustness checks to test if results are sensitive to different specifications. Chapter 
Five will explore in more detail the role of parental education as the evidence is still not 
conclusive on the relative importance of mother’s and father’s education and a thorough review 
of evidence linked to this matter and the new data collected will contribute to this literature. 
Finally, in chapter Six, I will analyse how polygyny affects the household’s decision making 
when it comes to schooling investments. Indeed, the literature on the impact of polygyny on 
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schooling decisions is still extremely limited and based on only one study (Mammen, 2009), 
which is discussed in chapter Six. This thesis will bring additional evidence on this subject 











Given that this thesis is based on primary data, in this chapter, I discuss the characteristics of 
the survey area as well as the data collection method and survey tools. I also investigate the 
quality of the data and the representativeness of the sample.  
3.2 Data description 
 Context of data collection 
Data were collected within the framework of a health insurance project that aimed to target 
people working as famers in agricultural areas in Senegal, i.e. 60% of the Senegalese 
population. This health insurance project known as “agro-sylvo-pastoral” health insurance was 
initiated by the Government of Senegal with the technical assistance of the International 
Labour Organisation. The health insurance law was voted in June 2004 (2004). In 2008, it was 
agreed that the effectiveness of the policy needed to be assessed in a test region before rolling 
out the project nationally (2008a). I was awarded, with two other researchers a small research 
grant from the International Labour Organization to design an impact evaluation of this project 
and collect the baseline data set. Two rural communities from the north of Senegal were chosen 
to start off the project while a third rural community, with similar observed characteristics to 
the pilot areas, was chosen as a control area in order to reconstruct the counterfactual, i.e. in 
order to assess the situation in the absence of the intervention. The survey questionnaire was 
extremely rich mainly containing information on health and agriculture behaviours. However, 
I also designed a section on education to answer the objectives of this thesis. In the sections 
below, I describe the methods used to design the impact evaluation and data collection tools as 
well as discussing the characteristics of the areas and the households that were surveyed. 
 Survey area 
The three rural communities are located in the north of Senegal in the Saint-Louis region, as 
shown in Figure 3-1. With a poverty rate of 42%, i.e. living on less than US$1.25 per day, the 
region is better off than the rest of Senegal where the poverty rate is 56% at the date of the 
survey (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2008b). The area is 




in the North, which forms the border with Mauritania. The two rural communities in the west, 
Ross Béthio and Gäé, belong to the county of Dagana and the rural community in the east 
belongs to the county of Podor.29 There are a few urban centres in the area and most of the 
population is considered as rural: 63% in Dagana and 90% in Podor (Agence Nationale de la 
Statistique et de la Démographie, 2008b).  
 
29 Senegal is divided into 14 regions which consist of 45 counties. Counties are subdivided into communes 







Figure 3-1 Rural communities surveyed from the Saint Louis region and from Senegal West to 
East: Ross Béthio, Gaé and Guédé.30 Blue lines are the three community boundaries and blue 






3.2.3.1 Population of interest 
Given the fact that only households earning a living from agriculture are eligible for the health 
insurance project, the survey was restricted to households belonging to a farmers’ organisation 
(FO). In doing so, we ensured that we had a sample of all the farmers in the area because 
membership of a farmers’ organisation is mandatory to sell agricultural output, buy inputs or 
to gain access to credit. Moreover, lists of members of farmers’ organisations are up to date, 
which allowed us to have an exhaustive sampling frame whereas there were no lists available 
of individuals per village. We decided to use farmers’ organisations as clusters to take 
advantage of the geographical concentration of their members and minimise the cost of the 
survey. The three rural communities were chosen as strata and the control community, Guédé, 
was over-sampled to equal 45% of the sample. 
3.2.3.2 Sampling size 
Since the reason for collecting the data was to set up of a baseline for the impact study of a 
health insurance project, the variables of interest were chosen in order to assess the potential 
effects of the project on health status, health access and out-of pocket health expenditures. 
Therefore, the minimum sample size needed to detect an effect of the project on these variables 
with a certain level of probability was computed using the method developed by Duflo et al. 
(2007).31 Nonetheless, the computation of the sample size requires additional information on 
the mean, and on between and within clusters variance of the variable of interest. We used the 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in Senegal in 2005 to obtain these statistics. 
Since the DHS does not contain information on farmers’ organisations, we used the cluster 
“village” as an approximation to farmers’ organisations. Indeed, most of the time, farmers’ 
organisations are confounded with villages. Computations led to a minimum sample size of 93 
 
30 Source: Google map 
 












  where α is a 
significance level and κ is the statistical power, P is the portion of subjects allocated to treatment group,  is the 
proportion of the total variation explained by the between-cluster differences and the SMDE is the standardised 




clusters with 5 households per cluster. An allowance for non-response of 10% was added which 
led to a total sample size of 512 households. 
3.2.3.3 Sampling method 
A list of farmers’ organisations was obtained from the “Société Nationale d'Aménagement et 
d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du fleuve Sénégal” (National Society for the planning and 
the Exploitation of the Delta Senegal River Lands) and in July and August 2008 field work 
was conducted to update this list. This list contained information on the number of members 
of farmers’ organisations and their locations that allowed us to use it as a sampling frame. 
Farmers’ organisations were drawn randomly with a probability proportional to their size.32 
Members of those organisation were drawn randomly from the lists of members of the selected 
farmers’ organisations.  
3.2.3.4 Data collection 
The survey took place over three weeks in May 2009, with 16 professional interviewers hired 
to collect the data. The selection process of the interviewers considered their experience and 
their knowledge of local languages (Fula and Wolof). Since the questionnaire includes 
questions about female contraception and women’s bargaining power, only female 
interviewers were hired. Once in the village, interviewers used the lists of members of the 
farmers’ organisation to draw the desired number of individuals. All the members of the 
households that were drawn were surveyed to have information on more individuals, notably 
children and women.  
3.2.3.5 Actual sample 
The sample is made up of 4512 individuals living in 504 households. The response rate is 
99.8%. This high response rate is not unusual for Senegal; for instance the Demographic and 
Health Survey of 2017 achieved a response rate of 98% (ANSD, 2018). All the surveyed 
households agreed to answer the questionnaire and are included in the dataset, but information 
 




on one household had to be deleted because the interviewer interviewed only the household 
head. The participation rate is 98.6%; seven households were not surveyed because some 
interviewers gave up before the end of the survey. Table 3-1 presents the characteristics of the 
sample. 
Table 3-1 Population of interest and sample composition 
 Gaé Ross Béthio Guédé Total 
Number of inhabitants 23,292 59,833 48,777 131,902 
Number of members of FOs 8,726 13,555 17,671 39,952 
% of members of FOs among the inhabitants 37.5 22.7 36.2 30.3 
% of members of FOs in the sampling frame 21.8 33.9 44.2 100 
%  of individuals in the sample 45.1 22.1 32.9 100 
Number of households 239 105 160 504 
Number of individuals 2,033 997 1,482 4512 
Average number of individuals per household 8.5 9.5 9.3 9 
 
We note that the percentage of the population in farmers’ organisations is similar to in Gäé and 
Guédé at more than 36%. This is really high given farmers’ organizations only include working 
adults and more than half of the population is aged 18 or less. It shows that in these two rural 
communities, almost everyone relies on agriculture and almost all adults belong to a farmers’ 
organization. In Ross Béthio the share of the population involved in a farmers’ organisation is 
still high but lower than in the two other rural communities. This may be explained by the 
greater availability of job opportunities in the private sector in this area because of the 
proximity of Saint-Louis, the main urban centre in the region. 
 Household questionnaires 
The household questionnaire includes questions at the household level asked of the household 
head and questions for individuals asked of each member of the household. The household 
questionnaire includes 15 sections as shown in Table 3-2 and an English translation is provided 




Table 3-2 Sections in the household questionnaire 
Section A: Demographics Section I: Condition of living 
Section B: Education Section J: Non-food Expenditure 
Section C: Adults’ health status  Section K: Remittances 
Section D: Child and maternal health Section L: Food expenditure 
Section E: Women’s autonomy Section M: Agricultural credit and days 
lost due to illness Section F: Health utilisation and user fees 
Section G: Health financing Section N: Agricultural outputs 
Section H: “Agro-sylvo-pastoral” project Section O: Agricultural inputs 
 Descriptive statistics 
3.2.5.1 Demographics 
Who belongs to a household may sometimes be hard to define. Students may study away from 
home during the week but be present during weekends and holidays or a guest may spend a 
few weeks in the household but without the intention to settle down. Moreover, individuals 
sharing extended family links may live close to each other and spend much of their time 
together. We defined a household as “a group of individuals that live and work on a plot 
together, share meals together, and pool resources in order to provide for their essential 
needs”. This definition corresponds to the traditional notion of "Njël" in Wolof or “Hirande” 
in Fula, both notions include the idea that the household is a consumption-production group. 
Students who still rely on the household are included in the household, and we took the 
willingness to settle as the condition for migrants to be part of the household. Generally, 
members of the household recognise the authority of a head of the household. 
Thus, households are not limited to nuclear families and often are made up of individuals 
sharing extended family links or even with no family relationship. This definition corresponds 
to the Senegalese context and about 30% of the individuals surveyed are neither the partner nor 
the child of the household head. For this reason, family links were carefully recorded by 
interviewers; we therefore know, for every individual, his/her family link with the household 
head as shown in Table 3-3. Children can be matched with their mother and/or their father if 




household. Moreover, every woman was asked the number of fostered and deceased children. 
Thus, we know the total number of children per woman. 
Table 3-3 Family relationship with the household head 
Relationship Frequency Percent 
Household head 504 11.19 
Spouse 538 11.92 
Child 2,123 47.04 
Father/Mother 127 2.81 
Brother/Sister 173 3.83 
Nephew/Niece 270 5.98 
Son/Daughter-in-law 109 2.42 
Brother/Sister-in-law 62 1.37 
Father/Mother-in-law 8 0.18 
Other relationships 187 4.14 
No relationship 16 0.35 
Fostered child 58 1.29 
Grand-children 337 7.47 
Total 4,512 100 
Table 3-4 shows that 83% of individuals who are between 0 and 18 years old could be matched 
with their mother and 76% of them with their father. The missing cases may be due to the death 
of the parent, his/her departure from the household or to the fact that individuals are not the 
children of the household head. Indeed, it is common that the household heads take care of 
their younger brothers and sisters if their parents are dead or too old to take care of them and 
fostering children is common. Thus, when we consider only children of the household head the 
matching rate is much higher than in the total sample (94% matched with the mother and 98% 








Children of the 
household head 
Number of individuals up to 18 year old 2,453 1,647 
Number of individuals matched with their mother 2,028 1,548 
Matching rate mother-child 82.67% 94% 
Number of individuals matched with their father 1,868 1,607 
Matching rate mother-child 76.15% 97.57% 
Number of individuals matched with their mother and 
father 
1,748 1,508 
Matching rate mother and father-child 71.26% 91.56% 
Matching children with their mother allows us to know who the siblings in the household are. 
Since household heads are usually males (90%), we usually know both parents of children of 
the household head. Thus, for those children, we know how many siblings they have from the 
same father and how many they have from the same mother and father. Since 20% of the 
households are polygamists this number may differ. Thus, the number of siblings is on average 
3.8 for siblings who share only the same mother and 4.9 for siblings who share the same mother 
and father. 
The rest of the demographics section of the survey includes questions about gender, age, 
marital status, the language spoken at home and religion of individuals.33 The sample consists 
of Wolof speakers (57%) and Fula speakers (40%), which are the two main ethnicities of 
Senegal, and Mauritanian-Arab speakers (2%). All the individuals say they are Muslims and 
96% say they belong to the Tijane brotherhood, whereas this brotherhood includes about 50% 
of all Senegalese people.34 
In the sample, the dependency ratio, computed as the ratio of individuals younger than 15 or 
older than 64 to the working age population (ages 15-64), was 96.4%. This ratio is higher than 
 
33 Language spoken at home is used as a proxy for ethnicity. 




the national figure: 86.1 in 200935. It may reflect the fact that people from rural areas tend to 
migrate to towns when they are adults to look for jobs.  
3.2.5.2 Education 
Data on education were collected for every individual in the household. The section of the 
survey dealing with education starts with a self-declaration of the ability of the individual to 
read and write in French and/or Arabic. The literacy rate of people aged 15 and older in our 
sample is 33%; this is below the national average of 42%. Literacy rates of men and women 
aged between 15 and 24 are 56% and 45% respectively. These figures are close to the national 
averages: 58% for men and 45% for women in 2006 (United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics). 
Individuals were also asked their current education status: attending a public formal school, 
attending a private formal school, attending a Koranic school or not attending any school.36 
Questions related to the current academic year and we recorded the information only if the 
individual was attending full time. Thus, children who only attend Koranic schools only during 
school holidays or during weekends were not recorded as Koranic students. The net primary 
school enrolment rate is 68% whereas the national average is 73%.37 At the secondary level, 
the net enrolment rate is 22%, again slightly below the national average of 25%.38 About 9% 
of individuals aged between 6 and 18 are attending a Koranic school with no significant 
differences between boys and girls and about 27% of them are neither enrolled in a formal 
school nor in a Koranic school. 
For all individuals, the maximum level of education achieved was recorded and coded 0 for 
those who never attended a formal school. Since the survey took place towards the end of the 
academic year, the maximum level of education for individuals who are currently enrolled is 
 
35 World Bank Development indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND  
36 Only three individuals declared being in a private school. 
37 World Bank development indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.CMPT.ZS  




recorded as the current level attended. In addition, the number of repetitions and the maximum 
diploma obtained were recorded. 
The average number of years of education is 2.6 years for individuals aged 18 and above and 
61% of them have no education at all. Primary school achievement is rare for adults: only 25% 
of men and 15% of women have completed more than six years of education. As we can see 
from Figure 1.6 older people tend to have less education, consistent with the fact that education 
attainment has increased over the past 30 years. For instance, the primary completion rate was 
only 23% in 1980 and 56% in 2008.39 Figure 3-2 shows that females received less education 
than males. 
 
Figure 3-2 Average number of years of schooling for males and females aged above 18 
Table 3-5 shows that children have better access to education than their parents: 51% of 
children aged between 12 and 18 managed to complete primary school. With a completion rate 
of only 45%, girls are disadvantaged but the difference between girls and boys depends on the 
 

































location of the household. Thus, outcomes for households living in the department of Podor 
tend to favour girls over boys whereas for households from Dagana the opposite applies. 
Table 3-5 Primary completion rates for boys and girls aged between 12 and 18 in Podor and 
Dagana (%) 
 
Podor Dagana Total 
Girls 51 44 45 
Boys 41 59 57 
Total 47 52 51 
 
Finally, individuals were asked the reason they stopped going to school or had never attended 
a school. 40  Individuals had a choice of answers and had to select the main reason. They were 
able to nominate another reason if they were not satisfied with the responses provided. Frequent 
spontaneous answers were coded separately and are not part of the ‘other’ section. 
Table 3-6 Reasons for not going to school 
Reasons Percent 
Not useful 56.4 
Koranic schooling 25.2 
No school available 7.6 
Too young 4.5 
Health problems 1.9 
Too expensive 1.4 
Help family/Work 1.3 
Other 1.8 
 
As we can see from Table 3-6, the two main reasons for having no schooling are the fact that 
schooling is perceived as not useful (56%) and the preference for Koranic schooling (25%). 
Thus, households may have the perception that returns to formal schooling are low. This is 
 




consistent with studies that find that perceived returns to schooling are a major determinant of 
schooling (Jensen, 2010). It is worth noting that the proportion of individuals declaring that 
education is not useful is only 22% for individuals aged 20 and below, which shows a growing 
interest in education in Senegal. The lack of school availability is not a major barrier to 
schooling with only 8% choosing this explanation. Moreover, individuals aged 20 and below 
report this reason in only 4% of the cases, which reflects the efforts of Senegal to build new 
schooling facilities. Lack of money is not seen as a reason for not going to school. It may be 
explained by the fact that schooling is free and that the only expenses households must cover 
are books and pencils. Finally, even if the sample is restricted to individuals aged six or above, 
4.5% say that their child is too young to go to school, whereas the legal age to start primary 
school is six. It may be due to the fact that parents do not rely only on age in determining if 
their child is ready for school; they also take into consideration the height and the maturity of 
their child. 
Table 3-7 Reasons for stopping school 
Reasons Percent 
Failure/Discipline 23.6 
Help family/Work 22.5 
School problems 12.8 
Disinterest for school 8.0 
Repetitions 7.2 
Pregnancy/wedding 7.2 
I had learnt enough 3.5 
Health problems 3.4 
Too expensive 3.3 
Koranic schooling 2.5 
Professional training 1.2 






As shown in Table 3-7, 24% of individuals stopped their studies because they were not 
successful or undisciplined and 7% of them stopped because of repetitions. Repetitions are 
very common in Senegal; 47% of individuals who attended a formal school repeated a grade 
at least once. Repetitions may be harmful if the school the child is attending does not provide 
all the grades. In fact, it is not uncommon that schools in Senegal offer only certain grades. 
Children who have to repeat may then be obliged to go to another school or to attend a lower 
grade. Failures are common as well and usually occur at the end of primary school when 
students have to pass an exam to enter secondary school. Thus, many individuals are not able 
to go further than primary school: 40% of the individuals who received schooling stopped at 
the end of primary school. The second reason to quit schooling is to support the family. It 
reflects the high opportunity cost of children in this area where many boys help in the fields 
and many girls help their mothers with the household chores. School problems are due to the 
lack of schools when children want to pursue their studies, for instance at the end of primary 
school, or it may be due to interruption of the academic year because of teacher strikes or a 
sick teacher who is not replaced. Unlike the reasons for not going to school, Koranic schooling 
does not seem to cause drop outs.  
3.2.5.3 Fertility 
The questionnaire includes questions on female contraception. Thus, 18% of married women 
aged 15-49 say they use a modern contraception method; this is slightly above the national rate 
of 12%.41 Family planning is far from being effective since 25% of the mothers say that they 
did not plan their last child.  
3.2.5.4 Child health and mortality 
The mid upper arm circumference of all the children aged five or less was measured. This 
measure can be used to assess wasting42 of children (Frisancho, 1990). The circumference has 
been standardised by age and by gender using the WHO reference table. It is found that 4% of 
 
41 World Bank development indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONM.ZS  




the children can be considered as wasted whereas the national figure was 8.7% in 2005 and 
2012.43 
Parents were asked how many of their children died before the age of 5. Thus, the under-5 
mortality rate is 163/1000 in the sample. It is much higher than the national figure for 2009: 
78.5/100.44 However, the computed under-5 mortality rate includes deaths of children that 
happened in the past as every woman was asked the number of her children who died before 
the age of 5. Thus, the rate is lower for younger mothers as shown in Figure 3-3.  
 
Figure 3-3  Under-5 mortality rate per 1,000 by mothers’ age 
This downward bias in under-5 mortality rate is consistent with the decrease observed in 
Senegal in under 5 mortality during the past 50 years. Thus, the under-5 mortality rate was over 
300/1000 in the early 1960’s and reached 75/1000 in 2010 as seen in Figure 3-4. 
 
43 World Bank development indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.WAST.ZS  













Figure 3-4 Under-5 mortality rate per 1,000 rate in Senegal 1960-201045 
3.2.5.5 Wealth of households 
It is not easy to assess the wealth of households. Incomes of rural African households are 
seasonal and may vary from one year to another. In order to assess the wealth of households 
we collected data on assets owned by the household and conditions of living, monthly and 
yearly expenditures, remittances and agricultural revenue. 
3.2.5.5.1 Assets owned by households and conditions of living 
We collected data on ownership of seven common assets owned by households in Senegal and 
on their conditions of living. The number of assets owned was also recorded. Ownership of 
durable assets and conditions of living are widely used to assess the long-term economic status 
of households in developing countries. It is less error prone than the recording of expenditures 
and it has a small variation from one month to another or from one year to another. Moreover, 
since the survey took place in a small area, we can assume that prices and the availabilities of 
assets are the same for all the households. Thus, Filmer and Pritchett (2001, page 115) find in 
a study on educational enrolment in Asian countries “that the asset index, as a proxy of 
economic status for use in predicting enrolments was at least as reliable as consumption 
expenditures, and sometimes more so”. 
 











To construct an asset index, we have to assess the internal consistency of the ownership of the 
assets and of the conditions of living. If items measure the same latent trait (here the long-term 
economic status), high correlations between variables should be found. Cronbach’s alpha is 
used to assess if variables are correlated with each other and estimates the reliability of the 
index. The computation of Cronbach’s alpha gives us the correlation of the items with a scale 
computed with the other items; to include an item in the final score, we want it to be positively46 
correlated with the overall scale. If an item is not correlated with the ownership of other items, 
it means that they are not measuring the same latent trait and are probably not a good proxy for 
wealth. 
As we can see in Table 3-8, the ownership of a gas stove is not positively correlated with the 
other items and is then removed from our final asset-based indicator. It suggests that owning a 
gas stove in this region may not be related to wealth. Ownership of an air-conditioner is slightly 
correlated with the ownership of other assets; it is because only few households own one. 
Indeed, when ownership rates are close to 0 or 100, the variance of the variable is small and 
the correlation with other items diminishes.  










Gas stove 5.7 [0;4] -0.08 
Fridge 15.8 [0;2] 0.37 
Air-conditioner 0.6 [0;1] 0.11 
Fan 14.9 [0;6] 0.37 
Radio 85.2 [0;11] 0.07 
TV 55.6 [0;5] 0.47 
Vehicle 6.1 [0;2] 0.2 
 
 




Conditions of living are ordered from the worst to the best. We can note in Table 3-9 that, 
generally, the worst situation is negatively correlated with the other items (assets owned and 
conditions of living). Noteworthy, to drink water from the river is not correlated with poverty. 
It may be because households living close to the river have access to better irrigated lands and 
may be richer. Conditions of living are used as a dummy in the asset-based indicator. 
Table 3-9 Conditions of living 
 Percentage of ownership Correlation with other items 
Main source of drinking water:   
River 28.5 0.002 
Water vendor 0.6 -0.02 
Unprotected well 9.1 -0.24 
Protected well 7.5 -0.2 
Drilling 48.3 0.08 
Public service 4.8 -0.14 
Other 1.1 -0.16 
Fuel used for cooking:   
Cowpat 0.8 -0.08 
Wood 78.4 -0.44 
Coal 16.4 0.33 
Gas 4.2 0.32 
Electricity 0.2 0.02 
Type of toilet:   
No toilet 8.9 -0.33 
Traditional latrine 64 -0.34 
Ventilated improved pit latrine  18.2 0.48 
Flush toilet 8.1 0.26 
Flush toilet + sewer 0.4 0.06 
Other 0.4 -0.03 
Main source of lighting:   
No lighting 0.4 -0.07 
Candle 1.4 -0.08 
Lamp (kerosene, battery, oil, gas) 35.3 -0.68 
Solar energy 5.4 0.12 
Petrol 0.8 -0.03 
National electric company 56.2 0.64 
Other 0.6 -0.09 
 
Once we decided which variables to include in the asset-based indicator, we must choose a 
way to construct this indicator. We followed Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and used a principal 
components analysis to build an asset-based indicator that reflects the long-term economic 
status of households. Conditions of living and assets owned were included except for gas stove. 
The first dimension of the principal component analysis explains 63% of the variance, meaning 




indicator of wealth. The indicator computed is a standardised variable with a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. 
 
Figure 3-5 Distribution of the asset-based indicator 
As shown in Figure 3-5, the asset-based indicator distribution has an approximate bell shape 
with about 17.6% of the households below one standard deviation and 15.7% of the households 
above one standard deviation. 
3.2.5.5.2 Remittances 
Households were asked the amount of remittances they sent during the last year and the amount 
they received (Table 3-10). Moreover, they were asked if they must repay (or have to be repaid) 
in order to distinguish loans and gifts. 
Table 3-10 Remittances 
Percentage of households who received a remittance 42% 
Percentage of households who sent a remittance 27% 
Average amount of remittances sent in US$ 83 
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Most of the remittances are gifts; less than 5% have to be paid back. Remittances received are 
greater than remittances sent and may come from family members living abroad. Indeed, this 
area of Senegal is known to be an important departure point for international migrants to 
Europe.  
3.2.5.5.3 Consumption aggregate 
Expenditure indicators are often favoured over income indicators to assess the living standard 
of households in developing countries. Indeed, expenditures vary less from year to year than 
income does. Moreover, when households are mostly self-employed, it is easier to assess their 
consumption than their revenue. 
Heads of households were asked the amount of expenditures they made during the last 30 days 
and the frequency of these types of expenditures during the last 12 months (Figure 3-6). Food 
expenditures were recorded separately and we asked households the amount of their self-






Figure 3-6 Means of yearly household expenditure of non-food items in US$ 
Repayments of debt are the largest expenditure item. Nonetheless, it was not included in the 
total expenditure aggregate as debts are a way to finance consumption. Religion and 
celebrations are two important expenditure items. Donations to the religious authorities are 
common and individuals try to make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lives and 
celebrations, such as weddings, are often costly for households. These two types of 
expenditures, as with expenditure related to jewellery, are not made every year and may vary 
greatly from one household to another. To include those expenditures may therefore lead to 
underestimating the expenditures of households that did not undertake this type of expenditure 
in the year of the study. Thus, we do not include expenditures related to religion, celebrations 
and jewellery in the final consumption aggregate. Furniture expenditure is also excluded as we 
lack information on the type of furniture bought. Moreover, we do not include in the final 
consumption aggregate expenditures that are compulsory for households. Thus, taxes are not 
included. Health expenditures are considered as a necessity in rural Senegal and are also 



















paid by households as only 3.5% of households pay rent and we are unable to value the rent 
that the other households would pay if they did not own their houses. 
Non-food expenditures considered are therefore clothing, transport, communications, energy, 
education and remittances sent per household. 47 The average amount spent per household per 
year is 845 US$. Average yearly food expenditure is presented in Figure 3-7. 
 
Figure 3-7 Mean of yearly household food expenditure in US$ 
 
Total food expenditure equals US$ 2625 per household per year. Self-consumption48 makes up 
an important part of this amount; about US$468. For instance, 57% of the consumption of rice 
comes from self-consumption. 
 
47 About 2% of the remittances sent have to be repaid. They are not included as they are considered as loans. 






















We computed the consumption aggregate for each household, which is the sum of non-food 
and food expenditures. The median amount of the consumption aggregate is US$3470 per 
household per year and, on average, food makes up 77% of this amount. 
Obviously, larger households should have higher expenditures. We could therefore divide the 
total of expenditures by the size of the household. Nevertheless, this method ignores the fact 
that children have fewer needs than adults and the existence of economies of scale. Instead, we 
followed the methodology recommended by Deaton and Zaidi (2002) and we deflated the 
consumption aggregate by the number of adult equivalents. Adult equivalent (AE) is defined 
as: 
AE = (𝐴 + 𝛼𝐶)𝜃  
 
where A is the number of adults in the household and C the number of children.49 𝛼 is a 
parameter that represents the cost of a child. It is usually low in developing countries and, as 
recommended by Deaton and Zaidi (2002), we set it at 0.3. 𝜃 is a parameter that represents 
economies of scale. In the context of our survey, there are few items that exhibit economies of 
scale, so we chose a high value for 𝜃 =  0.9, also the value recommended by Deaton and Zaidi 
(2002). We found that the median of total expenditures per adult equivalent is US$480 and 
25% of the individuals spent less than 352 US$ during the last year, that is less than one dollar 
per day. The distribution of the indicator is right skewed as we can see from Figure 3-8, with 
about 5% of the individuals spending more than US$1,000 and 1% of spending more than 
US$1,500.  
 





Figure 3-8 Distribution of the consumption aggregate 
3.2.5.5.4 Agricultural revenue 
Data on agricultural outputs and inputs were collected. We asked households which crops they 
grew for the last 12 months and how much of their production they sold. With this information, 
we can assess the agricultural revenue of households. Nevertheless, we do not have information 
on additional sources of revenue so we might underestimate households’ total income if we 
use agricultural revenue as a proxy. Since larger households have more needs and a larger 
workforce, we divided the agricultural revenue by the number of individuals in the household. 
Table 3-11 Agricultural revenue in US$50 
Median agricultural revenue per household  1653 
Median agricultural revenue per capita  180 
Agricultural revenue per capita of the first decile  35 
Agricultural revenue per capita of the last decile 566 
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Only 3.6% of the households had no revenue during the last year; most of the time this was 
due to a catastrophic event such as pests or the breakdown of a pump for irrigation. Moreover, 
agricultural revenue is unequally shared among individuals; individuals at the first decile earn 
16 times more than individuals at the last decile. This reflects the unequal access to land for 
farmers and may mean that some households have additional sources of revenue. 
3.2.5.5.5 Comparison of wealth, expenditures and revenue indicators 
The indicators of wealth, expenditures and agricultural revenue are different measures of how 
rich or poor households are.  However, they are only slightly correlated with each other as seen 
in Table 3-12. 
Table 3-12 Correlations between wealth indicators 
 Asset based 
indicator 




Asset-based indicator 1   
Expenditures per adult 
equivalent 
0.13 1  
Agricultural revenue 
per capita 
0.23 0.32 1 
Moreover, they have different distributions. Agricultural revenue is not evenly distributed 
among households as we can see in Figure 3-9 and, as we saw before, the distribution of total 





Figure 3-9 Lorenz curves of the different wealth indicators 
3.2.6. Quality of the data collected 
3.2.5.6 Data entry 
Every questionnaire was checked with the interviewer and in cases of inconsistent answers 
households were phoned. Then, data were captured with the software EpiData and extensive 
field controls were applied in order to ensure the quality of the capture. About one quarter of 
the capture was checked and questionnaires with more than two mistakes had to be entirely 
recaptured by the data capture assistant. Since data capture assistants were paid according to 
the number of questionnaires captured, they had an incentive to do their job carefully. 
3.2.5.7 Data cleaning 
After the end of the data capture, an extensive data cleaning exercise was performed in order 
to detect the remaining capture mistakes and inconsistent answers. Inconsistent answers were 

































capture. In addition, variables were created, children were matched to their mothers and 
individuals were matched to their household’s characteristics.  
3.2.5.8 Response rate 
The response rate is high for all the answers as shown in Table 3-13. It is slightly lower for 
some embarrassing questions, such as the contraception status. Since an interviewer made a 
mistake when she was filling the auto-consumption section, we cannot compute total 
expenditures for these households. 
Table 3-13 Response rate of key variables 
 Percent 
Gender 100 
Family relationship 100 
Birth certificate 99.3 
Date of birth 100 
Age 100 
Marital status 99.5 
Ethnicity 100 
Religion 99.9 
Ability to read 98.7 
Ability to write 98.7 
Enrolment status 98.5 
Last class achieved 99.6 
Reasons for not having gone to school 98.9 
Reasons for having stopped schooling 96 
Current class attained 99.5 
Number of repetitions 92.1 
Maximum diploma obtained 98.9 
Contraception status 86.9 
Assets owned 100 
Expenditures 94.1 
Amount of remittances sent 91.7 
Amount of remittances received 95.7 
Agricultural revenue 100 
With such high rates of response, we should not face issues of response bias or sample attrition. 
Imputation of data does not seem to be necessary in this case. 
3.2.5.9 Quality of age recording 
Surveys in developing countries sometimes exhibit peaks in the distribution of age at values 




or when they intentionally misreport it. As Figure 3-10 shows, the distribution of age in the 
dataset does not seem to exhibit spikes around ages ending with a 0 or 5 digit.  
 
 
Figure 3-10 Distribution of age 
The presence of age bunching can be tested more formally with the Whipple’s index.  This 
index measures the preference of people for rounded ages (ages ending with a 0 or 5 digit). It 
is computed by multiplying by five the proportion of individuals in the 23-62 age interval who 
report ages ending in 0 or 5 (Shryock et al., 1980). The computation of the index gives a value 
of 106.5. This value is small and shows that the data do not suffer from an important bias in 
age recording. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations classifies 
a Whipple’s index in the 105-110 interval as relatively accurate (2008b).  
3.3 Conclusion 
Those data will be used to investigate the determinants of schooling behaviours in Chapter 
Four, the effect of parental education on children education in Chapter Five and finally in 
Chapter Six the data are used to investigate intra-allocation of schooling in polygynous 
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the dataset is representative of the area of interest. The questionnaire includes information on 
the large range of topics that will be useful to tackle the research questions that this thesis aims 
to answer. The response rates and quality of the data recording are very good and should avoid 










The aim of this chapter is to investigate the different determinants of schooling in rural Senegal 
where only 39% of children complete primary school.51 One could think that a lack of local 
school to attend and child labour are the main culprits for low school attendance in rural areas 
of Senegal, but Senegal is investing more than ever in education. From 2000 to 2009, the 
number of primary school teachers has increased more rapidly than the number of primary 
school students (respectively 119% and 49%) and the student-teacher ratio has decreased from 
51 to 35.52 Numerous primary and middle schools have been built across the country and the 
access rate to first grade has increased from 91% to 99% over the last ten years. In my dataset, 
95% of the children live in a village where there is a primary school and, among those who 
never enrolled, less than 5% say that it was due to a lack of school availability. Child labour is 
also not widespread: only 17% of children aged six to 18-years-old work in the fields, although 
this number does not take into account household chores. Actually, 29% of children aged six 
to 12 who live in a village with a primary school do not participate in agricultural work, but 
are still not enrolled in formal education. 
This context suggests that improving school availability alone cannot be successful. A better 
understanding of household decision making is crucial to design education policies that are 
effective and fair. The literature review in Chapter Two has shown that there is a lack of 
evidence on the determinants of the demand for schooling in Senegal, and more generally in 
Africa. There are also some conflicting results and the roles of school availability, parental 
education or household wealth are not well understood.  
Thus, this chapter aims to analyse the main barriers to schooling in a rural area of Senegal at 
the household level. In the first part, a theoretical model is developed to put household 
decisions regarding schooling in an economic framework. Then, descriptive statistics are 
presented and finally econometric models based on the theoretical framework are estimated. 
 
51 Demographic and Health Survey Senegal 2015.  





The conclusions of this chapter will pave the way for the next two empirical chapters that will 
explore in more detail specific determinants of schooling.  
4.2 Modelling the demand for schooling 
In a traditional economic framework, parents may be seen as rational agents who weigh the 
benefits of education against its direct and indirect costs. Children will be sent to school if the 
benefits of education outweigh its cost. Since, especially at a young age, education decisions 
are made by parents, children’s education should benefit parents in one way or another for an 
investment to happen. Parents can benefit from education through the future monetary benefits 
that their children might remit to them in the future or because they are altruistic and care about 
their children’s well-being. In my model, parents are assumed to be altruistic towards their 
children (Becker 1991). Parents invest in the education of their children to increase their stock 
of human capital and, thus, their future income and well-being. Moreover, altruism in the 
family will lead children to take care of their parents in their old age. This is particularly 
important in Senegal since there is no retirement fund and families must take care of their 
elderly. Therefore, education may be both a consumption and investment good.  
More formally, the household utility function can be defined over household consumption, C, 
and the benefits of education, S, 53 and those benefits can only be acquired by the household if 
they send their child to school. Thus, the utility of a household conditional on the child’s 
enrolment (subscript 1) is:  
𝑈1 = 𝑈(𝐶1, 𝑆)            (1) 
where 𝐶1 is the consumption of the household conditional on the child’s enrolment. 
Then, the household budget constraint is given by: 
 
53 S is defined as the benefits of education and not its level as households derive utility from education’s benefits 
and not just the fact of sending children to school. Moreover, education’s benefits can differ between different 




𝑦 =  𝐶1 +  𝑝 + 𝑤           (2) 
where y is the household income, p is the direct cost associated with schooling and w is the 
indirect cost associated with schooling. To keep the expression simple, I note p+w= a. 
Symmetrically, households who do not send their child to school have a utility function defined 
by: 
𝑈0 = 𝑈(𝐶0, 0)           (3) 
and a budget constraint: 
𝑦 =  𝐶0            (4) 
In this simple model, households are not allowed to borrow to finance their consumption or the 
education of their children. The budget constraint is then binding and 𝐶0> 𝐶1; therefore, parents 
have to reduce their current consumption in order to finance their children’s education. Finally, 
households choose the option that maximises their utility subject to their budget constraint: 
𝑈∗ = max (𝑈1, 𝑈0)           (5) 
where 𝑈∗ is the maximised utility. 
4.3 Empirical Specification 
Empirically, the utility function of schooling depends on the expected costs and benefits of 
education.  Because of diminishing marginal returns to consumption, the utility derived from 
consumption is assumed to be not linear. In this case, the marginal rate of substitution between 
schooling and consumption is not linear and income influences the choice of schooling of 
households (Gertler and Glewwe 1990). The non-linearity of consumption can be modelled by 
using a log model. Thus, the utility derived from sending a child to school is defined as: 
𝑈1 =  𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln (𝐶1) +  1         (6) 
The 𝛽′𝑠 are the parameters to be estimated and 1 is the error term. By rewriting (2) as:  




And substituting in (6), I obtain: 
𝑈1 =  𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln(y −  𝑎) +  1        (8) 
 (8) represents the utility derived from sending a child to school. Since 𝑦 =  𝐶0, the utility to 
keep a child at home is defined as: 
𝑈0 =  𝛽2ln(y) +  0           (9) 
A household will send a child to school if 𝑈1 > 𝑈0. The variable E represents the enrolment 
status of a child such as: 
{
𝐸 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈1 > 𝑈0
𝐸 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑈1 ≤ 𝑈0
          (10) 
By substituting (8) and (9) in (10) I obtain: 
𝐸 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln(y −  𝑎) +  1 − (𝛽2ln(y) +  0) > 0     (11) 
And thus: 
𝐸 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln(1 − 𝑎/𝑦) +  1 −  0 > 0       (12) 
I can rewrite equation (12) as a model with a latent variable E*: 
𝐸∗ =  𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln(1 − 𝑎/𝑦) +  1 −  0       (13) 
And: 
{
𝐸 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐸∗ >  0
𝐸 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐸∗ ≤ 0
          (14) 
Equation (13) can be estimated with a logit regression and shows that the utility gain of being 




 Benefits of education 
If parents invest in their children’s education to increase the future income or wealth of the 
family, then parents should take into account the expected returns to education. Thus, 
maximization of family utility implies that marginal rates of return are equalised between 
children, and, as a consequence, as long as brighter children are expected to receive greater 
benefits from education, they should receive more schooling.54 Differences in schooling 
between children and between households should then be a function of the ability of children. 
Nonetheless, ability is not the only determinant of expected returns. For instance, parents may 
favour boys’ education over girls’ education if women receive a lower wage than men in the 
job market. Furthermore, parents and students may have incomplete information about returns 
from schooling. A study by Jensen (2010) found that parents and students underestimate returns 
to schooling in the Dominican Republic, especially the returns from secondary school, and that 
providing them information about returns from schooling helps to increase educational 
attainment. Since education may help parents to have better information about returns from 
schooling, and I expect that parents tend to underestimate the benefits of education, the 
education of parents should have a positive impact on educational attainment of children. 
Finally, the quality of schooling may vary from one school to another, and so, the benefits of 
education are likely to be different depending on the school attained.  Therefore, I expect that 
variables at the school level that affect the quality of schooling will have an impact on school 
attendance. 
 Direct costs of schooling 
Schooling fees and the purchase of schooling materials are the most obvious direct schooling 
costs. In Senegal, these costs are low at primary school but increase at the secondary level. 
Moreover, transportation costs are also a direct cost of schooling and distance to the closest 
school facility may be seen as a proxy for this cost. Furthermore, parents have to pay for the 
meals taken outside the home by their children when they go to school and some may pay for 
 
54 This assumes that parents have true expectations about the abilities of their children. For instance, if parents 
over-estimate how bright their first child is compared to their future children, they could over-invest in the 




private lessons. Nevertheless, schooling expenditures are low: in my dataset, at $23 per year 
per enrolled child, education expenditures make up less than 2% of household budgets. Indeed, 
in Senegal, most education expenditures are undertaken by the government and households’ 
direct contribution to education expenditures is less than 10%.  
 Opportunity cost of schooling 
The opportunity cost of schooling may be a greater burden for households than the direct costs 
of schooling.  Children may be needed to perform household chores in the household and/or to 
work in the family fields. When children go to school, they have less time to perform these 
tasks, and other household members are forced to work more or to diminish their consumption 
to compensate for the loss. The opportunity cost of children increases with the age of children 
since older children are more likely to be able to help their parents. In Senegal, since boys are 
expected to help in the household’s fields, it is expected that their opportunity cost of schooling 
increases with the field area. However, the number of adult men in the household should 
diminish the opportunity cost of schooling of boys by freeing them from the need to cultivate 
the fields. On the other hand, since girls are often used to take care of babies and young 
children, I can expect that the number of children will have a negative impact on girls’ 
schooling whereas the number of adult women should have a positive effect. Finally, access to 
basic services, such as water or electricity, may reduce the opportunity cost of children. Indeed, 
if households do not have access to tap water or to electricity, children may be needed to fetch 
water or collect wood or charcoal. 
 Income 
Since the marginal rate of substitution between schooling and consumption is assumed to be 
non-linear and households have to reduce their consumption in order to increase education 
expenditure, sending children to school will be costlier for poor households. Therefore, a 
greater effect of income on enrolment is expected for poor households than for rich households. 
 Household intra-allocation of resources 
In my dataset, about 23% of the children are not the son or daughter of the household head. 




that household heads have a preference for their progeny, I expect that the likelihood of being 
enrolled will be greater for the children of the household head. 
4.4 Results 
  Descriptive statistics 
The dependent variable of the model is the current enrolment status of the child in a formal 
school coded as one for currently enrolled and zero for not enrolled. I restricted the sample to 
children in the 6-18 age interval as enrolment starts officially at six in Senegal and enrolment 
drops significantly after the age of 18 (see Figure 4-1). Moreover, at this age, girls start to 
marry and to leave the household.  
 
Figure 4-1 Mean enrolment rates by age 
There are 28 individuals in the age interval 6 to 18 who are already married. Since they might 
have different characteristics and preferences toward enrolment than the rest of the dataset, I 
exclude them from my final sample. This leads to a sample of 1,501 individuals with roughly 





















Table 4-1 Sample by age and gender 
 Female Male Total 
Number of individuals aged between 6 and 18 771 758 1,529 
Number of individuals aged between 6 and 18 who are not married 745 756 1,501 
The costs and benefits of education are likely to differ according to gender. Indeed, it is 
expected that the opportunity cost of time for girls will be more dependent on the family 
structure of the household, whereas the opportunity cost of time for boys should be more 
dependent on the area cultivated by the household. For these reasons, the model in equation 
(13) is fitted separately for girls and boys. A statistical test is performed and shows that the two 
samples should be treated separately (see appendix 4.2). 
4.4.1.1 Child’s characteristics 
As can be seen in Figure 4-1, children’s enrolment rate increases with age, peaks at the age of 
11 or 12 and starts decreasing thereafter. Thus, this pattern reflects the joint effect of late 
enrolments and early drop-outs. For this reason, both age and age squared of the child are 
included in the model. A cubic term has also been tested. The relationship of the child with the 
household head is included to capture the preference of household heads for their own sons 
and daughters.  
4.4.1.2 Parents’ characteristics 
The numbers of years of schooling of the mother and of the father are included separately to 
measure parents’ educational achievement. It has been found in the literature that parental 
education is positively correlated with the likelihood of being enrolled. This effect can be due 
to differences in preferences for education being inherited or conditioned by past enrolment at 
school. Thus, parents who were living in a family with high preferences for education may 
have inherited those preferences. It is also possible that cognitive performances are inherited 
and that children whose parents have high cognitive ability are more likely to be successful at 





Although it has been shown that parental education is a predictive factor of child’s enrolment, 
the relative impact of father’s and mother’s schooling is still uncertain. Some studies in Nigeria 
and Ghana find a greater impact of mother’s schooling on education (Lincove, 2009, 
Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1997) whereas a study in Kenya finds a greater impact of father’s 
education (Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu, 2007). In Senegal, Dumas and Lambert (2010) find 
a positive and significant effect of father’s education but no significant effect for mother’s 
schooling on the likelihood of ever being enrolled and Glick and Sahn (2010) find no 
significant effect of parents’ education on the grade attained and rate of drop outs. 
I include the age of fathers and mothers as a control. Indeed, the increasing rate of enrolment 
in Senegal over the past 30 years means that older parents have a lower achievement than 
younger parents. Finally, I control for the presence of mothers and fathers in the household 
with a dummy variable. For missing fathers and mothers, age and education were set to 0. 
4.4.1.3 Household’s characteristics 
I expect that the structure of the household will have an impact on a child’s enrolment. For 
instance, a greater number of children under 5 should increase the need for girls to stay at home 
to take care of them and thus reduce the likelihood of school enrolment (Glick and Sahn, 2000). 
The effect of the number of school-aged children on enrolment is uncertain. An additional 
school-aged child in the household will compete for resources with other school-aged children 
and may reduce their enrolment. Nonetheless, an additional child will also decrease the 
opportunity cost of other children in the household. Since girls and boys do not usually perform 
the same tasks in the household, it is expected that same-gender school-aged children will have 
a positive impact on enrolment through reducing the opportunity cost, whereas school-aged 
children of a different gender should have a negative impact through reducing the household’s 
resources. Finally, the number of adult men and women in the household should have a positive 
impact on enrolment by reducing the opportunity cost of children.  
Household wealth is measured by monthly expenditures adjusted by adult equivalent55 (Deaton 
and Zaidi, 2002). Expenditures are usually considered as a good proxy for wealth in developing 
 
55 To take into account the lower financial needs of children and economies of scale in the household, total 
expenditures are divided by the number of adult equivalent in the household. The formula used to compute adult 




countries where income is usually seasonal. The variable is expressed in logarithms to take into 
account the expected non-linear impact of income on enrolment. 
Direct access to water is included as I expect that it will free children from the need to fetch 
water. Access to electricity may also have a positive impact on enrolment as it improves the 
efficiency of the household in performing some household chores and may free boys and girls 
from household chores. For instance, access to electricity may allow the ownership of a fridge 
that allows the household to shop less often. Moreover, electricity may prevent drop outs as 
children living in a household with access to electricity have better access to lighting to do their 
homework after school. Nonetheless, since access to basic services may be influenced by 
variables at the community level, I control for the percentage of households that have access 
to water and electricity in the village. Since households with a larger cultivated area will need 
a greater workforce, it is expected that the size of the area cultivated will have a negative impact 
on enrolment, especially on boys who are more likely to work in the fields.  
Finally, I introduce a dummy variable to control for the ethnicity of the household. My sample 
mainly includes the two main ethnic groups from the north of Senegal: Wolof and Pulaar. No 
significant difference is expected between the schooling of Wolof children and Pulaar children 
but I hope to capture some of the household heterogeneity. A third ethnicity, Moorish, makes 
up about 2% of my sample. Unlike Wolof and Pulaar, Moorish are often migrants form 
Mauritania and may be culturally different from Pulaar and Wolof. 
4.4.1.4 School characteristics 
Distance to a school facility increases the cost of schooling by adding transport costs to the 
other costs of schooling. Moreover, the youngest children may be considered too weak to walk 
to the next schooling facility. 95% of the children in my sample live in a village with a primary 
school but only 48% live in a place where there is a secondary school and 25% live more than 
10 kilometres away from a secondary school. As I expect that transport costs are concave, I 
introduce the number of kilometres to a secondary school in logarithms. 
The benefits of schooling may vary with the quality of schooling. I introduce the ratio of 
teachers per students in the closest primary school to control for the quality of schooling. Since 




the sign of the ratio of teachers per student should be negative. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that, at 35 to 1, the ratio of teachers per student is far below the national average of 52. Indeed, 
ratios of teachers per students are usually lower in rural areas in Senegal. 
4.4.1.5 Community characteristics 
About 8% of the children are enrolled in a Koranic school. Unfortunately, I do not have data 
on the availability of Koranic schooling by village, but I proxy it by the percentage of other 
school-aged children in the village who are enrolled in a Koranic school. 
Finally, I introduce regional dummies to capture geographical heterogeneity. 
It is worth noting that some of the variables might change over time and that older children 
might have faced a different context that still impacts their education participation at the time 
of the survey. The child’s and parents’ characteristics are probably stable over time but 
household composition, household wealth and school and community characteristics may have 
changed, although most of the variables in the model are probably changing relatively slowly. 
In the absence of panel data, I cannot observe past values and estimated coefficients could 





Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics 





Formal enrolment 0.672 0.470 0.646 0.478 
Koranic enrolment 0.07 0.256 0.084 0.277 
Age 11.901 3.487 12.030 3.630 
Child of household head 0.711 0.454 0.733 0.443 
Father’s number of years of schooling 1.327 2.894 1.681 3.432 
Age of father 39.299 23.896 40.064 23.016 
Mother’s number of years of schooling 0.885 2.202 1.098 2.446 
Age of mother 32.539 17.910 32.070 17.342 
Father is missing 0.242 0.429 0.219 0.414 
Mother is missing 0.200 0.400 0.198 0.399 
Number of children (under 5) 1.877 1.431 1.980 1.419 
Number of school-aged boys 1.536 1.330 2.588 1.270 
Number of school-aged girls 2.420 1.257 1.524 1.238 
Number of adult men 2.115 1.322 2.225 1.357 
Number of adult women 2.620 1.340 2.585 1.378 
Monthly expenditures in adult equivalent 
(in log) 
4.340 0.419 4.353 0.426 
Household have no tap water 0.466 0.499 0.463 0.499 
Household does not have electricity 0.399 0.490 0.331 0.471 
Area cultivated (in log) 0.952 0.510 0.978 0.521 
Ethnicity     
Wolof 0.52 0.5 0.57 0.5 
Pulaar 0.457 0.498 0.399 0.490 
Moorish 0.023 0.150 0.032 0.176 
Primary school in the village 0.953 0.212 0.955 0.207 
Number of kilometres to the closest 
secondary school (in log) 
1.317 1.215 1.186 1.195 
Ratio of teachers per students in the 
closest primary school 
35.339 13.127 35.874 13.127 
Rural community     
Ross Bethio 0.212 0.409 0.215 0.411 
Gae 0.426 0.495 0.448 0.498 
Guede 0.362 0.481 0.336 0.473 
Percentage of households with no access 
to electricity in the village 
37.809 36.127 33.638 34.686 
Percentage of households with no access 
to tap water in the village 
46.173 41.068 45.411 40.434 
Percentage of school-aged children 
enrolled in a Koranic school in the 
village 
8.071 8.111 8.250 8.291 






 Determinants of schooling for boys and girls 
Table 4-3 Determinants of being currently enrolled at school 
Variables Girls Boys 
      
Age 1.130*** 0.828*** 
Age squared -0.083*** -0.056*** 
Age cubic 0.002*** 0.001** 
Child of household head 0.122* -0.005 
   
Father number of years of schooling 0.006 0.005 
Age of father 0.001 -0.008** 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.006 0.033*** 
Age of mother -0.008** 0.006 
Father is missing 0.229 -0.403** 
Mother is missing -0.327** 0.211 
   
Number of children under 5 -0.052*** -0.009 
Number of school-aged boys -0.002 0.023 
Number of school-aged girls 0.005 -0.010 
Number of adult men -0.010 -0.040* 
Number of adult women 0.016 0.002 
   
Monthly expenditures in adult equivalent (log) 0.127** 0.057 
Household has to fetch water -0.074 0.036 
Household does not have electricity -0.146** -0.187*** 
Area cultivated (log) -0.042 0.023 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.088 -0.036 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.271 -0.364** 
   
Primary school in the village 0.266*** -0.017 
Number of kilometres to secondary school (log) -0.067*** -0.061** 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school -0.002 -0.002 
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) 
-0.044 -0.027 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) 0.015 -0.119 
Percentage of households with no electricity in the village 0.003*** 0.001 
Percentage of households with no direct access to water in 
the village 
0.001 -0.000 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic 
in the village 
-0.009** -0.011*** 
   
Constant -4.902*** -3.297*** 
   
Observations 740 752 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Standard 
errors are clustered by household. 
The model is fitted separately for boys and girls. I perform the test computed by Allison (1999) 
(see Appendix 4.2) to test the equality of residual variations and coefficients between the boys’ 
and girls’ sub-samples. Indeed, in a logit model, coefficients can be compared across groups 




the null hypothesis of equal residual variation, but I reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis 
of equal coefficients across groups. Thus, the coefficients for the model for boys and the model 
for girls are significantly different and the estimates have to be computed separately. 
As expected, age and age squared are statistically significant for boys and girls. The cubic term 
is also statistically significant. The maximum of enrolment is reached at the age of 10.8 for 
girls and at the age of 11.4 for boys. The minimum is 18.3 for girls and 20.6 for boys, out of 
the range of my sample suggesting that school enrolment decreases with age at a diminishing 
rate. At the child level, to be the daughter of the household head is associated with an increase 
in the probability of enrolment by 0.12, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Nevertheless, no significant effect was found for boys.  
Father’s education is not associated with an increase in enrolment for boys or girls and father’s 
age has a negative and significant effect only for boys. The characteristics of the father 
therefore is correlated with the schooling decision of boys but not for girls. Older fathers may 
have more traditional values and a lower preference for education than younger ones. They 
might also consider that they are more likely to die before their children benefit from their 
education and thus be less willing to invest in their education. Symmetrically, mother’s age has 
a negative impact on girls’ education. Mother’s education has a positive and significant effect 
on boys’ enrolment but not on girls’ enrolment. An additional year of mother’s schooling is 
associated with an increase of 0.03 percentage points in the probability of boy’s enrolment. 
Mother’s education is often found to have a positive impact on a child’s enrolment and some 
studies in Africa (Glick and Sahn, 2000, Burke and Beegle, 2004) find a greater impact of 
mother’s education on girls than on boys. These studies argue that education of women 
increases their bargaining power, and, since women would have a greater concern for girls’ 
education than men, it should increase girls’ education. I find the opposite pattern here, 
suggesting that the most educated women are better informed of education’s benefits and send 
their sons to school to reap these benefits. It is not surprising that women are more sensitive to 
the potential benefits of education than men, since women often have to rely on their children 
in their old age, whereas men are usually supported by their younger wives (Lloyd and Gage-
Brandon, 1994). Figure 4-2 shows the marginal effect of mother’s education on boys and girls. 




years of schooling of the mother increases, the gap between boys and girls closes and, 
eventually, sons of highly educated women are more likely to enrol than daughters. 
 
Figure 4-2: Predicted probability of enrolment for boys and girls according to mother's 
education. Other variables are estimated at their sample mean.  
To see if my results are driven by the inclusion of individuals with a missing father and/or 
mother, I computed my estimates on the sub-samples of children with no missing fathers, no 
missing mothers and no missing fathers or missing mothers simultaneously (see appendix 4.3 
for girls and appendix 4.4 for boys). The exclusion of missing fathers and/or mothers does not 
change the conclusions about the effects of parents’ education whereas mother’s age is no 
longer statistically significant for girls. Furthermore, in column (4) for girls and (10) for boys, 
I include the number of years of schooling and age of the household head instead of variables 
at the father level. These variables are sometimes used when data at the father level are missing 
(Diagne, 2005). Father’s schooling could be irrelevant if household heads take the decision on 




schooling of the household head does not change my conclusions.56 Also, the presence of 
fostered children could bias downward the coefficient associated with parental schooling if the 
correlation between parents’ and children’s education has a genetic component, but, maybe 
because of the small number of fostered children, coefficients associated with parental 
education are similar when fostered children are excluded.  Finally, I tested alternative 
measures of schooling: a dummy to control if the mother/father has ever been to school and a 
dummy coded one if the individual is literate and zero otherwise. My results show a similar 
pattern with no statistically significant effects of mother’s and father’s attainment and literacy 
on girls and positive effects of mother’s attainment and literacy for boys.57 Of course, the 
estimated coefficients should be interpreted as representing correlations since parental 
education can be endogenous. The next chapter of the thesis attempts to review more 
thoroughly the impact of parental education considering the potential endogeneity bias.  
As expected, the number of children under five years of age has a negative and significant 
effect on enrolment for girls but not for boys. An additional child in the household is associated 
with a decrease in the probability of being enrolled of 5.2 percentage points for girls. 
Nevertheless, the other variables at the household level are not significant for girls. Thus, a 
larger number of children increases the need for school-aged girls to stay at home to take care 
of them. Of course, the number of children in the household is not random and if fertility and 
schooling decisions are jointly taken by the household, it is possible that the negative effects 
of a larger number of children reflects lower preferences for education. A larger number of 
adult women is not a protective factor for girls.58 For boys, the variable “number of adult men” 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. The negative effect does not support my assumption 
that a greater number of adult men decreases the opportunity cost of boys but may suggest that 
men divert part of the household’s resources to themselves. 
Whereas the need to fetch water outside the household has no significant effect on enrolment, 
access to electricity has a strong statistically significant effect for boys and girls. The 
 
56 I do not include both father’s schooling and household head’s schooling because the two variables are highly 
collinear (r=0.88) 
57 The interaction between mother’s and father’s schooling was also tested but it is not significant for boys or 
girls. 
58 An interaction term between the number of children and the number of women has been tested for girls. It 




probability of enrolment of a girl living in a household with no access to electricity is 0.14 
lower than for a girl living in a household with access to electricity. The difference is even 
greater for boys (0.19). Since I control for the percentage of access to electricity in the village, 
the estimated coefficient is purged from any geographical effect. The coefficient on land area 
cultivated is negative but not statistically significant. It is possible that the expenditures 
variable does not fully control for household wealth and that the variable land area also captures 
the fact that households might be better off. In this case, the negative effect of a larger land 
area, which could increase the demand for child labour, could be balanced by the greater wealth 
of these households.  
Monthly expenditure, which is a proxy for wealth, has a positive impact and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for girls but the coefficient is not statistically significant for boys. 
The greater responsiveness of enrolment for girls than for boys has already been found in other 
studies in Western Africa (Glick and Sahn, 2000, Lincove, 2009). As can be seen in Figure 
4-3, the marginal effect of the logarithm of expenditure on enrolment is linear. The difference 
in enrolment between the first decile and the last decile is 18.7 percentage points for girls 
(significant at the 5% level) whereas the difference is not statistically significant for boys. 
Finally, it is worth noting that poor households favour boys over girls whereas rich households 
favour girls. This could suggest that girls’ education is a luxury good in Senegal. It is harder to 
explain the absence of association between income and boys’ education and, notably, the fact 
that in rich households boys are less likely to be enrolled than girls. It could be that when there 
are no financial constraints, other variables play a role for boys, such as the desire for parents 
to have boys follow a Koranic education. It could also be that, because of gender 
discrimination, girls need to be more educated than boys to access the same jobs and rich 






Figure 4-3 Predicted probability of enrolment according to expenditures. Other variables are 
set at their sample mean.  
Table 4-4: Predicted probability of enrolment at different level of expenditures 
 Girls Boys 
At the lowest decile  0.612 0.642 
At median 0.708 0.683 
At the highest decile 0.798 0.727 
Whereas the quality of schooling, proxied by the ratio of teachers per student, is not statistically 
significant for girls and boys, the distance to the closest schooling facility is correlated with a 
lower enrolment. The presence of a primary school in the village is strongly correlated with 
more enrolment for girls. Nonetheless, because of the small number of observations in my 
sample with no primary school in the village, this result is not robust to alternative 
specifications. Thus, appendix 4.5 shows that, after the inclusion of village fixed-effects, this 
variable is no longer significant. The distance to the closest secondary school has a negative 
effect on the probability of enrolment for boys and girls and seems robust to alternative 



































Finally, at the village level, the percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic school 
is statistically significant and is negatively correlated with enrolment for boys and girls. It 
shows that this alternative form of schooling may compete with formal schooling in Senegal.  
 Robustness checks 
4.4.3.1  Accounting for endogeneity 
The estimated effect of electricity may be biased if access to electricity is correlated with 
unobservable variables. For instance, the decision by a household to connect may be correlated 
with its preferences toward children’s education. Moreover, access to electricity may be a 
proxy for a household’s permanent income. If monthly expenditures are only weakly correlated 
with household’s permanent income, then access to electricity will capture the effect of 
permanent income on enrolment. To control for the potential endogeneity of access to 
electricity, I use the availability of electricity in the village as an instrumental variable. I 
consider that a village has access to electricity if at least one household is connected to the 
national grid or if the village was considered connected to the national grid in a 2003 World 
Bank survey report.59 In addition, I control for variables such as school availability in the 
village, water availability and distance to the main road but not the average number of 
households having access to electricity, which is correlated with my instrumental variable.  
A valid instrumental variable must comply with some key assumptions. First, it needs to be 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable of interest. This is the relevance assumption. 
In this case, even if households can have access to electricity through other means, such as 
solar panels (6% of the sample) or electric generator (1% of the sample), most of the 
household’s access electricity through the national grid making village access to the national 
grid a strong predictor of whether households have electricity.60 There is also some variation 
in access to electricity in villages connected to the grid with as little as 16% of households 
having electricity in some of these villages while close to 100% of households have electricity 
in other villages. Secondly, the exclusion restriction implies that the instrumental variable 
should not have a direct causal impact on the outcome variable. I believe that grid availability 
 
59 Information was extracted from World Bank (2003)  
60 Another assumption is monotonicity, that is the instrumental variable has a monotonic effect on the 
endogenous regressor. This assumption would be violated if some households would be less likely to have 




in the village should not cause school enrolment. Finally, the exogeneity assumption implies 
that the instrument is not correlated with unobservable confounding variables correlated with 
the outcome of interest. It is possible that grid availability is correlated with village 
characteristics that have a positive impact on enrolment, such as school availability, better 
transportation or water and sanitation. This is the reason why I control for these observable 
village characteristics and I assume that there are no remaining confounding variables that I do 
not control for. This is confirmed when I introduce grid availability in a model with enrolment 
as a dependent variable and the endogenous variable and control variables; the p-value 
associated with grid availability is 0.99.   
The endogenous regressor, not having electricity, and the dependent variable, being currently 
enrolled, are both discrete variables leading to estimation difficulties. Indeed, an instrumental 
variable model with a binary outcome makes the assumption that the endogenous regressor is 
continuous (Wooldridge, 2002). Angrist and Pischke (2008) suggest using a linear probability 
model in this case. However, the parameters are not scaled and cannot be compared to the logit 
model. This is why I provide an OLS estimate as a comparison.   
The sample includes boys and girls as the coefficients for electricity in the household for boys 
and girls are similar in the OLS model and I assume it should not be different according to the 
sex of the child.61 Having a larger sample should help to give more precise estimates as 
instrumental variable estimates usually have larger standard errors. 
Results are reported in Table 4-5. After controlling for endogeneity, the coefficient associated 
with electricity in the household is really close to the one estimated with an OLS model. 
However, the standard error is twice as large, and the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
An endogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator yields consistent 
estimates (p=0.8) and suggests that the OLS estimate is not biased because of endogeneity.    
Therefore, previous estimates for girls and boys seem to be consistent and improving access to 
electricity could then be a way to improve schooling, although without more information on 
costs and feasibility it may not be the most cost-effective alternative to do so. Nonetheless, I 
am unable to assess if the impact comes from an improvement in household efficiency that 
 




decreases the opportunity cost of children or from the improvement in conditions of study for 
children. 
Table 4-5: Instrumental variable estimates 
Variables OLS IV 
      
Household does not have electricity -0.085** -0.100 
Standard error (0.043) (0.098) 
   
First stage regression   
Village has access to electricity  -0.493*** 
Standard error  (0.061) 
   
Observations 1,490 1,490 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered by household. 
 
4.4.3.2 Measuring income using an asset-based indicator 
Many studies of the demand for schooling in developing countries use indicators based on the 
ownership of durable goods as a proxy for wealth. It is notably the case for studies using DHS 
data as the DHS does not collect expenditure data. Thus, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) argue that 
asset-based indicators perform as well as household expenditure in predicting enrolment. 
Nevertheless, asset-based indicators may confound the effects of income and the effects of the 
ownership per se of these assets (Glick and Sahn, 2006). For instance, the ownership of a gas 
cooker may be a proxy for wealth but, at the same time, it may allow households to spend less 
time cooking and increase children’s available time for schooling.  
In order to compare my results with studies that use an asset-based indicator, I constructed a 
similar indicator based on the ownership of durable goods.62,63 One of the problems 
 
62 Durables goods included are: fridge, air conditioning, fan, radio, TV and vehicle. 
63 A principal component analysis on the ownership of goods was estimated and the vector of the first dimension 




encountered with the inclusion of this indicator is its collinearity with access to electricity, 
which is typical of many asset-based indicators in other studies that include a large number of 
electrical appliances. For this reason, I present in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 specifications with 
and without the access to electricity variable. The results show that the asset-based indicator is 
never statistically significant when I control for the household’s access to electricity. On the 
other hand, the inclusion of this indicator does not have much effect on the coefficients 
associated with monthly expenditure. The results in columns (4) and (8) are similar to those 
from studies that use an asset-based indicator. In this case, the coefficient associated with the 
asset-based indicator is statistically significant at the 5% level. Nonetheless, it is hard to 
interpret the coefficient of the asset-based indicator as a proxy for wealth since I do not control 
for access to electricity. Thus, although asset-based indicators may be good predictors of 
enrolment, they do not allow us to reach firm conclusions about the impact of household wealth 





Table 4-6: Results with an asset-based indicator. Girls. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled 
          
Monthly expenditure (in log) 0.121** 0.127**   
Asset-based indicator 0.019 0.046* 0.030 0.059** 
Household does not have electricity -0.122  -0.131  
     
Age 1.138*** 1.126*** 1.134*** 1.122*** 
Age squared -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.083*** 
Age cubic 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Child of household head 0.125* 0.137* 0.122* 0.133* 
 
    
Father number of years of schooling 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 
Age of father 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Age of mother -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 
Father is missing 0.230 0.244 0.182 0.194 
Mother is missing -0.330** -0.339** -0.291* -0.300* 
     
Number of children -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
Number of school-aged boys -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 
Number of school-aged girls 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.000 
Number of adult men -0.013 -0.015 -0.022 -0.025 
Number of adult women 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.014 
     
Household has to fetch water -0.073 -0.069 -0.092 -0.089 
Area cultivated (log) -0.046 -0.052 -0.030 -0.036 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.087 -0.108 -0.057 -0.078 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.272 -0.269 -0.302* -0.300* 
 
    
Primary school in the village 0.265*** 0.244** 0.262*** 0.240** 
Number of kilometers to secondary school (log) -0.065** -0.060** -0.068*** -0.062** 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
    
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) -0.051 -0.061 -0.084 -0.095 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) 0.012 0.026 -0.011 0.004 
Percentage of households with no electricity in the village 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 
Percentage of households with no direct access to water in 
the village 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic 
in the village -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008* 
 
    
Constant -4.899*** -4.874*** -4.307*** -4.254*** 
     
Observations 740 740 740 740 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Standard 





Table 4-7: Results with an asset-based indicator. Boys. 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled 
          
Monthly expenditure (in log) 0.042 0.043   
Asset-based indicator 0.041 0.075** 0.047 0.081** 
Household does not have electricity -0.140*  -0.140*  
     
Age 0.817*** 0.800*** 0.817*** 0.800*** 
Age squared -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.054*** 
Age cubic 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
Child of household head 0.003 0.012 0.001 0.010 
 
    
Father number of years of schooling 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Age of father -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
Age of mother 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
Father is missing -0.404** -0.399** -0.408** -0.403** 
Mother is missing 0.199 0.189 0.201 0.191 
     
Number of children -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 
Number of school-aged boys 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 
Number of school-aged girls -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
Number of adult men -0.044** -0.046** -0.048** -0.050** 
Number of adult women -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
     
Household has to fetch water 0.036 0.038 0.031 0.033 
Area cultivated (log) 0.011 -0.003 0.014 -0.000 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.033 -0.040 -0.027 -0.034 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.364** -0.380** -0.366** -0.382** 
 
    
Primary school in the village -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
Number of kilometers to secondary school (log) -0.060** -0.064** -0.059** -0.063** 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
    
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) -0.043 -0.066 -0.053 -0.077 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) -0.123 -0.121 -0.124 -0.122 
Percentage of households with no electricity in the village 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Percentage of households with no direct access to water in 
the village -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic 
in the village -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 
    
Constant -3.176*** -3.135*** -2.985*** -2.937*** 
     
Observations 752 752 752 752 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Standard 





4.4.3.3 Additional model specifications 
4.4.3.3.1 Multinomial logit 
One of the limitations of the model specification is that I did not explicitly take into account 
the availability of Koranic schooling. Indeed, as much as 7.7% of school-aged children in my 
sample are enrolled in a Koranic school. In those schools, students learn by heart verses of the 
Koran and to read and write Arabic. The most successful students may become religious 
leaders. In Senegal, Koranic schooling is not recognised as part of the formal schooling system 
since it does not teach children basic skills such as counting and literacy in French. In my 
sample, almost all villages have at least one child attending a Koranic school, suggesting good 
availability of those schools.  
Even if the benefits of Koranic and formal schooling are clearly different, the costs associated 
with the two alternatives do not differ much. Like primary schooling, Koranic schools are 
usually free (André and Demonsant, 2009) and households face a similar opportunity cost of 
schooling whether they send their children to a Koranic or a formal school. Thus, households 
can clearly choose three different strategies of schooling for their children: no schooling, 
Koranic schooling or formal schooling. 
To take into account the presence of Koranic schooling, I estimate a multinomial logit model 
with the three possible and mutually exclusive alternatives of schooling: no schooling, Koranic 
schooling or formal schooling. Since there are no Moorish girls who attend a Koranic school 
and no boys who attend one in villages with no primary school, I face a problem of perfect 
prediction. To overcome this problem, I exclude those observations from the sample. To ease 
comparisons, I use the same restrictions of samples for boys and girls and I present the results 
of logit models on the restricted samples.  
Results are presented in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. The marginal effects for boys and girls 
computed from the restricted samples are similar to those from the whole sample. Comparison 
with the marginal effects of the multinomial logit shows that this alternative specification does 
not change my conclusions.  
However, multinomial logit models assume the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 




going to a formal school would not change if Koranic schooling was no longer available. To 
test this assumption, I use the test proposed by Hausman and McFadden (1984). The test 
requires that the coefficients of a full multinomial model and a multinomial model without 
alternatives are equal. I present the results in Appendix 4.6. I cannot reject the equality of 
coefficients for boys and girls. Thus, the IIA assumption is not violated and there is no evidence 
of incorrect model specification. 
More complex models could relax the assumption. For instance, multinomial probit relaxes the 
IIA assumption. Unfortunately, its computation in Stata does not allow us to relax this 
assumption (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Nested logit requires a nested structure of choices 
to be specified that splits alternatives into groups. For instance, in my case, formal and Koranic 
schooling could be grouped together. Nonetheless, as I have only three alternatives, I have a 
degenerate nest, i.e. there is only one alternative in a branch of the decision tree. In this case, 
variables at the alternative level are required to estimate the model.64 Since, I do not have 
variables at this level, I could not test this specification. 
  
 




Table 4-8: Logit and multinomial logit for girls. 
  Logit Multinomial logit 
Variables Formal Koranic  Formal  
        
Age 1.167*** -0.052 1.135*** 
Age squared -0.088*** 0.004 -0.086*** 
Age cubic 0.002*** -0.000 0.002*** 
Child of household head 0.189*** -0.008 0.183*** 
 
   
Father number of years of schooling 0.004 -0.002 0.001 
Age of father 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.003 0.002 0.007 
Age of mother -0.009** 0.001 -0.008** 
Father is missing 0.304* -0.003 0.251 
Mother is missing -0.337** 0.024 -0.281* 
 
   
Number of children -0.047** 0.008** -0.042** 
Number of school-aged boys 0.012 -0.002 0.010 
Number of school-aged girls -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
Number of adult men -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 
Number of adult women 0.005 0.008* 0.013 
 
   
Monthly expenditures in adult equivalent (log) 0.175*** -0.004 0.171*** 
Household has to fetch water -0.051 0.011 -0.055 
Household does not have electricity -0.160** 0.020 -0.139* 
Area cultivated (log) -0.054 0.014 -0.038 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.126* 0.006 -0.113* 
    
Number of kilometers to secondary school (log) -0.082*** 0.005 -0.074*** 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school -0.003 0.001* -0.002 
 
   
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) -0.006 0.015 0.003 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) 0.054 -0.004 0.047 
Percentage of households with no electricity in the 
village 0.003*** -0.000 0.003*** 
Percentage of households with no direct access to 
water in the village 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a 
Koranic in the village -0.010** 0.002** -0.007* 
    
Constant -4.900*** 0.060 -4.773*** 
    
Observations 672 672 672 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Standard 





Table 4-9: Logit and multinomial logit for boys. 
  Logit Multinomial logit 
Variables Formal Koranic  Formal 
        
Age 0.850*** -0.110* 0.822*** 
Age squared -0.058*** 0.008* -0.057*** 
Age cubic 0.001** -0.000 0.001*** 
Child of household head 0.049 -0.020 0.059 
 
   
Father number of years of schooling 0.002 -0.000 0.002 
Age of father -0.008** 0.001 -0.007** 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.029*** -0.002 0.030*** 
Age of mother 0.006 -0.001 0.005 
Father is missing -0.386* 0.062 -0.369** 
Mother is missing 0.259 -0.080 0.221 
 
   
Number of children -0.010 0.001 -0.012 
Number of school-aged boys 0.023 -0.006 0.017 
Number of school-aged girls -0.012 -0.002 -0.013 
Number of adult men -0.040* 0.003 -0.034 
Number of adult women 0.006 0.013** 0.023 
 
   
Monthly expenditures in adult equivalent (log) 0.098 -0.008 0.087 
Household has to fetch water 0.080 -0.026 0.054 
Household does not have electricity -0.176*** 0.009 -0.155** 
Area cultivated (log) 0.026 0.014 0.036 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.010 0.061** 0.019 
    
Number of kilometers to secondary school (log) -0.081*** 0.015 -0.069** 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) 0.020 0.057* -0.003 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) -0.070 0.010 -0.094 
Percentage of households with no electricity in the village 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Percentage of households with no direct access to water 
in the village -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic 
in the village -0.014*** 0.006*** -0.009** 
Constant -3.652*** 0.304 -3.415*** 
    
Observations 679 679 679 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Standard 





4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate the determinants of schooling at the household level. Results show 
that determinants for girls and boys are significantly different suggesting that barriers to 
schooling vary by sex and a separate analysis is more informative. Like other studies, 
household wealth is found to be correlated with school participation but only for girls and the 
lowest school participation of girls is concentrated among poor households. Financial 
constraints seem to matter only for girls, maybe because very poor households tend to prioritise 
boys. Access to financial resources is also probably what explains why daughters, but not sons, 
of the household head are more likely to go to school. Household heads usually control the 
household’s financial resources and it shows that they have a limited altruism for children who 
are not their own. Households seem then to behave as a separate cell rather than a whole with 
decisions about children made in relations to their position in the household. This will be 
explored further in Chapter Six. 
Contrary to Dumas and Lambert (2010), father’s education is not statistically significant and 
mother’s education is only significant for boys. This is a puzzling result that is not in line with 
the rest of the literature that usually finds a stronger effect of mother’s education for girls. This 
could be consistent with the fact that women are on average younger than their husbands and 
will rely on their children for their old age. More educated women may favour their son’s 
education as they know that men have better prospects than women in the labour market in 
Senegal.  
The results also show that the opportunity cost of time of children seems to be important as 
girls are impacted by young children and boys benefit from the presence of adult men in the 
household. There is also a strong gender divide on roles that girls and boys perform in the 
households. The fact that access to electricity seems to be a determinant of schooling may also 
derive from the fact that electricity reduces household chores and frees up children’s time.  
Although primary school availability is good, the lack of secondary schools is still a clear 
barrier to schooling for girls and boys. However, the observed quality of schooling, proxied by 




Finally, social norms seem to matter and this study fills a gap in the understanding of the choice 
between formal and Koranic schooling in Senegal. In areas with a large number of students 
enrolled in Koranic schooling, both girls and boys are less likely to be enrolled at school. Also, 
households from the Moorish ethnicity are less likely to send their children to school even after 













Chapter 5: Effect of parental education on children’s education in 





As noted by Behrman (1997), mothers’ education is often thought to have a large and positive 
impact on children’s education. It is widely believed that a child’s education is influenced more 
by the education of his/her mother than by the education of his/her father. Thus, female 
education is often supported for both its positive effects on the wellbeing of women and its 
effects on the future schooling of children, especially girls who are supposed to be even more 
influenced by their mother’s schooling than boys.  
The results presented in Chapter 3 somewhat match this pattern. Indeed, I show that mother’s 
schooling has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of going to school 
for boys but not for girls, whereas father’s schooling is never found to be statistically significant 
for boys or girls. Thus, this finding is in line with the conventional wisdom that mother’s 
schooling is more important than father’s schooling in children’s education but, surprisingly, 
the coefficient of mother’s schooling was lower for daughters than for sons. In contrast, a study 
by Dumas and Lambert (2010) finds a positive and significant effect of father’s schooling on 
children’s education in Senegal and the effect of father’s schooling is found to be even greater 
than the effect of mother’s schooling. Knowing the relative effects of mothers’ and fathers’ 
schooling in Senegal is important from a policy point of view: it can help to better target 
children who are at risk of being out-of-school, quantify better the long term benefits of 
investments in girls’ education and shed some light on the decision making process of 
households in Senegal. Indeed, an absence of effects of mothers’ schooling could suggest that 
women are excluded from the decision of sending children to school.  
Results from Dumas and Lambert (2010) and my results are hard to compare as the sampling 
methodology, the sub-samples, schooling outcomes studied and control variables are different. 
Nonetheless, it is puzzling to find opposite conclusions on the effects of parental schooling for 
the same country and it is important to understand the reasons that explain this difference. 
Indeed, studies on the demand for schooling typically use very different methodologies, which 
makes the comparison of their results difficult. By understanding what methodological aspects 
influence the difference in findings between Dumas and Lambert (2010) and my own findings, 
I aim to shed light on the methodological aspects that are important to take into account in the 




what makes mother’s schooling more important than father’s schooling in Senegal, I will try 
to gain a better understanding of intergenerational mobility in this country. 
In this chapter, I first present the transmission channels of parental education to children’s 
education. In section 5.3, I survey the different studies that estimate the effects of parental 
education on children’s schooling decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Senegal. I look at 
general patterns in the differences of methodology that may explain differences in findings in 
the effects of parental education. Section 5.4 presents the differences in sampling and 
methodology between my results and the results of Dumas and Lambert (2010). It aims to 
assess if the two samples used are comparable and, then, to understand why the conclusions 
reached are different. Finally, section 5.5 discusses other methodological issues that are not 
taken into account in Dumas and Lambert (2010) and tries to answer the question of which is 
the more important determinant of children’s education in Senegal: father’s schooling or 
mother’s schooling. 
5.2 Transmission channels of parents’ education to children’s education 
First of all, it is important to distinguish between schooling and education. Education means 
acquiring knowledge and reasoning skills whereas schooling is only a means to acquire 
education. Education for individuals with the same level of schooling may vary according to 
their home and community environment, such as their parents’ schooling or the quality of 
school they attended, and to their cognitive abilities. Thus, schooling must be seen as one of 
the choices made by parents to increase their children’s education. Nonetheless, children’s 
education is not limited to the official curriculum and parents may wish that their children 
acquire other knowledge such as farming skills or religious knowledge. Moreover, parents may 
try to teach their children how to read and write. However, I focus here on the formal aspects 
of education such as the ability to read and write. Since literacy is highly correlated with the 
number of years of schooling (see  Figure 5-1), I consider the number of years of schooling as 






Figure 5-1 Probability of being literate by number of years of schooling (adults only) 
Parental schooling is found to be an important determinant of children’s schooling and 
education in most studies (Behrman, 1997). I present here the different transmission channels 
that may explain this relationship (see Figure 5-2).  
 Direct effects 
Parental education has a direct effect on children’s education because more educated parents 
are more efficient at raising their children. Parents with more schooling may have more 
information to select the most efficient school inputs for their children and, usually, they are 
more able to control the schoolwork of their children or to help them in their studies. In Senegal, 
this effect can be particularly important since individuals who have no schooling cannot usually 
speak French whereas school education is entirely in French. Thus, it has been found that 
primary school children who speak French at home are more successful at school (PASEC, 
2009). Moreover, in Senegal as in most African countries, there are few alternatives to parental 
care, such as kindergarten for young children or private tuition for older children, that could 
help children who do not receive help at home and mitigate the negative effects of having 
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 Indirect effects 
Parental schooling may be associated with a shift in parental preferences for schooling and may 
allow parents to provide a better environment for the schooling of children. 
5.2.2.1 Preferences  
Schooling may provide more information about the returns to schooling to parents. Indeed, if 
parents do not properly estimate the returns to schooling it may bias their investment in 
children’s schooling. It is not uncommon that parents have a biased estimate of returns to 
schooling. For instance, it has been found that in the Dominican Republic individuals tend to 
underestimate the returns to schooling (Jensen, 2010) whereas in Madagascar, even if parents 
are correct on average, they tend to overestimate the returns to high levels of schooling and 
underestimate the returns to low levels of schooling (Nguyen, 2008). There is no similar 
evidence for Senegal, but if parents also underestimate the returns to schooling and if parents 
with more schooling are less likely to be biased in their beliefs, then parental education should 
increase children’s education through the increase in perceived returns to schooling, especially 
at lower levels of schooling.  
Education is associated with more bargaining power for women (Friedberg and Webb, 2006) 
and, therefore, it gives them a greater say in the household’s preferences. For instance, in my 
dataset, 36% of the mothers who have been to school are involved in decisions concerning their 
children’s schooling, whereas only 27% of those who have not been to school are involved in 
these decisions. Moreover, we can expect that women have higher preferences for children’s 
education than men. Indeed, in Senegal, wives are typically younger than their husbands65 and, 
therefore, they depend more on their children to support them during their old age than their 
husbands who usually rely on their younger wives. Thus, mother’s education can change a 
household’s preferences toward education by giving more power to women who are more 
likely to have pro-child education preferences than men. 
 




5.2.2.2 Better environment 
More educated parents are more likely to provide a suitable environment for their children. 
First, schooling is associated with higher earnings and greater wealth is found to be positively 
associated with children’s schooling in most of the studies in sub-Saharan Africa ((Glick and 
Sahn, 2000), (Bommier and Lambert, 2000) (Deininger, 2003) (Lincove, 2009) (Kabubo-
Mariara and Mwabu, 2007) (Blunch and Verner, 2001)). But wealth is not the only intermediate 
outcome that is correlated with parental schooling and with children’s schooling. Thus, more 
educated women have fewer children on average and, therefore, resources between children 
are less diluted. However, it is worth noting that these two relationships are weak in my dataset. 
Indeed, education of women is only weakly associated with the number of children a woman 
has. Thus, based on a simple correlation, an additional year of education is associated with 0.05 
fewer children for women and the correlation is not statistically significant for men. Also, 
women with some education start having children later; thus according to DHS (2005) the 15-
19 year old fertility rate in Senegal was 142/1,000 for women with no education and 80/1,000 
for women with primary education. Older women can potentially have more bargaining power, 
more personal resources and be more mature, which could benefit the education of their 
children.  The impact of schooling on earnings is harder to measure since I do not have data at 
the individual level for income. However, as a rough estimate, I find that an increase of one 
year in the average number of years of schooling of adults in the household is associated with 
an increase in expenditures in adult equivalent of 2.6%. 
Another indirect effect may come through community characteristics. Lack of schooling 
facilities is a major barrier to schooling for children in sub-Saharan Africa (Filmer, 2007) and 
we can expect that parental schooling is correlated with the availability of schooling facilities. 
Indeed, parents who have more education and stronger preferences toward schooling may be 
more likely to move to areas where schools are available. Even if the parents have not moved, 
we can expect that the availability of schooling in the present is correlated with the availability 
of schooling in the area in the past. Thus, parents and children are more likely to be schooled 
because of the availability of schooling facilities. Moreover, more educated parents may have 
more say in governmental decisions and influence where schools are built. On the other hand, 
governments may wish to build schools in the most deprived areas and, in this case, areas with 




schooling and the community infrastructure can go both ways (see Figure 5-2) and the change 
induced by controlling for community or school characteristics in the estimated impact of 
parental schooling is unknown a priori (Behrman, 1997).  
Finally, one important indirect effect is positive assortative matching; that is more educated 
individuals tend to marry more educated spouses. Thus, the correlation between mother’s 
schooling and father’s schooling is 0.22 in my dataset which is much lower than the average 
correlation reported by Behrman (1997) of 0.5 to 0.6. As a result, an important indirect effect 
of father’s (mother’s) schooling comes through the fact that children who have more educated 
fathers (mothers) tend to have more educated mothers (fathers). 
All these indirect transmission channels can usually be controlled for in estimates. 
Nevertheless, if we want to estimate the total effect of parental education, it is important to 
remove these control variables. In addition, the relative impact of father’s and mother’s 
schooling may be biased by the inclusion or exclusion of these control variables. For instance, 
Behrman (1997) finds that controlling for household income reduces the coefficient associated 
with father’s schooling more than the coefficient associated with mother’s schooling, whereas 
controlling for the number of children has the opposite effect. This is consistent with the fact 
that father’s education is more closely associated with wealth whereas mother’s education is 
more associated with the fertility of the household. 
 Endogeneity 
There are numerous reasons to think that parental schooling may be endogenous. A first reason 
is that parental schooling may suffer from measurement error. In some studies, individual 
information is provided by one member of the household who can give imprecise information 
about the schooling of the other household members. In this case, the coefficient of parents’ 
schooling will be underestimated. 
There are also unobservable variables that may bias the coefficient of parental schooling. First, 
parental preferences toward schooling may have been inherited from their own parents (i.e. the 
grand-parents of the child as described in Figure 5-2). Since grand-parents’ preferences for 
schooling had a positive influence on parents’ schooling and they are likely to be positively 




parental education will be overestimated. Another source of endogeneity comes through 
parents’ cognitive ability. Indeed, if parents who have better innate abilities are more successful 
at school and have children with better abilities, the coefficient on parental schooling will be 
biased. This source of endogeneity could be controlled for if information on children’s 
cognitive ability was available. Nonetheless, this information is missing in most of the datasets 
and it may lead to an overestimation of the effect of parental schooling. 
The sign of the total endogeneity bias is unknown a priori. Nonetheless, in studies where 
parental schooling is properly recorded the bias should be positive. Thus, Behrman (1997) 
observes in his meta-analysis on the effect of mother’s schooling on child’s schooling that 















































5.3 Effects of parents’ schooling on children’s schooling in the literature 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
To look at the effects of parents’ schooling on children’s schooling in Africa, I focus on studies 
that estimate the demand for education at the child level and include simultaneously father’s 
and mother’s education. Indeed, failing to control for spouse’s education may lead to an 
important bias in the estimated impact of the other spouse’s education. In any case, most of the 
studies that do not control for mother’s and/or father’s schooling use the schooling of the 
household head instead.   
Despite the large number of studies that look at the determinants of schooling in sub-Saharan 
Africa, few studies control for both father’s and mother’s education simultaneously. Thus, out 
of 59 studies on the determinants of schooling in Africa that I reviewed,66 only 14 of them 
satisfy this condition. Table 5-1 summarises the findings of these 14 studies: (Glewwe and 
Jacoby, 1994, Lavy, 1996, Tansel, 1997, Glick and Sahn, 2000, Deininger, 2003, Burke and 
Beegle, 2004, Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu, 2007, Sackey, 2007, Mussa, 2009, Nerman and 
Owens, 2010, Weir, 2011, Dumas and Lambert, 2010, Glick and Sahn, 2010). These studies 
generally look at more than one schooling outcome and many of them present separate results 
for boys and girls. Thus, there are 61 separate estimates and results may vary from one estimate 
to another in one particular study depending on the outcome and/or sub-sample studied. 
In the majority of cases (39/61) mother’s schooling is found to have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on children’s schooling and father’s schooling is found to have a positive and 
significant effect in a slightly greater number of cases (46/61). Most of the studies focus on 
current enrolment and/or the highest grade attained. In both cases, father’s schooling is found 
to be statistically significant in a greater number of cases. However, it is worth noting that 
estimates of the maximum grade attained are more likely to exhibit a statistically significant 
effect of parental education than estimates of current enrolment, which could be due to 
differences in statistical power. Other schooling decisions such as late entry to school or 
 
66 Studies were searched in Google Scholar using the keywords “education” “Africa” “schooling” and “school” 





dropouts are rarely studied. Only one study in Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994) finds a 
significant effect of mother’s schooling on late entry whereas parental schooling does not seem 
to protect against drop outs in Guinea (Glick and Sahn, 2000) or in Senegal (Glick and Sahn, 
2010). Estimates on female sub-samples are more likely to show a statistically significant effect 
of mother’s schooling than for male sub-samples whereas this pattern is absent for father’s 
schooling. The pattern is also identical for the different age groups with roughly the same 
proportion of studies finding a statistically significant impact of parental education for middle-
school aged children and primary and middle school-aged children together. Finally, the most 
striking difference appears to be the location of the study as studies taking place in Western 
Africa are much more likely to find a statistically significant effect of parental education than 
in Eastern Africa.67 Thus, the effects of parental education seem to differ between these two 
regions.  
The last two columns of Table 5-1 show that there is no clear pattern as to whether mother’s 
schooling or father’s schooling is more important in schooling decisions. Father’s schooling 
coefficients are more likely to be greater than mother’s schooling coefficients in estimates for 
the maximum grade attained. Surprisingly, the father’s schooling coefficient is more often 
greater than the mother’s schooling coefficient in the male and female sub-samples but the 
pattern is reversed when male and female sub-samples are combined in the same regression 
equation. Although it is hard to draw strong conclusions based on the relative effects of 
mother’s and father’s schooling according to the gender sub-samples, different age groups 
show a clear pattern. When primary school-aged children are included in the estimates, the 
mother’s schooling coefficient is greater in 13 of the 15 estimates. However, when older 
individuals are taken into account the mother’s schooling coefficient is greater in only 10 of 
the 34 cases. Thus, it seems that mothers and fathers may play a role at different ages and that 
mothers are more involved in the education of young children. This finding is consistent with 
Behrman’s (1997) conclusion in his survey of studies on determinants of schooling for the 
world as a whole. Finally, the relative effect of mother’s and father’s education differs greatly 
according to the location of the study. Mother’s schooling is found to be a more important 
 





determinant of schooling decisions in only 10 of 30 cases in Western Africa whereas the figure 
is 13 out of 18 in Eastern Africa. 
Table 5-1 Findings from the literature on the effect of parental schooling on children’s 





















Schooling outcomes      
Highest grade 
attained 25 21 25 10 14 
Currently enrolled 31 17 21 12 11 
Late entry 2 1 0 1 0 
Drop outs 3 0 0 0 0 
Gender samples      
Females 18 14 14 7 9 
Males 18 10 15 5 9 
Females and males 25 15 17 11 7 
Age samples      
Primary aged 4 3 3 3 0 
Primary and middle 
school aged 18 10 12 10 2 
Middle school aged 32 19 23 9 17 
Adults 8 7 8 1 7 
Location      
Western Africa 36 25 31 10 20 
Eastern Africa 25 14 15 13 5 
Total 61 39 46 23 25 
Notes: Western Africa includes studies conducted in Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, and Eastern 
Africa in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda. 
Some studies allow for non-linear effects of parental schooling by measuring parental 
schooling with dummies for the different levels achieved (e.g. no schooling, primary schooling 
and secondary schooling). In these cases, the higher level of parental schooling is not always 
associated with the highest schooling outcome for children. Indeed in two out of the 14 cases 
for mother’s schooling and five out of 14 cases for father’s schooling, coefficients associated 




In order to compare my results with the meta-analysis of Behrman, I computed the effect of 
mother’s schooling relative to father’s schooling for the 61 estimates summarised in Table 5-1 
as defined as “the estimated mother’s impact minus that for fathers as a percent of their average 
estimated impact” in Behrman (1997) p.20. It is defined by: 
 θ = (
?̂?𝑚−?̂?𝑓
(?̂?𝑚+?̂?𝑓)/2
) ∗ 100  
where ?̂?𝑓  is the estimated mother’s impact and ?̂?𝑚 is the estimated father’s impact.β̂f-β̂m 
In his analysis Behrman finds a mean of θ of -36 per cent suggesting a greater impact of father’s 
schooling, in other words the difference between the estimated effects of mother’s and of 
father’s schooling makes up 36 per cent of the average estimated effects of mother’s and 
father’s schooling. Nonetheless, there is great variability in this estimate; the standard deviation 
is 654 per cent, and in a majority of cases values are positive and the median is 10 per cent. I 
find a similar pattern in the African context based on the studies summarised in Table 5-1, with 
a mean of -44 per cent and a standard deviation of 228. As in Behrman’s analysis there are a 
lot of extreme negative values and the median for all the estimates is -4 per cent. Figure 5-3 
shows the distribution of the values computed. We can see that most of the values are centred 
around 0 but that some estimates suggest a particularly large effect of father’s schooling 





Figure 5-3 Distribution of the estimated impact of mother's schooling relative to father's 
schooling. 
Unlike Behrman I find slight differences according to the measure used. The median value of 
θ is -12 per cent when the outcome measures the number of years of schooling and -1 per cent 
for current enrolment. Analysis by sub-samples supports the hypothesis that mother’s 
schooling is more important for girls, with a median value of eight per cent, than for boys, with 
a median value of -16 per cent. As found in the comparison of the number of estimates, 
mother’s schooling is found to be more important for young children than for older children. 
Thus, the median value of θ is 32 per cent for estimates that include primary school-aged 
children against a median value of -18 per cent for estimates for teenagers and adults. It is 
consistent with the hypothesis that mothers, who spend a significant amount of time with young 
children, are more important at younger ages, whereas fathers, who often make financial 
decisions, are more important at an older age when schooling becomes more expensive. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find an important effect of mother’s characteristics on 
schooling outcomes of young children. Finally, there is a marked difference between estimates 
from Western Africa (median value of θ: -17 per cent) and estimates from Eastern Africa 





















sub-sample or by outcome. This difference could come from different cultural backgrounds 
between the two regions or it may be due to better access to schooling in eastern Africa that 
makes parental schooling relatively less important. 
 Senegal 
There are four studies on the determinants of children’s schooling outcomes in Senegal that 
control for both mother’s schooling and for father’s schooling. Despite the fact that these four 
studies are based on the same dataset, Education et Bien-Etre des Ménages au Senegal (EBMS 
2003), results differ somewhat from one study to the next.  
Dumas and Lambert’s (2010) paper is the most compelling as it focuses on the relationship 
between school attainment and parents’ schooling. They find that the effects of father’s and 
mother’s schooling on the likelihood of ever going to school, and on the final grade attained, 
are similar. Nonetheless, parents’ schooling may be endogenous and simple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) or probit may suffer from a bias due to omitted variables such as parents’ ability 
and/or family preferences for schooling. Thus, after controlling for parents’ schooling 
endogeneity, by using the presence of infrastructure in the community when parents were 10-
year-old and the rank of the parents among their siblings as instrumental variables, they find 
that father’s schooling has a greater impact on schooling outcomes than mother’s schooling. 
Other studies in the Senegalese context do not correct for the endogeneity of parental schooling 
in models that estimate the determinants of schooling. Thus, in a study on the sub-sample of 
children who took a test in mathematics and French while they were in second grade68, Glick 
and Sahn (2010) find that father’s schooling is positively associated with the final grade 
attained but they find no statistically significant effect of mother’s schooling after controlling 
for test score. This study corrects for the unobservable heterogeneity at the school level by 
using a multilevel modelling approach. Results are sensitive to the method used as the 
relationship is not statistically significant when school random effects are used instead of 
school fixed effects. Moreover, they find no effect of parents’ schooling on the likelihood of 
primary school dropouts or on test scores. In another separate study, Glick and Sahn (2009) 
look at the determinants of test scores and find very small or statistically insignificant effects 
 




of parents’ schooling on test scores. Finally, André and Demonsant (2009) study the 
relationship between formal and Koranic schooling. Their estimates show a negative 
relationship between father’s schooling and the number of years of Koranic schooling for boys.  
Those results tend to show a greater effect of father’s schooling than mother’s schooling on 
children’s schooling. That is consistent with findings of other studies in Western Africa. 
Nonetheless, the two studies of Glick and Sahn (2009 and 2010) are restricted to children who 
have enrolled in second grade (about 75% of the children in my dataset) and the study of Andre 
and Demonsant (2009) does not look directly at the determinants of formal schooling. Thus, 
the relative effect of mother’s and father’s schooling remains an open question in Senegal as 
the evidence is based on a small number of studies and on only one dataset. 
5.4 Comparisons with Dumas and Lambert 2010 
 The EBMS 2003 survey 
In 1995-96, PASEC (Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN) 
collected data on a sample of 2,400 2nd grade students located in 120 public primary schools in 
Senegal. In the framework of the survey, students sat standardised French and math tests at the 
beginning and at the end of the academic year and data on school, teacher and child 
characteristics were collected. In 2003, the EBMS (Education et Bien-Etre des Ménages au 
Senegal) survey was set up to collect information on these children and their families. The 
survey attempted to collect data from children enrolled in the 60 randomly chosen schools (32 
rural and 28 urban). In order to sample students who had not attended school, the survey 
collected information on households living in the same community. To be included in the 
sample, additional households had to include at least one child aged between 14 and 17 as it is 
the age range of children who took the PASEC tests. On average, per school, 16 out of 20 
children surveyed by PASEC managed to be surveyed both at the beginning and at the end of 
the year. The number of additional households was chosen in order to obtain 30 households 
per community. 
I first compare the EBMS 2003 dataset with the dataset I use that was collected in the Saint 
Louis region, north of Senegal, in 2009 (SN 2009). The advantage of my dataset over the 
EBMS 2003 dataset is that the sampling methodology does not depend on school availability 




1995-96 PASEC survey, only communities that include a primary school in 1995 may be 
included in the survey. Furthermore, the sampling methodology of the PASEC survey implies 
that the probability of inclusion of schools in the sample depends on their size.69 Thus, schools 
with more students are more likely to be included in the sample. This methodology ensures the 
representativeness of the sample at the national level but may lead to a sample bias if 
communities with larger schools have different characteristics than communities with smaller 
schools. In addition, the EBMS 2003 sample includes about half of the households with at least 
one child enrolled in 2nd grade in 1995-96. On the other hand, the sampling frame used in the 
collection of my dataset is a list of membership of a farmer organization. The area surveyed 
includes three rural communities in the North of Senegal. My sample is then representative of 
the farming population of this area and the sample means are close to official figures. Thus, I 
find a net primary attendance rate of 75.1%, which is very close to the official figure (75.5%) 
computed by the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD) for the year 
2008 (see Table 5-2). Disaggregated figures for girls and boys are slightly different between 
my datasets and the ANSD figures but the differences remain small, which shows that estimates 
from my sample are close to the ones of the general population. 
Table 5-2 Net primary attendance rates computed by ANSD and SN 2009 
 
ANSD 08 SN 2009 
Total 75.5% 75.1% 
Girls 81.6% 77.9% 
Boys 69.5% 72.1% 
 Comparison of EBMS 2003 and SN 2009 surveys in terms of descriptive statistics 
To underline potential biases induced by the sampling methodology followed by EBMS, I 
simulate several samples with my dataset to look at descriptive statistics. The samples (1) and 
(2) (see Table 5-3) are used by Dumas and Lambert (2010). They differ somewhat from my 
sample (SN 2009). In their paper, they use only the observations for children who live with 
their mother and father. It leads them to use a sub-sample of their dataset. A comparison of 
column (1) and (2) shows that the means of observable variables are very close for the whole 
 




sample (column (1)) and the reduced sample (column (2)), with the notable exception that 
children in the reduced sample are younger and less likely to have no older brothers or sisters. 
I find similar results with my sample (columns (3) and (4)). Unfortunately, the way the data 
were collected does not allow me to compare parents’ characteristics and number of older 
brothers and sisters for children of the two samples as these variables are only available for 
children who live with their parents in the SN 2009 dataset.  
Children from the EBMS 2003 are more likely to have been enrolled at school and have, on 
average, more educated parents than children from the SN 2009 dataset. Moreover, children 
from the SN 2009 dataset are less educated than children from the EBMS 2003 dataset. These 
differences are all significant at the 1% level. Other differences between the two samples 
include household’s size, which is smaller in the SN 2009 dataset, and the likelihood of having 
no older brother, which is also smaller in the SN 2009 dataset.  
There are many reasons that may explain why these two datasets differ. First, the sampling 
methodologies used to collect the two datasets are different and the EBMS 2003 may have 
over-sampled communities with a level of schooling greater than average. Differences may, as 
well, come from the fact that the EBMS 2003 dataset includes communities from all parts of 
Senegal whereas the SN 2009 dataset includes only rural communities from the north of 
Senegal. Finally, there was a huge increase in schooling attainment between 2003 and 2009, 
such that the primary net enrolment rate rose from 63.6% to 75% during this period. 
In order to assess the impact of the sampling methodology on the variables’ means, I simulate 
two samples from my dataset. The first sample presented in columns (5) and (6) includes only 
households with at least one child aged between 14 and 17. It mimics the methodology used 
by the EBMS 2003 survey to sample additional households. Differences of means between this 
sub-sample and the SN 2009 whole sample are not statistically significant, with the exception 
of the household’s size and the likelihood of having no older brother. Therefore, this feature of 
the sampling methodology does not seem to lead to a biased sample.  
Nonetheless, the sampling methodology of the EBMS 2003 implies that about half of the 
households included in the final sample had at least one child enrolled in 2nd grade in 1995-96. 
To simulate the construction of this sample, I constructed a second sub-sample that includes 




sample means are presented in columns (7) and (8). This sub-sample differs from the whole 
sample. Thus, children from this sample are more likely to have ever been to school, have, on 
average, 0.2 more levels of schooling than children from the whole sample and live in richer 
households. Nonetheless, parents’ schooling is similar for this sub-sample and the whole 
sample. This sampling methodology is then likely to lead to the construction of a biased sample 
where children have higher than average schooling outcomes.  
Since the EBMS 2003 sample includes only families that had at least one child enrolled, it is 
likely to be biased toward a population of children with a greater achievement than average. It 
may lead to a bias in the estimates if the behaviour of this population differs from the rest of 
the Senegalese population. On the other hand, the SN 2009 sample does not suffer from this 
bias but, as it is representative of only one part of Senegal, it may not be appropriate to 
generalise the results to the rest of the country. I will explore the potential biases coming from 
the location of communities of dataset SN 2009 by comparing this dataset to a nationally 





Table 5-3 Comparison of EBMS2003 and SN2009 samples 
 EBMS 2003 SN 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ever went to school 0.81 0.83 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.85 0.85 
 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.36 
Level attained 2.56 2.53 1.4 1.38 1.44 1.41 1.62 1.56 
 1.25 1.23 1.18 1.15 1.22 1.18 1.19 1.16 
Father's level 2.28 2.45  0.66  0.62  0.68 
 1.98 2.11  1.31  1.24  1.3 
Mother's level 1.6 1.65  0.34  0.47  0.32 
 1.24 1.27  0.78  0.5  0.75 
Wealth70 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.20 
 0.95 0.96 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 
Boy 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.53 
 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Household's size 12.76 12.98 10.88 11.07 11.37 11.47 11.23 11.26 
 6.01 5.94 3.76 3.70 3.71 3.71 3.66 3.6 
No older brother 0.52 0.42  0.36  0.31  0.31 
 0.49 0.49  0.48  0.46  0.46 
No older sister 0.58 0.5  0.53  0.49  0.48 
 0.49 0.5  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Age 15.12 14.68 14.78 14.65 15.03 14.84 15.05 14.88 
 3.11 3.09 3.38 3.30 3.14 3.14 3.01 3.11 
Number of observations 6,793 2,592 1,244 813 954 660 804 563 
Note: Samples (1) and (2) are respectively the whole sample and the sample with only children with co 
residence of parents (Dumas and Lambert, 2010 Table A2). Samples (3) and (4) are respectively the whole 
sample and the sample with only children with co residence of parents. Samples (5) and (6) are respectively the 
whole sample and the sample with only children with co residence of parents for whom there is at least one 
child aged between 14 and 17. Samples (7) and (8) are respectively the whole sample and the sample with only 
children with co residence of parents for whom there is at least one child aged between 14 and 17 who attended 
grade 2. Figures in italic are standard deviations. EBMS 2003 is the dataset used in the study of Dumas and 
Lambert (2010) and SN2009 is my dataset. 
 Comparisons of estimates with the EBMS 2003 sample and the SN 2009 sample 
To check the consistency of results between the two samples, I compare estimates obtained 
with the EBMS 2003 dataset and the SN 2009 dataset. Table 5-4 shows the determinants of the 
likelihood of ever having enrolled at school for the EBMS 2003 dataset (presented by Dumas 
and Lambert (2010)) and those obtained with the SN 2009 dataset. The same control variables 
are included in both cases and the same statistical methodology is used. The marginal effect of 
 




father’s schooling on the likelihood of being enrolled is greater in the SN 2009 dataset than in 
the EBMS 2003 dataset but the difference is not statistically significant. The marginal effect of 
mother’s schooling is not significant in the SN 2009 dataset whereas it is in the EBMS 2003 
dataset. However, the coefficients are similar and the absence of a significant effect is due to 
larger standard errors in the SN 2009 dataset that may come from the fact the sample is smaller. 
I fit the model to the sub-samples (6) and (8) (see note Table 5-3) to see if a different sampling 
methodology could change the results. The results do not change much whatever the sample 
used but it is worth noting that the effect of father’s schooling decreases in sample (8), which 
mimics closely the sample selection of EBMS 2003, and becomes closer to the effect found by 
Dumas and Lambert (2010). 
Table 5-4: Ever went to school (Probit) 
  Dumas and Lambert 2010 SN2009 
Sample used (1) (2) (4) (6) (8) 
Father's schooling 0.0446 0.0469 0.0752 0.0717 0.0408 
  (0.0039)*** (0.0077)*** (0.02)*** (0.0233)*** (0.019)** 
Mother's schooling 0.0403 0.0267 0.023 0.03 0.0195 
  (0.0069)*** (0.0128)** (0.0265) (0.0321) (0.024) 
Boy 0.0751 0.0653 -0.0087 0.0072 -0.0235 
  (0.0082)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0289) (0.0333) (0.0335) 
Household size 0.00018 0 -0.0135 -0.0146 -0.0116 
  (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.0048)** 
No older brother -0.0253 -0.0071 0.0195 0.0336 0.0084 
  (0.0080)*** 0.0158 (0.0293) (0.0328) (0.0308) 
No older sister -0.0241 -0.0381 -0.0457 -0.0563 -0.0321 
  (0.0082)*** (0.0157)** (0.0293) (0.0321)* (0.0309) 
Number of 
observations 6,843 2234 792 647 548 
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.208 0.098 0.104 0.082 
Note: See Table A3 in Dumas and Lambert (2010). Results are marginal effects. ***, ** and * denote 
respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors are 
presented in brackets. Additional controls include community fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered at 
the household level. Sample labels are the same as described in Table 5-3. 
Estimates obtained for the rural EBMS 2003 sub-sample show that the effects of mother’s and 
father’s schooling are greater for the rural sub-sample (see Table 5-5). In this sub-sample, the 
coefficients are larger than those found for SN 2009 when using a sample as similar as possible 
to EBMS 2003. Notably, the coefficient associated with mother’s schooling is smaller in SN 




associated with mother’s schooling in the girl sub-sample are smaller in SN 2009 estimates, 
but the other coefficients are similar. Therefore, even though most communities in the SN 2009 
dataset live in rural areas, SN 2009 estimates are very close to EBMS 2003 estimates for the 
whole sample except that coefficients associated with mother’s schooling are smaller. 
The results obtained for the two datasets are not so different for the probit model but they differ 
for the OLS model (see Table 5-6). When the outcome studied is the level of schooling attained, 
the estimated coefficient of father’s schooling is twice as large in the EBMS 2003 dataset 
compared to the SN 2009 dataset. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of mother’s schooling 
is five to ten times larger in the EBMS 2003 estimates. This leads to different conclusions 
between the findings of the two datasets as the estimated coefficient of father’s schooling is 
larger than the estimated coefficient of mother’s schooling in the SN 2009 dataset, whereas the 
opposite is found in the EBMS 2003 dataset. This difference does not seem to be explained by 
the difference in sampling methodology as the estimated coefficients do not vary much in the 
samples (4), (6) and (8). Nevertheless, I cannot rule out that the difference comes from the fact 
that the EBMS 2003 survey targets communities where there was a school in 1995 and/or from 
the fact that the SN 2009 dataset contains data on a particular region of Senegal. 
Table 5-5: Ever went to school (Probit) 
 Dumas and Lambert 2010 SN2009 
Sample used Rural Girls Boys (8) Girls (8) Boys (8) 
Father's schooling 0.08 0.063 0.035 0.0405 0.0528 0.0358 
 (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.016)** 
Mother's schooling 0.055 0.062 0.03 0.0201 0.0121 0.0283 
 (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.024) (0.030) (0.032) 
Note: Results are marginal effects. ***, ** and * denote respectively that the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the household level are presented in 
brackets. Additional controls include community fixed-effects. Sample labels are the same as described in Table 




Table 5-6: Grade attained (OLS) 
 Dumas and Lambert 2010 SN2009  
Sample used (1) (2) (4) (6) (8) 
      
Father's schooling 0.266 0.263 0.122 0.155 0.123 
 (0.021)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.045)*** (0.044)*** 
Mother's schooling 0.297 0.34 0.033 0.079 0.061 
 (0.035)*** (0.062)*** (0.074) (0.093) (0.093) 
Boy 0.53 0.273 -0.226 0.215 0.251 
 (0.053)*** (0.078)*** (0.088)** (0.1) (0.113)** 
Household size 0 -0.002 -0.022 -0.035 -0.014 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.013)* (0.015)** (0.01) 
No older brother -0.044 0.193 0.102 0.245 0.312 
 (0.053) (0.084)** (0.088) (0.1)** (0.113)*** 
No older sister -0.121 -0.165 0.016 0.035 0.112 
 (0.056)** (0.084)** (0.090) (0.098) (0.11) 
Constant 2.707 2.831 1.993 2.01 1.878 
 (0.252)*** (0.350)* (0.248)*** (0292)*** (0.303)*** 
      
Number of 
observations 6,793 2,592 814 660 563 
R2 0.104 0.131 0.099 0.137 0.124 
Note: Results are marginal effects.  ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different 
from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the household level are presented in brackets. 
Additional controls include community fixed-effects. Sample labels are the same as described in Table 5-3. 
 Comparison with Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) dataset 
To test if the differences between Dumas and Lambert’s results and my results come from the 
fact that the SN 2009 dataset was collected in the Saint-Louis region, I use the Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) dataset to compare statistics at the Senegalese level and in the Saint-
Louis region. In 2005, DHS surveyed 7,412 households in Senegal. The sample is 
representative of the whole Senegalese population and the dataset includes information on 
children’s and parents’ schooling. Unfortunately, comparisons with Dumas and Lambert’s 
(2010) estimates are not straightforward because children over 14 years of age were not 
matched with their parents. Moreover, the dataset lacks information on the number of brothers 
and sisters and therefore the control variables ‘no older brother” and “no older sister” cannot 
be included in the estimates. However, the DHS dataset can still be used to compare estimates 
for all of Senegal with estimates carried for the Saint-Louis region to see if this region exhibits 




impossible. In order to test if the results are different in the Saint-Louis region from the rest of 
the country, estimates are performed for the DHS dataset for all of Senegal, rural Senegal, the 
Saint-Louis region and the rural part of the Saint-Louis region (see Table 5-7and Table 5-8). 
Since the SN 2009 dataset includes farmers, I expect that the closest DHS sub-sample is the 
rural Saint-Louis sample.  
Table 5-7and Table 5-8 show that parents’ schooling coefficients, obtained from the DHS 
dataset, are similar for the Saint-Louis Region and the rest of Senegal. However, when the 
sample is restricted to the rural part for the Saint-Louis region, the coefficients on parents’ 
schooling are slightly higher than in the other sub-samples but the differences are not 
statistically significant. Thus, the Saint-Louis region does not seem to differ from the rest of 
Senegal and the differences between the EBMS 2003 estimates and SN 2009 estimates cannot 
be solely explained by the fact that the SN 2009 sample is restricted to the Saint-Louis region.  
The coefficients on parents’ schooling found in the estimates performed for the SN 2009 
dataset are lower than those obtained from the DHS dataset.71 The difference may stem from 
the fact that the matching rate of children with their parents is only 49% in the DHS dataset in 
the 10 to 14 year old sample, whereas it is 75% in the SN 2009 dataset for the same age sample. 
It is hard to explain such a difference in matching rates between the two datasets. If children 
who are not matched with their parents have different characteristics, for instance a weaker 
relationship with their parents, this may explain the differences in parents’ schooling effects 
on children’s schooling.  
 
71 Nonetheless, only the coefficient of father’s schooling for the probit estimates is statistically different between 




Table 5-7: Comparison of DHS 2005 and SN 2009 datasets for ever went to school (probit) 
 
DHS 2005 SN 2009 





     
Father's 
schooling 0.0537*** 0.0606*** 0.0578*** 0.0962*** 0.0131* 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.032) (0.008) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.0371*** 0.0516*** 0.0514** 0.0749** 0.0120 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.022) (0.031) (0.009) 
Boy 0.0403** 0.0441* -0.0340 -0.0249 -0.0100 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.058) (0.076) (0.034) 
Household size -0.0004 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0097 -0.0136** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
      
Number of 
observations 3,600 2,659 293 201 386 
Note: ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Standard errors clustered at the household level are presented in brackets. Additional controls include 





Table 5-8: Comparison of DHS 2005 and SN 2009 datasets for grade attained (OLS) 
 
DHS 2005 SN 2009 







     
Father's 
schooling 0.1129*** 0.1428*** 0.1317*** 0.1665** 0.0814** 
 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.036) (0.070) (0.037) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.0536*** 0.0523* 0.0814 0.1436 0.0297 
 
(0.017) (0.029) (0.059) (0.106) (0.056) 
Boy 0.0958* 0.1674*** -0.1393 -0.1055 -0.2307 
 
(0.054) (0.065) (0.209) (0.288) (0.240) 
Household size -0.0010 0.0068 0.0017 0.0607** -0.0347 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.024) (0.035) 
Constant 0.7839 0.8142 3.5286*** 1.3629 4.5174*** 
 
(0.551) (0.551) (0.833) (0.842) (0.799) 
      
Number of 
observations 4,389 2,973 352 222 420 
R-squared 0.393 0.301 0.339 0.192 0.095 
Note: ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Standard errors clustered at the household level are presented in brackets. Additional controls include 




 Instrumental variables 
Dumas and Lambert (2010) argue that unobservable variables may bias the estimated 
coefficients on parents’ schooling. Indeed, ability and/or preferences for education may be 
transmitted from parents to children (see Figure 5-2). Therefore, the OLS coefficient is likely 
to be biased because the true effect of schooling is confounded with unobservable variables. In 
this case, the coefficient estimated with OLS does not give the expected effect of an exogenous 
increase in parents’ schooling. 
In order to control for endogeneity, Dumas and Lambert (2010) use the method of instrumental 
variables (IV). Their instruments for parents’ schooling are based on whether the children’s 
mothers or fathers have no older brothers or older sisters, and the availability of schooling 
facilities when the parents were ten years old.  
The rationale for the first instrumental variable, parent being the eldest child, is that it has been 
found that birth order is associated with school enrolment. It has notably been found that the 
first child is less likely to be enrolled (Emerson and Souza, 2008). One can argue that the first 
child may differ from other siblings in dimensions other than schooling. For instance, the first 
child may be favoured for inheritance or the first child may be the one who will take care of 
his or her younger brothers and sisters later in life. However, the authors look at observable 
characteristics for parents who were the eldest child and other parents and find no statistically 
significant differences and they conclude that differences between the eldest child and his or 
her siblings is limited to schooling. Obviously, they cannot test differences in terms of 
unobservable characteristics and their instrument could be invalid if there are differences in 
terms of unobservable variables. For instance, Bjerkedal et al. (2007) find a negative 
correlation between birth order and IQ in a sample of Norwegian men. Another potential issue 
with this instrumental variable is that birth order may have a different effect for poor and rich 
families. Thus, Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) study the relationship between birth order and 
schooling in twelve African countries, including Senegal, and find that birth order is negatively 
correlated with schooling level in poor families but positively correlated in rich families. This 
would mean that the instrumental variable has opposite effects on different sub-populations, 
which violates the monotonicity assumption and makes instrumental variable estimates invalid 
(Angrist et al., 1996). Finally, since birth order is correlated with the number of siblings, the 




robustness check, the authors deal with this issue by restricting their sample to parents born 
among the first three children and, reassuringly, they find similar results.  
The exogeneity of the other instrument, the presence of infrastructure where parents lived when 
they were 10, relies on the assumption that grand-parents who had higher preferences for 
schooling did not move to areas where there were schools. This assumption cannot be tested 
but the authors notice that geographical mobility is low. Another potential problem with this 
instrumental variable is recall biases. Indeed, parents are asked to remember if there was a 
school in their community when they were 10 and, for instance, parents who have greater 
preferences for schooling may better remember the lack of school when they were young.  
In order to control for the potential endogeneity of parental education, I will use an instrumental 
variable approach similar to the one of Dumas and Lambert (2010). Information on school 
availability was collected in the SN 2009 survey but the information on siblings of parents was 
not collected, so I use only the instruments on school availability for parents proposed by 
Dumas and Lambert (2010). In the SN 2009 survey, parents were asked to give the main reason 
for not having enrolled at school or having stopped going to school. 70% of the fathers and 
79% of the mothers have no formal schooling. 10% of the fathers and 8% of the mothers who 
have no formal schooling declare that they did not go to school because there were no schools 
available (see Table 5-9). I use the fact that parents did not go to school because no school was 
available as an instrumental variable for parents’ schooling. This instrument is slightly different 
from the one used in Dumas and Lambert (2010) as they use a question on the presence of 
infrastructure in parents’ childhood and I use the reason given by parents for having no 
schooling. I need to make two assumptions for my instrumental variable to be valid. First, I 
need to assume that parents who had been to school had a school available in their 
neighbourhood. This is a reasonable assumption even though some parents may have been 
schooled in a school outside their community. I think this is unlikely as my instrument relates 
to primary schooling and distance between villages is important. The second assumption is that 
the reason given by parents for not having been to school reflects their experience and not their 
preferences for education. More precisely, parents may have more than one reason for not 




Table 5-9: Parents' reasons for not going to school 
 Fathers Mothers 
Percentage with no schooling 70.3 78.7 
Reasons for never been to 
school 
  
Not useful 53.7 80.9 
Koranic schooling 32.3 6.3 
No school available 10.1 8.2 
Other 3.9 4.6 
Reasons for stopping school   
Work 53.3 19.3 
Failure/repeating 13.5 28.7 
Administrative problems72 11.6 11.3 
Pregnancy/marriage 0 21.1 
Too expensive 8 1.5 
Disinterest in schooling 6.9 9.4 
Koranic schooling 3 0.4 
Other 3.6 8.3 
Number of observations 1,301 1,356 
I estimate different models that use the instrumental variable. First, I estimate a two-stage 
probit model correcting for the endogeneity of parental schooling. The estimates are performed 
correcting for the endogeneity of father’s schooling and then correcting for the endogeneity of 
mother’s schooling in a separate estimate.73 I then estimate three two-stage least square models 
with the level of schooling attained as a dependent variable correcting for the endogeneity of 
father’s schooling, then the endogeneity of mother’s schooling and finally including the 
endogeneity of father’s and mother’s schooling in the same model.  
 
72 Administrative problems include strikes and lack of schooling availability. 
73 Estimations with the simultaneous correction of endogeneity of mother’s and father’s education did not 




In Table 5-10, we can see that using instrumental variable estimation lowers the size of the 
coefficient on father’s schooling and increases the size of the coefficient of mother’s schooling 
in the two-stage probit models compared to probit models shown in Table 5-4. Thus, the bias 
found in parental schooling is in the opposite direction of the bias found by Dumas and Lambert 
(2010) but it is worth noting that the Wald test of exogeneity fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that father’s and mother’s schooling are exogenous in these models. For estimates of the level 
of schooling attained, the coefficient associated with father’s schooling is identical in OLS and 
two-stage least squares shown in Table 5-6. Similar to probit models, the test of exogeneity 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the variable father’s schooling is exogenous. When 
mother’s schooling is instrumented the coefficient becomes very large, but the estimate is also 
very imprecise. This is due to the fact that the instrument for mother’s schooling is weak, i.e. 
the instrumental variable is weakly associated with the endogenous regressor. This can bias 
estimates and produce large confidence intervals (Stock et al., 2005). This casts doubt on the 
validity of the instrumental variable for estimates associated with mother’s schooling.  






Father's schooling 0.008 0.044  0.1136 -0.0386 0.0046 
 (0.1) (0.047)  (0.237) (0.146) (0.376) 
Mother's schooling 0.041 0.269  0.0360 1.7034 1.6305 
 (0.038) (0.257)  (0.097) (1.238) (1.329) 















       
Wald test of exogeneity 0.4621 0.3655     
C statistic    0.9668 0.1381 0.3099 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic   
 
15.501 2.354 1.190 
Stock-Yogo critical values 
(10%)   
 
16.38 16.38 7.03 
       
Number of observations 787 791  807 811 805 
Note: ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Additional controls include community fixed-effects, 




Unlike Dumas and Lambert (2010) I do not find that correcting for the endogeneity of father’s 
schooling is necessary in my dataset. This could come from the fact that the main source of 
endogeneity in their study is measurement error and that measurement error is less of a problem 
in my dataset. In my case I cannot conclude that the effect of father’s schooling is 
underestimated in probit or OLS models. The available instrumental variable for mother’s 
schooling is not valid in my dataset and therefore I cannot conclude if this variable is 
endogenous or not.  
 Summary of the results 
When I replicate the methodology used by Dumas and Lambert (2010), I find similar results 
for the probit model but different results with OLS and IV. Nonetheless, the conclusions are 
similar since the estimated coefficient of father’s schooling is systematically found to be larger 
than mother’s schooling in the SN 2009 dataset, although it must be emphasised that the 
difference is not statistically significant. It is worth noting that Dumas and Lambert (2010) 
reach this same conclusion after controlling for the endogeneity of parents’ schooling.  
For the results based on the SN 2009 dataset, tests of exogeneity failed to reject that parents’ 
schooling is exogenous whereas Dumas and Lambert (2010) find that father’s schooling must 
be corrected for endogeneity. The size of the endogeneity bias in Dumas and Lambert (2010) 
and the failure to reject exogeneity for the results based on the SN 2009 dataset might stem 
from the fact that the main source of endogeneity comes from measurement error. Thus, in 
Senegal, the two other sources of endogeneity, transmission of preferences and cognitive 
abilities, may not be an important issue.  
5.5  Other methodological issues 
 Censoring 
One of the issues arising with the estimates of school achievement of children is that we 
observe children for whom we do not know their final attainment. We know that children who 
are still enrolled at school will achieve a level of schooling equal to or greater than the level 
that is being observed. Therefore, the outcome variable is right censored which leads to 
downward bias in the coefficients of explanatory variables if the analysis is carried out using 




Greene (1981) points out that the downward bias of the coefficients is the same for all the 
explanatory variables if they are normally distributed. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the bias 
will differ for the variables that are not normally distributed. Thus, even if the scope of the 
study is limited to the relative impact of mother’s and father’s schooling on children’s 
schooling outcomes, and not the absolute size of these impacts, the censoring of the outcome 
variable must be taken into account in order to estimate the true relative impact since mother’s 
and father’s schooling are usually not normally distributed.  
Dumas and Lambert (2010) deal with the censoring in the probit model by including only 
children older than 10. They do not deal with right censoring in the OLS estimates but argue 
that censoring is exogenous and only due to children’s age. In their dataset, 58% of the children 
are enrolled in the 10-21 age interval and to fail to take it into account may lead to a bias in the 
estimates (Holmes, 2001). 
 Sample selection 
Information on parents’ schooling was recorded if the parent lives with the child. Thus, for 
children who do not live with their mother or father, information on parents’ schooling is 
missing. In my dataset, about 75% of the individuals under the age of 18 live with their mother 
and father. However, after the age of 18, the number of individuals living with their parents 
decreases dramatically (see Figure 5-4). Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is particularly 
marked for girls who leave the household earlier than boys.  
Since the sample used to compute the estimates includes only children living with both their 
parents, the results cannot be generalised to children living without their parents. Children who 
do not live with their parents may have a different relationship with them and, therefore, the 
correlation between their schooling and their parents’ schooling may be different from the rest 
of the sample. Therefore, individuals included in the estimates comprise a selected sample of 
the whole population. Thus, if leaving the household is correlated with wealth or parents’ 
schooling, the coefficients of these variables may be biased. Moreover, leaving the household 
may be correlated with the ability of an individual and his/her level of schooling. The inclusion 
of older individuals may therefore bias the results, as they are more likely to have missing 
parents. Furthermore, the inclusion of individuals older than 18 results in a sample including 




schooling relative to father’s schooling if the effect of mother’s schooling and father’s 
schooling are different for boys and girls.  
 
Figure 5-4: Matching rate of individuals with their parents by children’s age. 
In the study by Dumas and Lambert (2010), the estimates are obtained from the whole sample 
and for the sub-sample of children who live with both their parents.74 Despite the fact that only 
33% of the individuals between the age of 10 and 21 in the sample live with both their parents, 
the results are very similar. It is worth noting that, in the SN 2009 dataset, 66% of individuals 
of the same age interval live with their mother and father. This difference in matching rate is 
important and could explain differences in the results found. 
 




 Estimates with censoring of final grade attained 
As the number of children matched with their parents decreases after 18 years of age, I restrict 
the sample to children aged less than 18 years. Moreover, to take into account the censoring of 
the level of schooling attained, I use a censored regression. The use of a censored regression 
allows fitting the model on a sample of younger children, censoring being no longer an issue. 
I compare the different estimates for samples including different age groups and estimates with 
and without censoring in order to estimate the possible biases arising from sample selection 
issues and the use of different estimation methods.  
When I take censoring into account, estimated coefficients of mother’s and father’s schooling 
are much larger (see Table 5-12). When individuals between 18 and 21 are excluded the 
estimated mother’s schooling coefficient becomes larger than the estimated father’s schooling 
coefficient in the censored model. When censoring is not taken into account the coefficients of 
mother’s and father’s schooling are identical (0.07) in the sub-sample of children aged 10 to 
18 (see Table 5-11). However, in the non-censored regressions mother’s schooling is not 
statistically significant whereas father’s schooling is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Thus, individuals from the 18 to 21 age interval who still live with their parents seem to have 
different characteristics that affect the estimated effect of parental schooling.  
The inclusion of primary school-aged children diminishes the effect of father’s schooling but 
does not change much the coefficient of mother’s schooling. The coefficient associated with 
father’s schooling is divided by 8 between the sub-sample of 10 to 18 year old children and the 
sub-sample of 7 to 11 year old children in the censored regressions and it makes the coefficient 
associated with mother’s schooling relatively more important.  
I also estimate probit models for various age groups to estimate the probability of having ever 
been enrolled. The exclusion of individuals aged between 18 and 21 reduces the marginal effect 
of father’s schooling and increases the marginal effect of mother’s schooling. However, the 
mother’s schooling coefficient is not statistically significant and the estimated effect of father’s 
schooling is still more important than the estimated effect of mother’s schooling. In samples 
that include primary-school-aged children, the marginal effect associated with mother’s 
schooling is greater than that associated with father’s schooling. It is particularly important for 




than the marginal effect associated with father’s schooling. However, the probability of having 
ever been enrolled at a young age does not necessarily reflect a higher achievement later in life 
as children who have been enrolled can drop out. 
Using a censored regression instead of a non-censored regression increases the coefficient of 
mother’s and father’s schooling by three to seven times. It shows that failing to take censoring 
into account leads to biased estimates. This increase is slightly larger for mother’s schooling 
and it leads to a reconsideration of the relative effect of mother’s schooling compared to 
father’s schooling. Thus, the relative effect of mother’s schooling is 12 per cent in the censored 
regression and -5% in the non-censored regression for the 10 to 18 age interval. Using a 
censored regression also allows the model to be estimated for younger children and it shows 
that the schooling of mothers is relatively more important for younger children. Because of the 
low matching rate between parents and children for individuals aged between 18 and 21, I do 
not think that estimates including this age group are reliable. Therefore, estimates considering 
censoring for other age samples tend to show that mother’s schooling is relatively more 
important. Since the total amount of schooling received is more important than having been 
enrolled at school, this result contradicts the conclusion of Dumas and Lambert (2010) that 
father’s schooling is more important in Senegal.  
Table 5-11: OLS regressions of level of schooling attained for various age samples 
 10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
Father’s schooling 0.122 0.075 0.033 0.011 
 (0.038)*** (0.036)** (0.030) (0.014) 
Mother’s schooling 0.033 0.071 0.046 0.059 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.052) (0.025)** 
Number of observations 813 686 989 484 
Relative effect of mother’s schooling 
relative to father’s schooling 
-115% -5% 33% 137% 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and presented in bracket. Additional controls include 





Table 5-12: Censored regressions for various age samples 
 10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
Father’s schooling 0.322 0.284 0.145 0.036 
 (0.093)*** (0.102)*** (0.08)* (0.053) 
Mother’s schooling 0.15 0.337 0.327 0.273 
 (0.152) (0.164)** (0.124)*** (0.106)*** 
Number of observations 813 685 988 481 
Relative effect of mother’s schooling 
relative to father’s schooling 
-79% 12% 74% 155% 
Note: ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Additional controls include community fixed-effects, gender household size, no older brother and no older 
sister. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Full results in appendix 5.5. 
 
Table 5-13: Probability of ever going to school for various age brackets 
 10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
Father’s schooling 0.075 0.048 0.022 0.013 
 (0.021)*** (0.019)** (0.013)* (0.015) 
Mother’s schooling 0.023 0.034 0.048 0.064 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.021)** (0.027)** 
Number of observations 813 685 988 481 
Relative effect of mother’s schooling 
relative to father’s schooling 
-106% 34% 74% 132% 
Note: ***, ** and * mean respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level. Additional controls include community fixed-effects, gender household size, no older brother and no older 
sister. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Full results in appendix 5.6. 
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have reviewed the different causal pathways that link parental schooling to 
children’s schooling. I then extended the review of Behrman (1997) on the relative impact of 
mother’s and father’s schooling on a child’s schooling. I showed that there is no general pattern 
in Sub-Saharan Africa towards a greater effect of mother’s schooling. Across studies, mother’s 
schooling is found to be more important than father’s schooling for young children and girls 
but father’s schooling is relatively more important for older children.  
I then turned to evidence on the role of parental schooling in Senegal. Evidence on the role of 
parental schooling in Senegal is limited and is mostly based on four studies using the same 
dataset. I use another dataset to replicate the results found in one of these studies (Dumas and 
Lambert, 2010). I first showed that the sample of children used in Dumas and Lambert (2010) 




not affect the final results. The estimates on the probability of having ever been enrolled at 
school are similar between the two datasets but the estimates on grade attained are different. I 
cannot explain the reasons for this difference but using DHS data I showed that it is probably 
not due to the fact that my dataset includes only communities from the North of Senegal. Then, 
I attempt to estimate the causal impact of parental schooling by using an instrumental variable 
that takes into account access to schooling of parents in their childhood. Unlike Dumas and 
Lambert (2010), my results do not indicate that parental schooling is endogenous in Senegal.  
Despite the differences between my estimates and those of Dumas and Lambert (2010), I also 
find that father’s schooling is more important than mother’s schooling when I use a similar 
method even if the sampling strategies of the two surveys differ in a lot of aspects.  However, 
these results are sensitive to the method used. Thus, taking into account the censoring of the 
data tends to give relatively more weight to the coefficient on mother’s schooling. More 
importantly, results are very sensitive to the age group considered. When younger children are 
included in the sample, the coefficient on mother’s schooling becomes relatively higher 
compared to father’s schooling. It is worth noting that the total amount of schooling for children 
aged 10 to 18 is still more dependent on mothers’ rather than fathers’ schooling. It is difficult 
to know if the influence of mothers’ education continues to play a role in schooling decisions 
when children are older or if the effect is only due to the accumulation of schooling in younger 
years. But for fathers, the models seem to be relatively clear that their level of education does 
not influence schooling decisions before children reach their teenage years. This is consistent 
with the findings of Behrman (1997) that mother’s schooling is more important for younger 
children and with my own review of studies from African countries.  
This chapter illustrates the difficulty of comparing studies on the determinants of schooling as 
the method used has an important impact on the results. So, I showed that the answer to a 
simple question such as is mother’s schooling relatively more or less important than father’s 
schooling in Senegal for children’s schooling depends heavily on the type of estimates used. 
Even advanced methods such as instrumental variables may not give a definitive answer if the 
estimates are based on a sample that is not representative of the general population. The high 
variability of the effect of father’s schooling relative to mother’s schooling may also be due to 




different age samples. Therefore, without a common framework it is hard to compare these 









Chapter 6: Allocation of schooling in polygynous households: the 
case of rural Senegal
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6.1 Introduction 
Polygamy is defined as a type of union that includes more than one partner. Polygyny is the 
type of polygamy where a man marries more than one wife and polyandry is the very rare case 
where a woman marries more than one man. Polygyny is a form of union practised by most of 
the cultures in the world. According to Gould et al. (2008), 850 of the 1,170 societies listed in 
Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas practice polygyny. Polygynous unions are common across Sub-
Saharan Africa. Based on DHS surveys, Munro et al. (2010) report that, in most Sub-Saharan 
African countries, at least one third of married women are in a polygynous union and the 
incidence of polygyny is generally higher in West Africa. Senegal is no exception and, despite 
a slight decrease over the last 20 years, 39.5% of married women have one or more co-wives 
and there are on average 1.28 married women per married man.  
In a polygynous household, decisions concerning children’s schooling may be more 
complicated than in a monogamous household. Indeed, when a father allocates resources for 
the education of his children, he may prefer to allocate more resources toward children of one 
of his wives. Therefore, polygyny may lead to inequalities in access to human capital if 
resources are not shared equally between children of different co-wives.  
This chapter exploits the dataset described in chapter three to look at the allocation of schooling 
of children living in polygynous households. It builds on the current limited literature about 
allocation of resources between co-wives in polygynous households. Moreover, it attempts to 
understand better the determinants of schooling in Senegal where the primary school 
completion rate was only 59% in 2016.75 
Thus, this chapter looks at the determinants of schooling in polygynous households, notably 
the effects of the seniority of the mother and the level of education of the mother and the other 
wives in the household. The chapter examines if the behaviour of polygynous households 
regarding children’s education is better described by a unitary model, where the household can 
be seen as a single economic entity, or by a collective model where wives in the household act 
like separate economic entities. Looking at the difference in effects of full and half siblings in 
polygynous households is used as a test of the validity of the unitary model. Moreover, the 
 
75 World Bank data. 
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chapter deals with the potential endogeneity of the number of siblings by comparing the 
difference in effects between full brothers and sisters on the one hand and half brothers and 
sisters on the other. 
The main findings are that, unlike Mammen (2009), the seniority of the mother is not found to 
have an effect on children’s education. Moreover, it is found that the education of the other 
wives in the households has a strong positive effect that shows that wives are more partners 
than rivals when it comes to educating children. Finally, the difference in effects between 
additional full and half siblings tends to show that co-wives in polygynous households behave 
more like separate entities and that resources may not be used efficiently in polygynous 
households. These results can have important implications for the targeting of social policies. 
For instance, cash transfers given directly to men can be allocated inefficiently if men do not 
share it according to children’s needs but in a way that equalises resources between his co-
wives.   
6.2 Literature review 
An important contribution to the theoretical work on the allocation of resources between co-
wives has been made by Bergstrom (1994). Bergstrom’s model predicts that co-wives will be 
treated equally. In his model, it is assumed that men try to maximise their number of offspring 
and that all women have the same fertility function. The fertility of a woman depends on the 
amount of resources provided by her husband and it is assumed that her fertility function 
exhibits diminishing marginal returns. Given these assumptions, men should invest the same 
amount of resources in each wife in order to maximise their number of children. Furthermore, 
the model allows for differences in earning abilities between wives and it shows that 
differences in earning abilities are reflected in differences in bride price such that the net price 
of a wife is equalised. Given that women are assumed to have the same fertility function, the 
model predicts that all the women in the community receive the same amount of resources from 
their husbands and differences in wealth between men are reflected by the fact that richer men 
marry more wives.  
This model is an interesting starting point to understand the allocation of resources between 
co-wives inside the household. One implication of the model is that any difference in the 
allocation of resources between co-wives is caused by a difference in fertility ability. It can be 
extended to the difference of schooling investments between children of different co-wives. 
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Indeed, in this case, if we assume that men invest in the education of children such that the 
marginal benefit of additional schooling is equal across children and that mothers mainly take 
care of their own children, the allocation of schooling investment to co-wives will depend on 
the ability of mothers to raise their children.  
However, Bergstrom assumes in his model that men are the sole decision makers inside the 
household and that resources are pooled between household members. These two assumptions 
are typical of the unitary model first developed by economists to explain households’ 
behaviour. In this type of model, a household is assumed to act as a single entity. As a 
consequence, the household’s resources are pooled and inequalities between household 
members are due to gains in efficiency (e.g. more resources for the most productive people 
(Pitt et al., 1990)) or to the household’s preferences for inequalities (e.g. children receive less 
than parents). Moreover, the unitary model makes the assumption that one of the household 
members (e.g. the head of the household) is acting as a benevolent dictator and can force 
household members to act in a certain way. Nonetheless, the assumption of a benevolent 
dictator does not explain how household members’ preferences are aggregated. Thus, 
Samuelson (1956) suggests that decisions about consumption may come from a consensus 
between family members and Sen (1966) assumes that the benevolent dictator maximises a 
weighted average of the different utility functions but he does not explain where the weights 
come from. Becker and Lewis (1973) try to tackle the problem of aggregation of preferences 
by explaining that individuals marry spouses with similar preferences and develop the ‘rotten 
kid theorem’, which stipulates that the benevolent dictator can change the behaviour of a selfish 
household member by changing the allocation of resources he or she receives (Becker, 1981, 
Becker, 1974). 
The problem of the aggregation of preferences has led to the development of a new type of 
model called the collective model (Chiappori, 1988, Browning et al., 1994, Bourguignon et al., 
1995, Browning and Chiappori, 1998). The collective model assumes that household members 
with more bargaining power will have more weight in the household’s aggregate utility 
function and, therefore, the household’s members with more bargaining power will be able to 
seize a greater share of the household’s resources. Studies have used differences in preferences 
between men and women to show that a household’s consumption is a function of the relative 
bargaining power of the household’s members. Thus, Browning et al. (1994) show that the 
final allocation of expenditures on each partner in a Canadian dataset depends on their relative 
 153 
incomes and ages and the level of lifetime wealth. Duflo and Udry (2004) find that the pattern 
of households’ expenditures is influenced by the relative income of men and women in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Studies have also shown the importance of women’s bargaining power in investment 
in children’s human capital. Indeed, women have on average stronger preferences for 
children’s health and education than men and when they have more weight in the decisions 
taken by the households, there is greater investment in children’s human capital. Thus, it is 
found that children receive more education in households where women have more bargaining 
power (Ridao-Cano, 2001, Ray and Basu, 2001) and that children are less malnourished if the 
recipient of a cash transfer program is a woman (Duflo, 2000).  
Although there is an extensive literature on the collective model in the framework of 
monogamous households, the literature for polygynous households is limited. The case of 
polygynous households opens new theoretical perspectives. Indeed, as in monogamous 
households, the level of investment in children’s education in a polygynous household may 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the husband and his wives but, unlike monogamous 
households, the level of education of one child may also depend on the relative bargaining 
power of her mother relative to other co-wives.  
This point is more deeply explored by Mammen (2009) in a study on the level of education of 
children from polygynous families in Côte d’Ivoire. Mammen assumes that senior wives enjoy 
a higher social status and that therefore they have more bargaining power than junior wives. 
Moreover, she shows that senior wives and junior wives have similar levels of education, height 
and weight. In her quantitative analysis, she finds that middle school aged children of the senior 
wife are more likely to be enrolled and she interprets this as proof that the allocation of 
resources is biased toward mothers who have more bargaining power. It is worth noting that 
she does not a find a statistically significant effect of mother’s rank on the enrolment of primary 
school aged children. Primary school is cheaper and households are not financially constrained 
at this stage and, therefore, wives do not need to compete for resources for primary school aged 
children. 
This result is consistent with other studies that find a difference in the allocation of resources 
between senior wives and junior wives in Ethiopia and Nigeria (Gibson and Mace, 2006, 
Munro et al., 2010). The study by Munro et al. (2010) in Nigeria is particularly interesting as 
the assumption of equality between co-wives is directly tested in an experiment where 
 154 
husbands are asked to divide an amount of money between their wives. Senior wives are found 
to receive more money than junior wives. Moreover, the authors find that this inequality of 
treatment is not due to a difference in the number of children between senior wives and junior 
wives. 
On the other hand, Mulder (1989) finds that there is equality in treatment between wives among 
Kipsigis people in Kenya. Matz (2011) argues that the rank of a wife depends on her 
characteristics and that women with higher productivity should marry first. She finds that, in 
Ethiopia, parents of senior wives are on average richer. She also finds that children of junior 
wives have on average a lower educational achievement and interprets this as proof that senior 
wives have better abilities, although she concedes that the effect may come through the higher 
bargaining power of senior wives. Unfortunately, she does not include data on mother’s 
education to control for differences in education between co-wives. 
The analysis of the literature shows that the effects vary by country. Therefore, it is worth 
analysing the Senegalese case. 
6.3 Theoretical framework 
Following Mammen (2009), I briefly present the unitary model and the collective model and 
their implications for children’s education in a polygynous household. 
 Unitary model without and with borrowing constraints 
If there are no borrowing constraints, investment in a child will depend on her productivity and 
her mother’s productivity in raising her. Households will equalise marginal returns across 
children and differences between children will depend only on differences in cognitive abilities 
or differences in mother’s education, as education improves productivity in raising children. If 
the household faces borrowing constraints, the productivity of a child’s siblings has an 
influence on a child’s achievement as household resources will first be spent on the more able 
children.  In this case, the education of the other wives may also have an effect, as resources 
will be directed to more able mothers. However, an increase in the other wives’ education will 
not necessarily lead to a decrease in children’s education, as the learning environment of the 
household will be improved. Finally, if the rank of the mother among the co-wives is not 
 155 
correlated with her ability in raising children, the rank of the mother should have no effect on 
her child’s achievement in the unitary model. 
 Collective model without and with borrowing constraints 
In the collective model co-wives do not receive the same amount of resources and the amount 
they receive depends on their bargaining power. Moreover, it can be assumed for several 
reasons that women keep the benefits of their children’s education for themselves by being 
supported by their children in their old age. Firstly, wives are typically younger than their 
husband and are thus likely to become a widow, in which case they will rely on the support of 
their children (Schoumaker, 2000). Secondly, according to Islamic law, in the case of the death 
of the husband, assets will be shared between co-wives and children (Evans, 2012). Investment 
in human capital may then appear as a way to secure a share of the inheritance for wives. 
Finally, the death of the husband will also result in the dissolution of the household and co-
wives will usually no longer live together (Evans, 2012). Therefore, co-wives will not support 
each other during their old age. Given the above reasons, inefficiencies in the collective model 
may come from the fact that co-wives cannot commit that their educated children will support 
other co-wives and their children in the future. 
If there are no borrowing constraints, resources spent on a child will depend only on a child’s 
and her mother’s productivity as in the unitary model. On the other hand, if households cannot 
borrow, the level of education of a child will also depend on the bargaining power of her mother 
in the household. If the bargaining power is correlated with the rank of her mother, and more 
precisely if senior wives have more bargaining power in the household, then a child’s education 
will depend on her mother’s rank among co-wives. It is worth noting that, in this case, children 
do not compete with their half siblings but only with their full siblings as half siblings’ 
characteristics are not part of the decision process of the other wife.76 If it is assumed that the 
mother’s education is positively correlated with the share of resources a mother receives, then 
other wives’ education should have a negative effect on her child’s education. However, since 
the other wives’ education may have a positive effect through the improvement in the learning 
environment, the net effect of the other wives’ education is unknown. 
 




In the unitary model it is assumed that fathers allocate more education to the children with 
more ability and with more productive mothers. In this model, the total number of siblings may 
have an impact on investments in education but, since household heads make the decisions for 
the whole household, the effect of an additional sibling should be identical if this sibling is a 
half sibling or a full sibling. If the effect of a full sibling is different from the effect of a half 
sibling, then this suggests that decisions inside the household are not taken as described in the 
unitary model. 
6.4.1. Sibling rivalry 
An additional sibling is likely to have a negative effect on a child’s education. A large number 
of children decreases available resources per child in the household and may prevent children 
from going to school. However, these negative effects may be counterbalanced by the fact that 
children usually start working at a young age in Senegal and often perform several household 
chores. Thus, when children are old enough, they are able to work outside the household or in 
the household’s fields and they may bring additional resources to the household. Moreover, 
additional siblings decrease the opportunity cost of time of a child. Indeed, a larger number of 
children may share household chores and agricultural work which may save them time to go 
to school. 
The trade-off between the quantity and quality of children has been theorised by Becker and 
Lewis (1973). The theory states that parents may choose to have fewer children in order to 
invest more resources in their children. Thus, families with fewer children will be able to have 
more educated children. This has been found in the African context where the number of 
siblings may have an impact on a child’s education. Glick and Sahn (2000) find that the 
negative effect of the number of young siblings is stronger for girls than for boys, but they find 
a positive effect for the number of sisters in Guinea. Lloyd and Gage-Brandon (1994) find a 
positive effect of older siblings on boys’ and girls’ education but a negative effect of the 
youngest ones. In Congo, Shapiro and Tambashe (2001) find a negative effect of other children 
for girls’ and boys’ education. On the other hand, Chernichovsky (1985) finds a positive effect 
of sibling size in Botswana and explains this result by the fact that an additional sibling 
decreases the opportunity cost of other siblings. 
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6.4.2. Model tested 
The scope of this study is not to look at the effect of the number of siblings on education but 
to look at a potentially different effect between half siblings and full siblings to assess the 
relevance of the unitary model. Thus, the estimated model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽3𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽4𝑊2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽5𝑊3𝑖 +  𝑖𝑗𝑘    (1) 
where the subscript i denotes households, j mothers and k children. Y is an outcome variable of 
education such as enrolment or attainment, X1 is the number of full siblings, X2 is the number 
of half siblings and W1, W2 and W3 are covariates at the child, mother and household levels 
respectively.  
The restriction tested is 
  𝛽1 = 𝛽2 
A rejection of this restriction would cast doubt on the validity of the unitary model. Of course, 
one assumption is that additional siblings have an effect on a child’s education. Indeed, if the 
two coefficients are not statistically different from 0, rejection will not prove that the unitary 
model is more appropriate. The model is estimated on the sample of children who live in a 
polygynous household. The outcome variables used are the level of education and current 
enrolment. 
6.5 Descriptive statistics 
In 21% of the households surveyed the household head is married and lives with more than one 
wife, the rest being monogamous households.77 In 93% of the polygynous households, the 
household head is married with exactly two wives and in the remaining cases he is married 
with exactly three wives. Thus, no household reaches the limit of four wives allowed by Islam 
and Senegalese civil law. About 41% of women married to a household head and 35% of the 
 
77 In a few cases, household heads have had children with another wife but are not currently living with her. In 
this case the union is not considered as polygynous. 
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children of a household head live in a polygynous union. The incidence of polygyny is close 
to the Senegalese national figure of 39.5% in 2005 reported by Munro et al. (2010). 
In polygynous unions, senior wives, the ones who married the husband first, differ slightly 
from the other wives (see Table 6.1). The most obvious difference is that they are older and 
less educated. It is worth noting that the difference in education remains in a simple OLS 
regression controlling for age (see Appendix 6.1). Thus, the difference in education between 
senior wives and younger wives is not totally explained by the difference in age. It is puzzling 
because second wives have lower status in Senegalese society (Mondain N., 2004), and it could 
be expected that women with more education look for a better union. It is worth noting that a 
similar pattern is reported by Mammen (2009) in Cote d’Ivoire. This result contradicts the 
assumption made by Mammen that co-wives are identical, but it also contradicts the result 
found by Matz (2011) in Ethiopia that senior wives have more endowments. The fact that 
second wives are more educated than senior wives could be explained by the fact that the bride 
price for educated women is higher. Thus, Platteau and Gaspart (2007) find that the bride price 
of educated women is on average 45% higher than for non-educated women in the Senegal 
river valley. Consequently, young men may be unable to marry an educated woman: they may 
be forced to wait until they have accumulated more wealth to be able to marry an educated 
woman. 
Senior wives have on average 1.6 more children than younger wives; however, because they 
are more likely to have fostered children or have had children who have died, they have only 
0.5 more children living with them. In particular, wives of a lower rank are four times more 
likely than senior wives to have no children and this is not explained by the difference in age. 
It is worth noting that senior wives have about the same number of children and the same 
likelihood of not having children as wives in a monogamous union. Thus, on this dimension, 
senior wives look much more like wives in a monogamous union than wives of a lower rank. 
A similar result is found by Garenne and Van der Walle (1989) among Sereer people in 
Senegal. They show that the fertility of first wives is similar to the fertility of monogamous 
wives but that junior wives have on average fewer children. This difference disappears when 
husband’s age is standardised, which suggests that the difference in fertility is because junior 
wives marry older men on average.78 Another explanation for the lower fertility of lower rank 
 
78 They find that after the age of 40 men’s fertility declines by 16.2% every 10 years. 
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wives is that women who are not able to have children are more likely to divorce and remarry 
another man as a second or third wife. Those women become less valuable in the marriage 
market and they do not manage to marry or remain married in a monogamous union. 
Differences in contraception use does not seem to be a factor explaining the difference in the 
number of children as it is low for senior and junior wives.  
Finally, questions were asked of every married woman in the sample about their decision power 
in the household (see Table 6-1). Questions range from their economic power (work status, 
share of their income in household’s income, share of expenditures controlled) to their 
involvement in the household’s decisions. It is worth noting that differences between junior 
wives and senior wives in these dimensions are never statistically significant. For instance, 
only about one in five say that they are involved in the decisions concerning the education of 
their children, suggesting that mothers’ characteristics might only play an indirect role in 
children’s schooling. Hence, despite their higher social status, senior wives do not seem to have 
more bargaining power than junior wives in this region of Senegal. This result stands when an 
indicator that aggregates the different components of bargaining power is constructed. Thus, 
senior wives do not seem to be able to bend their household’s decisions in their favour and 
differences in educational achievement between children of the senior wife and children of 
junior wives are not expected.  
 160 
Table 6-1Characteristics of wives in a polygynous union 
 Senior  Other  Difference 
Age  45.01 38.81 6.2*** 
 9.11 10.02  
Age difference with her husband 10.19 16.3 -6.12*** 
 6.64 7.59  
Wives' number of year of schooling 0.56 1.66 -1.1*** 
 1.81 2.78  
Number of children 5.27 3.65 1.61*** 
 3.06 2.4  
Number of fostered children  0.75 0.4 0.35** 
 1.06 0.86  
Number of children living in the household 3.32 2.82 0.51* 
 1.91 1.95  
% of wives with no children 4.67 16.52 -11.84*** 
 0.21 0.37  
Rate of utilization of contraception 19.44 16.3 3.14 
 0.39 0.37  
% who worked during the last 12 months 81.55 78.94 2.6 
 38.97 40.94  
% who have a share of household income greater than 0 67.67 58.18 9.49 
 47 49.51  
% who have a share of household expenditure controlled greater than 0 76.23 66.36 9.87 
 42.77 47.46  
% who are involved in decisions concerning their own health 55.76 52.21 3.55 
 49.9 50.13  
% who are involved in decisions concerning the health of their children 47.57 37.96 9.6 
 50.18 48.75  
% involved in decisions concerning the education of their children 22.22 20.19 2.02 
 41.78 40.33  
% who are involved in decisions concerning daily non-food expenditures 46.15 38.93 7.21 
 50.09 48.97  
% who are involved in decisions concerning food expenditures 92.3 88.49 3.81 
 26.77 32.04  
% who are involved in decisions concerning important expenditures 20.19 23.89 -3.7 
 40.33 42.83  
% who are involved in decisions concerning visit to relatives 52.88 54.86 -1.98 
 50.15 49.98  
% who can go out without asking permission 54.8 48.21 6.59 
 50 50.19  
Number of observations 107 115  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in italics. 
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Although their mothers are more educated, children of low rank wives are not more likely to 
have been to school and do not have more education than children of senior wives (see Table 
6-2). Moreover, it is worth pointing out that children of senior wives and children of junior 
wives have roughly the same number of siblings living with them. 






other wives Difference 
Age (6-18) 12.28 11.45 0.83** 
 3.55 3.53  
Enrolled 55.85 59.34 -3.49 
 49.78 49.25  
Ever enrolled 68.61 69.61 -1 
 46.52 46.12  
Number of year of schooling 2.99 2.77 0.22 
 2.84 2.69  
Number of same mother siblings 4.49 4.27 0.22 
 1.5 1.51  
Number of observations 190 182  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. SE reported in italics. 
6.6 Results 
6.3.1. Level of education 
Table 6-3 presents the results from fitting the model. The dependent variable is the level of 
education reached by the child at the time of the survey. Levels of education range from zero 
to seven with zero being no formal education, one to six years of primary schooling and seven 
secondary education or more. Since 58% of the children are still enrolled, the model estimated 
is a right-censored model in order to correct for the censoring bias (Greene, 1981, Holmes, 
1999).79 Besides the number of full and half siblings, the model includes the child’s 
characteristics such as gender, age, age squared and the rank among siblings. To purge the 
correlation between birth order and the number of siblings, the birth order is divided by 
(number of siblings+1)/2. As a result, the average birth order is always one, whatever the family 
size and the correlation with the number of siblings is 0 (Booth and Kee, 2009). At the mother 
 
79 Estimates are performed with the Stata command ‘cmp’. (Roodman, 2011). 
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level, variables include the seniority of the mother in the household, her age and her level of 
education. Moreover, the age and education of the other mothers in the household are 
included.80 Finally, variables at the household level are the age and level of education of the 
father, the logarithm of total expenditures, the presence of electricity in the household, the 
distance from the village of the household to the main town in the area, and dummies for 
location. 
First, it is worth noting that the coefficient associated with whether the child’s mother is a 
junior wife is never statistically significant in any of the models. Thus, in Senegal, it cannot be 
concluded that the rank of the mother plays a role in the level of education reached; differences 
in educational achievement between children of different wives are not conditional on the rank 
of their mother in the union. Also, the coefficient on the level of education of the other wife is 
always positive and statistically significant. This coefficient is even larger than the coefficient 
associated with the level of education of the mother although the difference between the two 
coefficients is not statistically significant. This is an interesting and surprising result. Indeed, 
the model assumes that there is a rivalry between mothers and that fathers should invest more 
resources in the children of the most educated mother as she is supposed to be more productive 
at raising children. A positive effect could mean that mothers cooperate for the education of 
the children in the household and that the positive effect of a better educational environment 
exceeds the potential rivalry between co-wives. However, it is not possible to rule out that other 
factors explain the positive correlation between the other wife’s education and a child’s 
education, such as husband’s preferences for education that could be correlated with children’s 
and wives’ education levels.   
 
80 In the rare case where there are three wives in the household, the level of education and age included are an 
average of the two other wives. 
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Table 6-3: Determinants of level of education for children aged 6 to 18 living in a polygynous household 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Whole Girls Boys Whole Girls Boys 
              
Full siblings -0.166* -0.294*** -0.015    
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.126)    
Half siblings -0.090 -0.140*** 0.002    
 (0.060) (0.050) (0.099)    
Full siblings under 5    -0.366** -0.403* -0.482** 
    (0.157) (0.225) (0.192) 
Full siblings over 5    -0.114 -0.273** 0.130 
    (0.101) (0.107) (0.162) 
Half siblings under 5    -0.094 -0.287* 0.151 
    (0.156) (0.165) (0.162) 
Half siblings over 5    -0.086 -0.092 -0.014 
    (0.068) (0.065) (0.106) 
Other individuals -0.073 -0.081 -0.104 -0.072 -0.077 -0.120 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.077) (0.059) (0.057) (0.075) 
Girl -0.315   -0.296   
 (0.203)   (0.208)   
Age 0.777*** 0.720*** 0.958*** 0.753*** 0.707*** 0.918*** 
 (0.223) (0.270) (0.294) (0.224) (0.265) (0.306) 
Age squared -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Rank among siblings -0.579 -0.925** -0.023 -0.774* -1.207** -0.366 
 (0.420) (0.460) (0.552) (0.456) (0.503) (0.674) 
Junior wife -0.080 0.207 0.035 -0.135 0.186 -0.099 
 (0.263) (0.294) (0.419) (0.267) (0.312) (0.427) 
Mother’s level of education 0.271 0.102 0.522* 0.314* 0.098 0.680** 
 (0.173) (0.201) (0.271) (0.177) (0.208) (0.330) 
Mother’s age 0.001 -0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.007 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) 
Other wife’s level of education 0.455** 0.357* 0.595** 0.434** 0.371* 0.533** 
 (0.177) (0.202) (0.240) (0.179) (0.204) (0.229) 
Other wife’s age 0.023 0.038* 0.013 0.027* 0.038* 0.029 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) 
Father’s level of education 0.405** 0.458*** 0.239 0.397** 0.416** 0.247 
 (0.159) (0.156) (0.235) (0.163) (0.174) (0.231) 
Father’s age -0.018 -0.005 -0.022 -0.022 -0.012 -0.031 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Expenditures (in ln) 0.604* 0.782** 0.476 0.576* 0.760** 0.396 
 (0.320) (0.330) (0.441) (0.310) (0.331) (0.414) 
Electricity in the hh 0.630** 0.671** 0.751* 0.616** 0.602* 0.796** 
 (0.307) (0.292) (0.407) (0.310) (0.316) (0.389) 
Km to main town -0.100* -0.118** -0.082 -0.096* -0.121** -0.078 
 (0.058) (0.054) (0.073) (0.057) (0.053) (0.070) 
Location 2 -0.580 -1.197** -0.241 -0.525 -1.141** -0.226 
 (0.608) (0.568) (0.796) (0.613) (0.572) (0.789) 
Location 3 -0.309 -0.550 -0.461 -0.286 -0.583 -0.427 
 (0.480) (0.483) (0.596) (0.474) (0.448) (0.586) 
Constant -4.308* -4.481* -5.747** -3.534 -3.704 -4.277 
 (2.269) (2.360) (2.830) (2.195) (2.474) (2.893) 
Observations 355 187 168 355 187 168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clusters at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results show that for model (1) through (5), the coefficient associated with full siblings does 
not differ statistically from the one associated with half siblings and so the unitary model cannot 
be rejected. However, in model (6), boys seem less affected by an additional half sibling under 
the age of five than a full sibling under the same age, suggesting that in this case the unitary 
model can be rejected. 
Thus, results for model (1) show that an additional full sibling is associated with a reduction 
of 0.166 of a level of education and that this effect is stronger than the effect of an additional 
half sibling. Nonetheless, the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically 
significant (chi(2)=0.53, p=0.47).  
Since it has been found in other studies (Glick and Sahn, 2000) that the effect of the number 
of siblings differs between girls and boys, two separate models were estimated for the sub-
sample of girls and boys respectively. It is worth noting that girls are harmed more than boys 
by the presence of an additional sibling. The negative effect of an additional full sibling is 
approximately double the effect of an additional half sibling for girls, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (chi(2)=2.01, p=0.16). However, the effects of full and half siblings are 
not statistically significant for boys and, therefore, it is impossible to conclude if the unitary 
model is valid in this case. 
In models (4), (5) and (6), the number of full and half siblings has been split between the 
number of siblings younger than five years old and siblings older than five years old. Young 
children have been found to have a stronger negative effect on education than older children 
(Glick and Sahn, 2000, Lloyd and Gage-Brandon, 1994). It may be explained by the fact that 
young siblings are not able to work and bring resources into the household or help with 
household chores. Moreover, even if the cost of children under five is low as they are not 
attending school, they require more of their mother’s attention and older siblings in the 
household may be needed to help their mother. On the other hand, additional older siblings 
may have a positive effect on a child’s education if they bring resources into the household.  
Furthermore, it may be argued that the different effect of half siblings and full siblings comes 
from the fact that full siblings have a smaller age difference between each other than with their 
half siblings. Indeed, if a man waits a long time between his two marriages, then it is likely that 
the children he had with his first wife will be on average much older than the children he had 
with his second wife. In this case, half siblings and full siblings may not compete with each 
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other because of their age difference. Additional full siblings may have a crowding out effect 
if they are more likely to be of similar age and compete for the same resources at the same 
time. Including the number of full and half siblings under the age of five overcomes this issue 
as the timing of the births of these children was the same for full and half siblings. Hence, this 
variable will be used to test the unitary model. 
Results show that, indeed, the number of children under the age of five has a larger negative 
effect than the number of children over the age of five. For the whole sample, an additional full 
sibling under the age of five decreases the level of education by 0.37, whereas an additional 
half sibling under the age of five reduces the level of education by only 0.09. However, the 
Chi-squared test shows that the difference is not statistically significant (chi(2)=2.06, p=0.15). 
Separate models for boys and girls show that the negative effect of young siblings is 
particularly strong for boys. In the girl sub-sample, the difference between the coefficients 
associated with the number of full and half siblings under the age of five is not statistically 
different (chi(2)=0.23, p=0.63) but the difference is statistically significant for boys 
(chi(2)=5.07, p=0.02). Thus, this last result tends to show that the effect of full and half siblings 
may differ in certain circumstances and, then, it invalidates the unitary model.81 
6.3.2. Enrolment 
The likelihood of current enrolment has been tested using probit models (see Table 6-4). The 
results are similar to the results obtained with the level of education. The coefficients associated 
with full siblings and half siblings are not statistically significant in the whole sample and in 
the boy sample. However, the effect of full siblings is double the effect of half siblings for 
girls, but the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant (chi(2)=2.47, 
p=0.12). 
A negative and statistically significant effect of the number of full siblings under the age of 
five is found in the whole sample, whereas the number of half siblings under five is not 
statistically significant. However, the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically 
 
81 It is worth noting that nine tests of the unitary versus collective model are performed in this section. With a type 
I error rate of 5%, multiple comparisons inflate the true type I error rate. Thus, in this case, the chance of finding 
a false positive result is 1-(1-0.05)^9=37%.    
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significant (chi(2)=1.53, p=0.22). In the girls’ sub-sample the difference between the 
coefficients of interest is also not statistically significant (chi(2)=0.15, p=0.7). Finally, as was 
found for the level of education, the difference between the coefficients associated with the 
number of full and half siblings under five is statistically significant in the boy sub-sample 
(chi(2)=4.96, p=0.03). Thus, an additional full sibling under the age of five decreases the 
likelihood of going to school by 18 percentage points for boys whereas an additional half 
sibling has no effect. The difference in rivalry between half and full siblings tends to show that 
decisions about a boy’s education are more influenced by other children sharing the same 
mother than by other children of the household.  
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Table 6-4: Determinants of enrolment for children aged 6 to 18 living in a polygynous 
household 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Whole Girls Boys Whole Girls Boys 
              
Full siblings -0.036 -0.099*** 0.025    
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.037)    
Half siblings -0.020 -0.046*** 0.011    
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.029)    
Full siblings under 5    -0.118** -0.139* -0.176** 
    (0.058) (0.084) (0.074) 
Full siblings over 5    -0.013 -0.090*** 0.086* 
    (0.030) (0.032) (0.049) 
Half siblings under 5    -0.040 -0.106* 0.023 
    (0.050) (0.062) (0.086) 
Half siblings over 5    -0.014 -0.027 0.015 
    (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) 
Other individuals -0.020 -0.028 -0.023 -0.019 -0.026 -0.028 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) 
Girl 0.004   0.010   
 (0.062)   (0.064)   
Age 0.309*** 0.304*** 0.399*** 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.395*** 
 (0.064) (0.098) (0.084) (0.064) (0.097) (0.089) 
Age squared -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rank among siblings -0.188* -0.302** -0.057 -0.286** -0.410*** -0.241 
 (0.111) (0.123) (0.150) (0.125) (0.158) (0.191) 
Junior wife -0.039 0.013 0.036 -0.058 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.077) (0.101) (0.123) (0.082) (0.106) (0.127) 
Mother’s level of education 0.070 0.030 0.136* 0.086* 0.022 0.204** 
 (0.048) (0.064) (0.075) (0.050) (0.064) (0.095) 
Mother’s age -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Other wife’s level of education 0.130*** 0.099* 0.176** 0.127*** 0.105** 0.169** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.074) (0.047) (0.054) (0.073) 
Other wife’s age 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Father’s level of education 0.068 0.116** 0.028 0.062 0.104* 0.025 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.072) (0.050) (0.059) (0.074) 
Father’s age -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Expenditures (in ln) 0.141 0.244** 0.085 0.125 0.233** 0.034 
 (0.106) (0.121) (0.147) (0.103) (0.119) (0.142) 
Electricity in the hh 0.152 0.244** 0.144 0.145 0.227* 0.167 
 (0.104) (0.113) (0.124) (0.104) (0.118) (0.124) 
Km to main town -0.037** -0.037* -0.042* -0.036* -0.039* -0.042* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) 
Location 2 -0.215 -0.384** -0.190 -0.190 -0.372** -0.173 
 (0.175) (0.164) (0.200) (0.176) (0.165) (0.204) 
Location 3 -0.148 -0.223 -0.272 -0.134 -0.235 -0.250 
 (0.157) (0.174) (0.176) (0.156) (0.167) (0.186) 
       
Observations 363 191 172 363 191 172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clusters at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Endogeneity of the number of siblings 
6.6.1.1 Identification 
Until now the number of siblings has been considered as an exogenous variable. However, 
there are reasons to believe that this may not be the case. Indeed, fertility is not random and 
parents may influence the number of children they have (about 13% of married women in the 
sample take the contraceptive pill). The decision to have more or fewer children is likely to be 
correlated with the level of education desired by parents. Thus, the negative impact of the 
number of siblings may be explained by the fact that parents who want to have more children 
also have a lower preference for child’s education. Estimated coefficients are therefore biased 
since preferences for fertility and education are not observed and cannot be controlled for in 
the estimates. 
Endogeneity is not an issue if decisions about fertility and education depend only on 
unobservable variables at the household level and are not influenced by unobservable variables 
at the mother level, because, in this case, the endogeneity bias should be the same for half 
siblings and full siblings. Indeed, equation (1) may be seen as a reduced form and the full model 
is:   
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾1𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾2𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾3𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾4𝑊2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾5𝑊3𝑖 +  𝛾6𝑍𝑖 +   𝜐𝑖𝑗𝑘           (2) 
In this equation, Zi is the preference for fertility and education at the household level. Since Zi 
is not observable, it is omitted from the estimated model and coefficient estimates are biased. 
Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), the bias of  β1 and β2 in equation (1) is: 
β1 = γ1 +  γ6θ1 
β2 = γ2 +  γ6θ2 
where θ1 and θ2 are the coefficients associated with the variables X1 and X2 from a regression 
of Zi on all the co-variates in equation (2). If household heads make decisions about fertility 
and schooling for the whole household, θ1 and θ2 should be equal and the bias in estimating 
β1and β2 identical. Thus, in this case, any difference between β1and β2 must come from a 
difference between γ1 and γ2 and reflects a violation of the assumption of the unitary model.  
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However, endogeneity may also arise from unobservable variables at the mother level. Indeed, 
characteristics of wives may have an influence on the number of children they have and on the 
amount of education their children received. For instance, men might choose to have fewer 
children with wives they think are less capable of raising children and, in the meantime, they 
may allocate more resources for the education of the children of wives they think are more 
capable. In this case, the coefficient associated with full siblings will be biased downwards and 
any difference between the coefficients of half siblings and full siblings may not allow us to 
reject the assumption that the unitary model is more appropriate. 
In order to correct for potential endogeneity at the mother level, we can use the fact that 
additional brothers and additional sisters may have a different effect on a child’s education 
level.  Although the coefficient of full siblings may be biased because there are unobservable 
variables at the mother level, the bias should be the same for full brothers and full sisters. Thus, 
the extent of the bias depends on the partial correlation between additional siblings and 
mother’s unobservable variables and, since mothers cannot control the gender of their children, 
the partial correlations between the mother’s unobservable variables and the number of full 
brothers or the number of full sisters should be identical.82 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜋1𝐵1𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜋2𝑆1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜋3𝐵2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜋4𝑆2𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜋5𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜋6𝑊2𝑖𝑗 + 𝜋7𝑊3𝑖 +
               𝜋8𝑍𝑖𝑗 +   𝜈𝑖𝑗𝑘                                           (3) 
where B1 is the number of full brothers, S1 the number of full sisters, B2 the number of half-
brothers and S2 the number of half-sisters. The endogeneity problem stems from the fact that 
𝑍𝑖𝑗 is a variable at the mother level that is unobserved. Thus, the reduced form is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝜙𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆1B1𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜆2𝑆1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆3𝐵2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆4𝑆2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆5𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆6𝑊2𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆7𝑊3𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑘   (4)      
                                
 
82 Selective abortion is not available in rural Senegal and there is no known evidence of a bias against girls or 
boys. 
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According to the omitted variable bias formula, the bias depends on the correlation of the 
unobservable variables with the explanatory variables. Equation (5) is a regression of the 
omitted variables on the explanatory variables:  
𝑍𝑖𝑗 =  𝜓𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌1𝐵1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌2𝑆1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌3𝐵2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌4𝑆2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌5𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜌6𝑊2𝑖𝑗 + 𝜌7𝑊3𝑖 +  𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑘 (5)
                               
and coefficients of the reduced form may be expressed as: 
𝜆1 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋8𝜌1 
𝜆2 = 𝜋2 + 𝜋8𝜌2 
Since women cannot control the gender composition of their children, 𝜌1 should be equal to 𝜌2 
and the endogeneity bias should be the same.  
𝜆1 = 𝜋1 + 𝜅 
𝜆2 = 𝜋2 + 𝜅 
where 𝜅 =  𝜋8𝜌1 =  𝜋8𝜌2. 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that a mother’s characteristics have no direct impact on the 
number of children the other wives have. Thus, 𝜌3 and 𝜌4 equal 0 and estimates of 𝜆3 and 
𝜆4 should not be biased: 
𝜆3 = 𝜋3 
𝜆4 = 𝜋4 
Hence, the reduced form estimated is:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝜙𝑖𝑗𝑘 + (𝜋1 + 𝜅)𝐵1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + (𝜋2 + 𝜅)𝑆1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜋3𝐵2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜋4𝑆2𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜆5𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆6𝑊2𝑖𝑗 +
            𝜆7𝑊3𝑖 +  𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑘                             (6) 
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According to the unitary model, the effect of an additional sibling should be identical whether 
he or she is a full or a half sibling. However, the effect of additional sisters or brothers may be 
different. Thus, we should have:  
{
𝜋1 =  𝜋3
𝜋2 = 𝜋4
                         (7) 
If (7) holds, we obtain the following equalities: 
𝜆1 − 𝜋3 = 𝜅                         (8)  
𝜆2 − 𝜋4 = 𝜅                         (9)  
and from (8) and (9): 
𝜆1 − 𝜋3 = 𝜆2 − 𝜋4                      (10) 
If (10) does not hold, it means that (7) does not hold and this casts doubt on the validity of the 
unitary model. Testing this restriction takes advantage of the fact that the endogeneity bias 
should not change the relative effect of additional brothers and sisters.  
A Wald test can be used to test this restriction. However, this test is restrictive because it will 
not be statistically different from zero if 𝜋1 = 𝜋2  and 𝜋3 = 𝜋4, i.e. if the effects of additional 
brothers and sisters do not differ. Hence, first, a test of equality of the estimated coefficients of 
full brothers and full sisters has to be performed (i.e. 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 ). The effects of additional half 
brothers and sisters should be zero in the collective model, but estimated coefficients could be 
different from zero as these variables might be correlated with unobserved variables at the 
household head level (Zi in equation (2)).  
Hence, if 𝜆1 ≠ 𝜆2  and 𝜆1 − 𝜋3 ≠ 𝜆2 − 𝜋4, it would mean that the difference in the effect of 
full brothers and full sisters is different from the difference in the effects of half-brothers and 
half-sisters, which is not compatible with the unitary model. 
6.6.1.2 Results  
Table 6-5 shows the results for the level of education attained. In the whole sample, the 
negative effect of full sisters on a child’s education is larger than the effect of full brothers, 
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whereas the effects are reversed for half brothers and sisters. Thus, the effect of additional 
brothers is similar whether they are full brothers or half-brothers (-.118 and -.149 respectively) 
whereas the effect of full sisters and half-sisters differs more (-.223 and -.041 respectively). In 
both cases, the difference in the effects is not statistically significantly different from zero 
(chi(2)=0.07, p=0.79 and chi(2)=2.27, p=0.13 respectively) but the difference in the differences 
is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level (chi(2)=3.18, p=0.07). 
However, the difference between the effects of full brothers and full sisters is not statistically 
different from zero (chi(2)=0.89, p=0.34).  Thus, it is not possible to conclude for the whole 
sample if the unitary model is more appropriate than the collective model. 
In the girls-only sample, the effects of brothers and sisters is stronger than in the whole sample. 
The difference between full brothers and full sisters is statistically significant (chi(2)=3.85, 
p=0.05).  Hence, the restriction in (10) can be tested. The result shows that the difference in 
the differences is statistically significantly different from zero (chi(2)=5.01, p=0.03). In this 
case the unitary model should be rejected. Indeed, while the effect of brothers is similar, the 
effects of full and half-sisters is very different and full sisters are particularly harmful for girls 
whereas half-sisters are not. 
In the boys-only sample, the effect of additional siblings is close to zero and the difference 
between the effect of full brothers and full sisters is not statistically significant (chi(2)=0.15, 
p=0.7). Since the restriction (10) cannot be tested, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusion 
in the boys-only sample. 
As explained before, the difference in effect between full siblings and half siblings may come 
from the fact that full siblings may be closer in age than half siblings. Thus, estimates have 
been performed with the number of full and half-brothers and full and half-sisters under the 
age of five. As can be seen in column (4), the effect of brothers and sisters under the age of 
five is stronger than the effect of half brothers and sisters. However, since the difference 
between the effects of the number of full brothers under the age of five and the number of full 
sisters under the age of five is not statistically significant (chi(2)=0.08, p=0.77), it is not 
feasible to test the collective model in this sample. In the girls-only sample (column 5), the 
effect of additional full sisters under the age of five is three times more harmful for girls than 
an additional brother under the age of five and the difference is statistically significant 
(chi(2)=5.55, p=0.02). Moreover, in the girls-only sample, the difference in the differences in 
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the effects between full and half-brothers and full and half-sisters is statistically significant at 
10% (chi(2)=3.49, p=0.06). Hence, in this case, the unitary model can be rejected, at least at 
this significance level. Finally, in the boys-only sample column (6), the effects of full brothers 
and full sisters under the age of five are particularly harmful for boys, whereas the effects of 
half-brothers and half-sisters under the age of five are not statistically significantly different 
from zero. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect of full 
young brothers and the effect of full young sisters and, consequently, the test of restriction (10) 
cannot be performed. 
Table 6-5: Determinants of level of education for children aged 6 to 18 living in a polygynous 
household 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Whole Girls Boys Whole Girls Boys 
           
Number of full brothers -0.118 -0.185* 0.032     
(0.098) (0.104) (0.150)    
Number of full sisters -0.223* -0.455*** -0.023     
(0.117) (0.138) (0.147)    
Number of half brothers -0.149** -0.195** -0.108     
(0.075) (0.080) (0.111)    
Number of half sisters -0.041 -0.061 0.082     
(0.084) (0.092) (0.138)    
Number of full brothers under 5 year 
old 
  
 -0.334* -0.239 -0.547** 
   
 (0.198) (0.252) (0.276) 
Number of full sisters under 5 year old 
  
 -0.402** -0.731*** -0.311    
 (0.196) (0.222) (0.310) 
Number of half brothers under 5 year 
old 
  
 -0.145 -0.259 0.010 
   
 (0.190) (0.207) (0.314) 
Number of half sisters under 5 year old 
  
 -0.019 -0.211 0.322    
 (0.193) (0.225) (0.284) 
Number of full siblings over 5 year old 
  
 -0.111 -0.267** 0.120    
 (0.102) (0.112) (0.163) 
Number of half siblings over 5 year old 
  
 -0.092 -0.079 -0.033    
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.110)    
    
Observations 355 187 168 355 187 168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clusters at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Additional control variables are the same as in Table 6-1and their coefficients are similar. 
In Table 6-6, results of the probit model for enrolment are presented. Results are similar to 
those obtained with the level of education. Indeed, in the whole sample and in the boy sample, 
the differences in the effects of full brothers and full sisters are not statistically significant and 
the same result is found when the variables are restricted to full brothers and full sisters under 
the age of five. Thus, in these two samples the test cannot be performed. However, in the girls-
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only sample, both the difference in the effects between full brothers and full sisters and the 
difference in effects between full brothers and full sisters under the age of five are statistically 
significant, respectively (chi(2)=2.75, p=0.09) and (chi(2)=4.82, p=0.03). However, contrary 
to the results found with the level of education, the differences in the differences in effects are 
not statistically significantly different from 0, (respectively chi(2)=2.19, p=0.14 and 
chi(2)=1.55, p=0.21). Therefore, the validity of the unitary model cannot be ruled out for girls. 
This result contradicts the one found with the level of education as the dependent variable. 
However, it is worth pointing out that the restriction is close to being rejected (p=0.14). 
Moreover, it is possible that current enrolment is somewhat less sensitive to the allocation of 
resources than the total accumulation of capital, and, therefore, the power of the test might be 
lower when the dependent variable is the current enrolment.  
Table 6-6 : Determinants of enrolment for children aged 6 to 18 living in a polygynous 
household (marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Whole Girls Boys Whole Girls Boys 
           
Number of full brothers -0.022 -0.070* 0.045     
(0.031) (0.036) (0.044)    
Number of full sisters -0.053 -0.143*** 0.015     
(0.034) (0.039) (0.045)    
Number of half brothers -0.027 -0.057* -0.016     
(0.024) (0.031) (0.035)    
Number of half sisters -0.014 -0.034 0.036     
(0.027) (0.033) (0.043)    
Number of full brothers under 5 year old 
  
 -0.107 -0.084 -0.190**    
 (0.073) (0.097) (0.094) 
Number of full sisters under 5 year old 
  
 -0.158** -0.275*** -0.176    
 (0.073) (0.094) (0.110) 
Number of half brothers under 5 year 
old 
  
 -0.030 -0.074 0.006 
   
 (0.064) (0.075) (0.112) 
Number of half sisters under 5 year old 
  
 -0.038 -0.120 0.054    
 (0.068) (0.088) (0.098) 
Number of full siblings over 5 year old 
  
 -0.009 -0.087*** 0.092*    
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.050) 
Number of half siblings over 5 year old 
  
 -0.014 -0.025 0.015    
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.035)    
    
Observations 363 191 172 363 191 172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clusters at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Additional control variables are the same as in Table 6-1and their coefficients do not change much. 
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6.7 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to shed light on the allocation of schooling in polygynous 
households in Senegal. First, it has been shown that children of the senior wife and children of 
junior wives receive on average the same amount of education. This result may be explained 
by the fact that, despite their higher social status and their age, we cannot rule out that senior 
wives have the same bargaining power as junior wives and, as a result, they do not seem to be 
able to attract more of the household’s resources for their children’s schooling. On the other 
hand, junior wives have, on average, more schooling than senior wives but they do not manage 
to provide more schooling to their children than senior wives.83 In fact, the strong effect of the 
level of education of the other wives could indicate that wives cooperate in the education of 
their children. 
These two facts tend to show that polygynous households in Senegal behave more like a single 
entity, and that children of different wives are not treated differently. However, evidence that, 
in some cases, the effects of full and half siblings on education are different suggests that 
decisions about the schooling of children from different mothers are separated. At least in the 
girls-only sample, additional full siblings are more harmful than additional half siblings, and 
the difference in effects between full brothers and full sisters, on the one hand, and half-brothers 
and half-sisters on the other hand, shows that this difference is not due only to heterogeneity at 
the mother level. A possible explanation is that women use their discretionary income to pay 
for their own children’s education. However, in almost 80% of the cases women are not 
involved in decisions concerning the education of their children, and only 1.5% of them make 
decisions about children’s education by themselves. A more plausible explanation is, therefore, 
that household heads tend to equalise the number of educated children per women. Thus, a 
wife with twice as many children will not be able to have twice as many educated children as 
the other wife. This behaviour may come from a desire of men to equalise the allocation of 
resources between women but it comes at the expense of children’s education, as resources are 
not allocated in priority to the brightest children. It also means that, for a given level of 
resources, children living in polygynous households are likely to achieve lower educational 
 
83 The coefficient on junior wife is still not statistically significant when the mother’s level of education and the 
level of education of the other wife are excluded from the fitted model. 
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results than children living in monogamous households, as resources are less efficiently 
allocated in polygynous households. 
Thus, on the one hand, wives living in polygynous households in Senegal are cooperative and 
children seem to benefit from the level of education of all the wives in the household and, thus, 
it can be expected that the link between a child’s and her mother’s education is more tenuous 
in polygynous households than in monogamous households. On the other hand, it seems that 
children of different wives are considered separately when it comes to decisions about their 
education. 
This finding may be important for the design of cash transfer programs in Senegal and in other 
countries where polygyny is relatively common, although more research is needed to 
understand if polygynous households in other countries behave in the same way as Senegalese 
households. Thus, findings that show women are more prone to invest money in a child’s 
education lead to targeting women as beneficiaries of cash transfer programs. In the case of 
polygynous households, the targeting is even more important. Indeed, as in monogamous 
households, it can be expected that women will be more prone than men to spend any additional 
money on the schooling and health of their children. But, unlike monogamous households, 
results suggest that if a cash transfer program gives money to men in a polygynous household, 
the allocation of money between children of different co-wives is likely to be skewed towards 
children who have fewer full siblings. As long as the number of full siblings is not correlated 
with the cognitive abilities of a child, this allocation will lead to an imperfect allocation of 
resources and will lead to a lower level of human capital for a given amount of resources. 
However, as results do not show any systematic bias in favour of or against senior wives, 

















Chapter 7:  Conclusion
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Despite high investments in the schooling sector and a stated determination from the 
government to improve schooling outcomes, fewer than 60% of Senegalese children complete 
primary school and progress has stalled recently. Thanks to a surge in exports of commodities, 
Senegal is experiencing strong economic growth, but if it wants to ensure its long-term 
development, it needs to invest more and better in its human capital (Gassama and Sylla 2018).  
In this context, this thesis attempted to shed light on the barriers to schooling in rural Senegal. 
It focused on the household demand for schooling, and notably for primary schooling given 
how far Senegal still is from universal primary completion. The rationale for focusing on the 
demand for schooling was that almost all Senegalese children now live close enough to a 
primary school and that education is free, making, at least in theory, access to primary school 
universal but school participation rates remain low. Moreover, the literature review revealed 
that there is no consensus on the determinants of schooling in Senegal, and more generally in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Although studies have revealed that poverty, high demand for child 
labour, social norms or real or perceived low returns to schooling are factors limiting families 
from sending their children to school, the literature cannot identify a few dominant factors that 
reduce demand for schooling in Africa. This may be due to the complexity of studying this 
topic given the lack of good data, and notably longitudinal data and data on learning outcomes, 
the limitations of observational data when it comes to establishing causality and, probably, 
large differences in country contexts and social norms. The literature review also revealed that 
the theoretical framework, methods and outcomes of interest tend to vary dramatically from 
one study on the determinants of schooling to another, making it hard to compare and 
synthesise results.  
In chapter four, I conducted an econometric analysis of determinants of schooling using an 
original dataset collected in the North of Senegal. It revealed that determinants of schooling, 
notably household income, parental education and family structure, are markedly different 
between boys and girls and they should be analysed separately, which is a sign that social 
norms related to gender play an important role in parental decisions regarding schooling. The 
analysis showed as well that a lack of school availability plays a role but for most children 
cannot explain non-enrolment. There is some evidence that a lack of financial resources may 
play a role for girls but estimated coefficients remain low and there are out-of-school girls and 
boys even in the richest households. Moreover, the fact that girls who are not the child of the 
household head are less likely to go to school suggests that access to financial resources may 
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be an issue for some children and that household heads do not share resources equally between 
the children in the household. This is an interesting result that reveals that programs and 
policies targeting children living in the poorest households are likely to miss some children 
living in richer households but with a limited access to financial resources. 
According to the literature, one potential major constraint for children’s schooling is the 
opportunity cost of sending children to school, but my results are mixed on this issue. 
Measuring the opportunity cost of schooling is not feasible and I use variables that should 
impact children’s opportunity cost of time to estimate it. Thus, it is worth noting that the 
coefficient associated with the size of the cultivated area owned by the household is not 
statistically significant for boys and girls, whereas one could expect that households with a 
larger area to cultivate require more workers and would be more likely to use their children to 
work in the field. Since I control for the size of the household and its income, this result is 
unlikely to be due to the fact that larger and richer households have more land but also more 
resources to send children to school. This result is consistent with the fact that a relatively small 
proportion of children (17%) is reported as being engaged in agricultural work and shows that 
agricultural child labour does not seem to be a barrier to schooling. However, there is some 
evidence that girls are harmed by the presence of young children but not by the presence of 
school-age children, which suggests that they help taking care of young children instead of 
going to school. Another striking result is the strong impact of access to electricity on school 
enrolment. The use of an instrumental variable approach suggests that this effect is not biased 
because of endogeneity. There are different reasons that can explain why electricity helps 
children’s schooling. For instance, children are able to study later thanks to electric lighting or 
the use of a fan may help them to sleep better at night. But it is also likely that access to 
electricity decreases the opportunity cost of schooling of children by reducing the amount of 
household chores. Households with electricity can buy a fridge to store food longer and have 
an electric stove, which should help free up children’s time.   
Chapter five is focused on the effect of parental education on a child’s education. Results of 
the analysis in chapter four had shown a relationship between parental education and a child’s 
education only between mothers and sons. Although it is a result in line with the literature that 
usually finds a stronger effect of mother’s education relative to father’s education in developing 
countries, it is surprising to find no relationship between mother’s education and girl’s 
education. Moreover, Dumas and Lambert (2010), who specifically investigated the causal 
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impact of parental education on children’s education in Senegal, found a stronger impact of 
father’s education than mother’s education after controlling for the endogeneity of education. 
My own review of studies on determinants of schooling in Sub-Saharan African countries 
shows that, as was found in Behrman (1997), mother’s education tends to play a greater role in 
a child’s schooling than father’s education. However, the results of the review also show that 
the effect is opposite for older children whose schooling tends to depend more on their father’s 
education. Comparing my results with Dumas and Lambert’s, I found that replicating their 
results with my own data leads to reach the same conclusions as they did, but the results are 
sensitive to the estimation method used and the composition of the sample. I notably find that, 
in line with the rest of the literature, the effect of mother’s education tends to be stronger for 
younger children, whereas father’s education prevails for older children. This could mean that 
mothers are more involved in the education of younger children, whereas fathers are more 
involved with the education of older children. But it could also mean that fathers’ decisions 
carry more weight when children become older as education becomes more expensive and that 
men in Senegal usually make decisions regarding non-food expenses. Overall, Senegal does 
not seem to differ markedly from other African countries and both mother’s and father’s 
education tend to be important at different ages. My work has also shown the potential 
sensitivity of results due to the methodological choices of the researcher, leading to difficulties 
in interpreting results from different studies.  
The final empirical chapter attempted to shed light on the effects of polygyny on children’s 
schooling and on the intra-allocation of resources. I believe it is still an understudied topic 
given how widespread polygyny is in Sub-Saharan Africa. My results revealed that there are 
strong connections between co-wives, as evidenced by the fact that children seem to benefit 
from the education of other co-wives married to their father and living in the same household. 
Moreover, senior wives, the ones who married first, do not seem to be able to attract more 
resources despite having a higher social status than junior wives. Nonetheless, I was also able 
to show the behaviour of polygynous households when it comes to schooling’s decisions is 
better explained by a collective model than a unitary model. It means that different co-wives 
should be considered as separate entities in the household when it comes to the allocation of 
resources for education as, at least for girls, additional full siblings tend to have a greater 
negative impact on education outcomes than additional half siblings. Given the lack of 
women’s control on the household’s financial resources, I argue that this effect should come 
from the fact that husbands aim to equalise resources between wives and not between children. 
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This is a novel result that suggests that polygyny may have a negative impact on girls’ school 
achievement by withholding resources from the most able girls as the allocation of schooling 
is dependent on the number of full siblings and not only on a child’s ability and desire to pursue 
schooling. This result is also in line with the result of chapter four that found that daughters 
from the household head are more likely to go to school, which also suggested that households 
behave as separate entities.   
The extent of my research has been limited by the availability of data. It remains a challenge 
to study the determinants of schooling in Senegal, and in most Sub-Saharan African countries, 
given the lack of datasets including longitudinal data, relatively small sample sizes and lack of 
background information that could be used to obtain instrumental variables. Because of these 
limitations, it is often hard to establish causal effects. For instance, although household income 
is a strong predictor of a girl’s enrolment, I have not been able to establish if the effect is causal 
or if rich households have some characteristics that make them more likely to send their 
daughters to school. I was also limited by the lack of information on learning outcomes and 
had to rely on years of education or school participation as a second best.  
However, despite limitations in the data, I believe that I have shown that interesting results can 
emerge from a careful analysis of cross-sectional data and can provide valuable insights on 
households’ behaviour. Replications of my results using other datasets would help to 
strengthen my findings. For instance, the estimation strategy I used to test for the presence of 
a unitary or a collective model in polygynous household could be easily replicated in other 
contexts as it requires only information on family relationships within the household. It could 
help to gain new insights on the behaviour of polygynous households. More generally, more 
analysis is needed to understand the behaviour of households in Sub-Saharan Africa when it 
comes to children’s schooling in order to help governments design better policies to achieve 












Appendix 2.1: Tabular review of selected papers on determinants of schooling in Africa 
This table summarises the methodology and findings of some of the key papers included in the 
literature review chapter.  




12 years old 
children in a 
public or private 
school. 
- Bi-variate probit 
between free 
school and paying 
school 
- Selection model 




estimates for girls 
and boys 
-Schooling costs are not 
significant 
- Elasticity of wealth is greater 
for girls than for boys with 
wealth measured by an asset 
based indicator 
- Mother’s schooling has 
positive and distance to school 
negative effects 
- Number of young children 
(less than 5) has negative effects 





- Number of 
years of 
schooling of 10-
18 years old 
children 
- Enrolment of 
10-18 years old 
children 
- Drop outs in the 
past 5 years of 
- Ordered probit 
for maximum 
grade attained 
- Probit for 
enrolment 
- Probit for drop 
outs 
- All the estimates 
include a random 
-Wealth (measured by log of 
household’s expenditures) is 
significant only for girls 
- Mother’s schooling significant 
only for girls (but not in drop 
outs estimate) 
- Father’s schooling significant 
for boys and girls (but not in 




10-18 years old 
children 
 
effect at the 
household level. 
- Separate 
estimates for girls 
and boys 
-Number of young children has 
negative effect for girls 
- Number of sisters has positive 




Enrolment in a 
public or private 
school of 6-12 
years old children 
- Nested 
multinomial logit  





- Controls the 
endogeneity of 
school quality by 
including 
variables at the 
community level. 
This does not 
change the 
results. 
- Poor households are more 
sensitive to price 
- Negative impact of distance to 
school and positive impact of 
school quality (e.g. multigrade is 
negative but not student-teacher 
ratio) 
- Positive effect of parents’ 
schooling 
- Negative effect of number of 
children and positive effect of 
number of adults (especially 
number of women on girls) 
- Positive impact of wealth 




- Late enrolment 
- Number of 
years of 
schooling 
- Joint estimate of 
late enrolment 
and an ordered 
probit of grade 
attained by 
children between 
10 and 15. 
-Same determinants for late 
enrolment and number of years 
of schooling except girls who 
enrol younger and stay at school 
for a short time (early marriage) 
-Distance is significant even for 




- Wealth (measured as yearly 
expenditures) 
- School quality (quality of math 
teaching) 
- Schooling of household head 
- Joint estimation does not 




- Number of 
hours of 
schooling during 
the last week of 
children aged 
between 10 and 
15. 
- Panel data  
- Tobit with 
random effects 
- Separate 
analysis for boys 
and girls 
- Presence of mothers has 
positive effects and orphans 
have less hours of schooling 
- Parents’ schooling has positive 
effects (mother’s schooling 
stronger for girls and father’s 
schooling stronger for boys) 
- Wealth (measured by value of 
assets) has a positive effect 
- No effect of deaths in the 
household 
- Positive effect of a presence of 
a secondary school but no effect 






12 years old, 6-8 
years old, 9-12 




from 1992 and 
1999. Variables 
are interacted 
-  Impact of income (measured 
as per capita expenditure), 
parents’ schooling and gender 




18 years old 
children 
with a dummy for 
1999 to assess the 








- Primary school 
attendance of 6-




















for number of 
years of schooling 
-Determinants are similar for 
primary and secondary school 
attendance and grade attained. 
-  Father’s education is more 
important than mother’s 
education 
-Larger number of children and 
adults in the household 
decreases enrolment 
- Wealth is significant (dummy 
poor/non-poor based on 
expenditures) 
- Distance to school has a 
negative effect 
- Teacher quality has a positive 
effect 
- Number of siblings has a 
greater impact on girls 
- Distance to a source of water 















INTRODUCTION AND ACCEPTANCE 
 












Dpt                   RC                  Interviewer 
 
Number of visits to the household:  
 
 













My name is _____________________________, I am conducted a survey on the Agro-sylvo-pastoral health insurance project. We would like you and 
your household members to participate in this survey as will ask you questions on your household and on your household members. We are particularly 
interested in your health behaviours and on your agricultural activities. This information will help to improve the health insurance project. The interview 
lasts about two hours. Information that you will communicate is strictly confidential and will not be communicated. Your participation is voluntary, so 
you can refuse to answer to one specific question or to all questions. However, we hope you will accept to participate to this survey as your opinion is 
very important to us.  
 










RESPONDANT ACCEPTS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS………………1  
RESPONDANT DOES NOT ACCEPT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ……2   → END 
 
First of all, I would like to make an exhaustive list of the persons who live, sleep and eat meal in your dwelling space. First, I would like to know the 




Always record first the head of the household, followed by the first wife, his children with the first wife from the oldest to youngest. If there are several wives then enter the second 
















A1. Name and forename   A2. 
Gender  




Relationship to head of 
the household 
1 HH  
2 Wife  
3 Child  
4 Father / Mother  
5 Brother / Sister  
6 Nephew / Niece  
7 Stepson / 
Stepdaughter  
8 Brother in law / Sister 
in law  
9 Father in law / Mother 




have a birth 
certificate?  
0 NO  
1 YES  
A5.  






























ial status  











spoken by the 
individual  
1 Wolof  




5 Bambara  
6 Serer  
7 Bassari  
8 Jola  
9 Maure   






2 Tijaniyya  
3 Laayeen  
4 Qadiriyya  
5 Christian  






10 Other relationship  
11 No relationship  
12 Foster child  





 D        M      Y 
  
 
Y        M 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             



















































If the individual 
answered 0 or 1 to B3: 
What was the last grade 
you were enrolled?  
1 Never enrolled  
2 CI (1st)  
3 CP (2nd)  
4 CE1 (3rd)  
5 CE2 (4th)  
6 CM1 (5th)  
7 CM2 (6th)  
8 6e (7th)  
9 5e (8th)  
10 4e (9th)  
B5.  
If the individual answered 
1 to B4: Why did you not 
go to school?  
1 No school available  
2 It was too expensive  
3 My parents did not find 
it useful  
4 I devoted myself to 
Koranic school.  
5 Too young to go to 
school.  
6 Other  
B6.  
If the individual 
answered 2 or more to 
B4: Why did you stop 
going to school?  
1 Repeating  
2 Too expensive  
3 No school available  
4 I was not successful  
5 I had learned enough  
6 Pregnancy/Marriage  
7 Koranic school  
8 I had to work to help 
my family  
9 Other  
B7.  
If the individual 
answered 2 or 3 
at B3: Current 
enrollement 
1 CI (1st)  
2 CP (2nd)  
3 CE1 (3rd)  
4 CE2 (4th)  
5 CM1 (5th)  
6 CM2 (6th)  
7 6e (7th)  
8 5e (8th)  
9 4e (9th)  








What is your 
highest 
diploma?  
0 None  
1 CEPE (end 
of primary 
school)  

















































11 3e (10th)  
12 2e (11th)  
13 1e (12th)  
14 TER (13th)  
15 University  
11 2e (11th)  
12 1e (12th)  
13 TER (13th)  
14 University 










1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
10            
11            



















your health one 
year ago, would 
you say that 
your health is  
1 Much better 
now  
2 Somewhat 
better now  




5 Much worse  
6 No opinion  
C2.  
If you had to 
dress without 
help, could 
you do it:  
1 Easily  
2 With 
difficulty  
3 Not at all  
C3.  
If you have to 
carry a heavy 
load, such as a 
pail of water, 
could you do it: 
1 Easily  
2 With 
difficulty  
3 Not at all  
 
C4.  
If you had to 
walk 5 
kilometres, 
could you do 
it:  
1 Easily  
2 With 
difficulty  







1 yes  







1 Often  
2 rarely  
3 never  
C7.  
Do you feel 
anxious or 
depressed?  
1 Often  
2 rarely  
3 never  
C8.  
Where do you 
put your 
current health 
status on a 
scale out of 10, 
where 10 is the 
best health 












past 30 days?  
1 yes  
0 no  
C10.  
Specify the name 
of the disease  
 
C11.  
Number of days 


















    NUMBER 
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
10            
11            
















D1 is asked to mature woman, if she has children then fill the box  associated with the child for 
questions D2-D8 




















1 Yes  






the last 12 
months? 








0 No  
1 Yes but 
less than 
4 visits.  








0 yes  
1 Iron OR 




























5 hospital  
6 private 
hospital  









0 No  
1 Yes  
D9.  
What was the 
weight of the 
child at birth? 








1 yes  













1 yes  












1 yes  






d with the 
DCT 
vaccine?  
1 yes  






event in the 
past 30 
days?  
1 yes  












1 yes  
0 no  
D16.  




ce of the 
child in cm? 
 






2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
7                 
8                 
9                 
10                 
11                 


























1 yes  









1 Nothing  
2 <half  
3 =half  












2 <half  
3 =half  

















































































the visit to 






























n of your 
husband?  
1 Yes  
2 It 
depends  
3 No  
E12.  




1 He was away  





5 Answered for 
his wife  
1             




3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             








The last time you 
were sick who did you 
consult in first line?  
1 Doctor/nurse  
2 Community based 
health staff (ASC)  
3 Pharmacist  
F2.  
What was the 
reason why you 




you, what is a 
bad healthcare 
quality?  




What was the 
purpose of your last 
consultation?  
1 Vaccine  
2 Check-up  
4 Injection  
F5.  
Where did the 
consultation 
take place?  
1 Private 
hospital  
2 Hospital  















did it cost 





































4 Healer  
5 Other  
6 Self-treatment  
7 Did nothing  
3 Too much 
waiting time  
4 Ineffective 
treatment  
5 Corruption  
5 Medication  
6 Sickness  
7 Infant/maternal 
health  
8 Other  
4 Health post  





8 At home  






















































1            






3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
10            
11            























1 yes  
0 no  



















































1 yes  






1 yes  
0 no  
F18.  
If f16=1 & f17=0, 
why didn’t you 
buy medicine?  
1 Not available at 
the facility  
2 Too expensive  
3 I had the 
medicine  
4 I felt better  
5 It was free  
6 Donation  







2 Drugstore  
3 Street  




5 Facility + 
drugstore  
6 Healer  


























1 yes  
0 no  
F22.  
If no, why you have 
not finished your 
course of treatment?  
1 Not available  
2 Too expensive  
3 felt better  
4 I am currently taking 
medicine  
5 Ineffective  
6 other  








1 yes  









1 yes  














1              
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
7              
8              
9              
10              
11              

















F25.   
Last time you 
were sick who 
did you 
consult in 





staff (ASC)  
3 Pharmacist  
4 Healer  




Where did the 
consultation take 
place?  
1 Private hospital  
2 Hospital  
3 Health centre  
4 Health post  
5 Pharmacy  
6 Health 
compound  
7 Doctor’s place  
8 At home  























it cost to 
































1 yes  



















d X-ray?  
1 yes  
0 no  
















































1 yes  











































1               
2               
3               
4               
5               
6               
7               
8               
9               
10               
11               

















The last time 

















1 yes  



















1 yes  






How did you find the money to pay for this 
health expenditure?  
1 Savings  
2 Donation from family/ friend or 
neighbour  
3 Remittance  
4 Loans to community  
5 By selling agricultural goods (parcel of 
land, truck...)  
6 By selling non-agricultural goods  
7 By selling my harvest  
8 Child labour  
9 Tontine/ microfinance  







1 Yes  




















































1 Yes  










1 Yes  








for drugs?  
1 Yes  












1 Yes  











11 Free care 
12 I didn’t spend anything  






1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             










































1 Yes  










re is  
1 very 
useful  








to 70% for primary 
care (health posts 
and health centres), 
and up to 90% for 
services offered in 
regional and 
national hospitals. 
To join the project, 
you will have to pay 
an annual 
contribution of 3,500 








1 Yes  
0 No  
H5.  
If no, what is the 
main reason?  
1 Cannot afford 
premium  
2 Bad quality of care  
3 Health insurance is 
useless  
4 Health insurance is 
a jinx  
5 I don’t have 
confidence in the 
project (the project is 
too slow to start off) 
6  I am happy with 
my health insurance  
7 other  
H6.  
If no, what is the 
second reason?  
1 Cannot afford 
premium  
2 Bad quality of care  
3 Health insurance is 
useless  
4 Health insurance is 
a jinx  
5 I don’t have 
confidence  
6 Happy with my 
insurance  






to all your 
family 
members?  
1 Yes  
0 No  
H8.  
If no, who will 
you favor?  
1 Women  
2 Workers  
3 Children  




7 Other  
H9.  
For what reason?  
1 They feed us  
2 They are 
vulnerable  
3 We believe in us 
to fight poverty  
4 They are poor  
5 They are more 
efficient at work  
6 They take care of 





1           
          
          
          
          
          




The head of the household will answer the following questions; he can be helped by other household members. 













Do you have in your 
household…? 
YES…1   NO…0 If yes, how many do you 
have? 
NUMBER 
Stove I1. I8. 
Refrigerator  I2. I9. 
Air conditioner I3. I10. 
Fan  I4. I11. 
Radio I5. I12. 
Television I6. I13. 









What is the main source of water for drinking?  
1 River  
2 Water vendor  
3 Unprotected well  
4 Protected well  
5 Drilling  
6 Societe des eaux (public service)  
7 Other  
 
I17.  
What is the type of toilet that is used in your household?  
1 No toilet  
2 Traditional latrine  
3 ventilated improves pit latrine  
4 Flush toilet  
5 Flush toilet + sewer  







What fuel do you use more often for cooking?  
1 Cowpat  
2 Wood  
3 Coal  
4 Gas  
5 Electricity  
6 Other  
 
I18.  
What is the main source of lighting in your dwelling?  
1 No lighting  
2 Candle  
3 Lamp (kerosene, oil, gas or battery)  
4 Solar energy  
5 Petrol  
6 Senelec (public service) 






During the last 30 days did your household spent on…?  How much did you spend?  
 
AMOUNT 
How many times in the year did you have such a 
spending?  
NUMBER<12 
Clothing (shoes, boubou, fabric, clothes) 
 
J1. J14. 




Home improvement (house furnishings, repairing, paint, crockery, 
household linen)  
 
J3. J16. 




Health (preventive and curative care) 
 
J5. J18. 











Celebrations (cloth, food) 
 
J7. J20. 
Jewellery and beauty product 
 
J8. J21. 
Leisure (book, sport, travel) and Religion  
 
J9. J22. 
Tax (income tax, fine) J10. J23. 
Housing (rent, house purchase) J11. J24. 
Debt reimbursement    
 
J12. J25. 








K1. During the past 12 months has any member of your household provided money or goods to persons who are not members of your household?  
1 Yes  
0 No  
 
K2. If k1=1, how much money have members of your household sent in the past 12 months?  
 
K3. Do you expect the recipient to send you back the money?  
1 Yes  
0 No  
 
K4During the past 12 months has any member of your household received money or goods from persons who are not members of your household?  




0 No  
 
K5. If k4=1, how much money have members of your household received in the past 12 months?  
 
 
K6. Do you have to reimburse the money?  
1 Yes  







 What is the value of the food that 
your household self-consumed 
during the last 12 months? 
For the food that you bought, how much 
did you spend during the last month? 
How many times did you have 




L1. L18. L35. 
cereal (wheat, corn, sorghum, fonio, millet and 
by-product (flour, sankhal)  
L2. L19. L36. 
groundnut and by-product (paste)  
 
L3. L20. L37. 
meat (beef, mutton, and goat)  
 
L4. L21. L38. 
poultry  
 
L5 L22. L39. 
fish (fresh, smoked and dried) and seafood  
 
L6. L23. L40. 
tomato  
 




vegetables and tubers (potatoes, sweet potato, 
onions, beans, and manioc)  
L8. L25. L42. 
condiment (garlic, salt, spices)  
 
L9. L26. L43. 
vegetable oil (palm, cotton, sesame, deew gnor, 
deew rith, and groundnut)  
L10. L27. L44. 
fruit (banana, mango, orange, and apple)  
 
L11. L28. L45. 
dairy product (milk, cheese, yogurt, cream and 
butter)  
L12. L29. L46. 
drink (juice)  L13. L30. L47. 
tobacco  
 
L14. L31. L48. 
sugar  
 
L15. L32. L49. 
cake  
 
L16. L33. L50. 
meals consumed outside of the home  
 





Did your household get a loan from the bank “Caisse Nationale de 









How much of your own money did you spend on agricultural 
inputs?  
? 




How many days of work did you lose because of 
disease during ....?  
 
M4. The irrigated season 
 
 
NUMBER OF DAYS 
M5. The hot and dry season  
 
NUMBER OF DAYS 
M6. The cold and dry 
season  
 
NUMBER OF DAYS 
M7.  Another season(drop in 
level, pluvial crop)  
 
NUMBER OF DAYS 
1      
     
     




     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
I need to know some information concerning your 3 most important harvests. I would like to know the level of your output for each cultivation and period. 
Cultivation  













season   
 
 
Hot and dry 
season        
Cold and dry 
season  
Other Irrigated 
season   
 
 
Hot and dry 
season        
Cold and dry 
season  
Other Irrigated 
season   
 
 
Hot and dry 
season        






O2. Period of production Irrigated 
period    
Hot & 
dry 
period        
Cold & dry 
period 
Other Irrigated 
period     
Hot & dry 
period        
Cold & dry 
period 
Other Irrigated 
period     
Hot & dry 
period        
Cold & dry 
period 
Other 
O3.Area (Hectare)                        
O4. Where did you buy seed?  
Shop...1, Market...2, Donation...3 
            
O5. Quantity (kg)             
O6. Total cost (FCFA)             
O7. How did you prepare soil? 
Offsetage...1,bionage...2, manual 
ploughing...3 
            
O8. Total cost              
O9. Seedbed                              
line = 1, volée = 2, bunch = 3, pricking out 
= 4 
            
O10. mode : manual = 1 , drill= 2             
O11. Fertilizer   
natural= 1, chemical=2 
            
O12. Quantity of fertilizer (kg)             
O13. Total cost fertilizer (Fcfa)             
O14. Insecticide Quantity (L)             
O15. Total cost (Fcfa)             
O16. Weeding   mode  
manual=1, chemical=2 






O17. If chemical, total cost (Fcfa)             
O18.  Number of times done              
Familial labour force               
O19. Number of men 
            
O20. Number of days             
O21. Number of women             
O22. Number of days             
O23. Number of day labourers                                      
O24. Number of days             
O25. Unit cost (per day)             
O26. Number of contractual              
O27. Unit cost (for the task)             
O28. Number of permanent worker             





I note equation (13): 
f(y)= 𝛽1𝑆1 + 𝛽2ln (1 −
𝑎
𝑦
) +  1 −  0 
This function is defined on the interval ]𝑎, ∞]. 
The first derivative is: 
 f’(y)=a/(y2-ay)  
It is strictly positive on the interval ]𝑎, ∞]. Therefore, f(y) is a monotonic increasing function 
on ]𝑎, ∞]. 
The limits of f(y) are: 
 lim
𝑦→∞
𝑓(𝑦) = 𝛽1𝑆1 +  1 −  0 
lim
𝑦→𝑎
𝑓(𝑦) = −∞ 
Therefore, f(y) increases at a diminishing rate and tends toward the limit 𝛽1𝑆1 +  1 −  0. 
Appendix 4.2: Allison test 
Likelihood ratio test to reject null hypothesis of equal residual variation 
Chi2 (1): 0.05  
Prob> chi2=0.8153 
First, equal residual variation between the model for girls and the model for boys is tested. If 
the residual variances of the two models are different, it is impossible to compare the estimated 
coefficients of the two models (Hoetker, 2007). In this case, the test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of equal residual variation; therefore, the coefficients between boys and girls can 




Likelihood ratio test to reject null hypothesis that all coefficients are the same:  
Chi2 (28): 56.5  
Prob> chi2=0.0011 
Then, the equality of coefficients between the two models is tested. If the coefficients of the 
two models are not statistically different, there is no need to estimate two separate models. In 
this case, the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients between boys and girls is rejected at 





Appendix 4.3: Robustness check of parents' education. Girls. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled 
              
Age 1.264*** 1.066*** 1.270*** 1.142*** 1.136*** 1.127*** 
Age squared -0.093*** -0.077*** -0.093*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.083*** 
Age cubic 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Child of household head 0.115 0.100 0.100 0.133* 0.118 0.119* 
       
Father number of years of schooling 0.007 0.007 0.008    
Father has ever attended a school     0.054  
Father’s literacy      0.072 
Age of father 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.002 0.002 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005   
Mother has ever attended a school     0.053  
Mother’s literacy      0.017 
Age of mother -0.007* -0.006 -0.005 -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008** 
Household head’s number of years of 
schooling 
   0.010   
Age of household head    0.001   
Father is missing  0.116  0.150* 0.236 0.235 
Mother is missing -0.287   -0.317** -0.312* -0.335** 
       
Number of children 
Number of children 
-0.066*** -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.051** -0.053*** -0.051*** 
Number of school-aged boys -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
Number of school-aged girls -0.013 -0.023 -0.030 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Number of adult men -0.039* -0.034 -0.054** -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
Number of adult women 0.021 0.015 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.016 
       
Monthly expenditures in adult 
equivalent (log) 
Monthly expenditures in adult 
equivalent (log) 
0.096 0.082 0.082 0.118** 0.125** 0.128** 
Household has to fetch water -0.020 -0.084 0.008 -0.078 -0.075 -0.074 
Household does not have electricity -0.209*** -0.234*** -0.245*** -0.141* -0.146** -0.146** 
Area cultivated (log) -0.007 -0.011 0.006 -0.038 -0.041 -0.042 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.090 -0.114 -0.109 -0.081 -0.080 -0.090 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.377* -0.323 -0.362 -0.264 -0.267 -0.271 
       
 
Primary school in the village 
0.204* 0.269** 0.209* 0.269*** 0.263*** 0.258*** 
Number of kilometers to secondary 
l (log) 
-0.048 -0.057** -0.045 -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
Teachers per student in the closest 
primary school 
-0.001 -0.005* -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
       
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) 
-0.067 -0.025 -0.043 -0.048 -0.049 -0.054 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) 0.038 0.060 0.073 0.016 0.007 0.015 
Per entage of hous hold  wi  no 
electricity in the village 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Percentage of households with no 
direct access to water in the village 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Percentag  of school-aged children 
enrolled in a Koranic in the village 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
Constant -5.249*** -4.282*** -5.109*** -4.946*** -4.936*** -4.883*** 
       







Appendix 4.4: Robustness check of parents' education. Boys. 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled enrolled 
              
Age 0.952*** 0.875*** 0.998*** 0.763*** 0.804*** 0.811*** 
Age squared -0.066*** -0.060*** -0.070*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.055*** 
Age cubic 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
Child of household head 0.022 -0.030 0.017 -0.018 0.012 -0.005 
       
Father number of years of schooling 0.006 0.008 0.008    
Father has ever attended a school     0.051  
Father’s literacy      -0.021 
Age of father -0.007** -0.008*** -0.008**  -0.007** -0.009*** 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.025** 0.032*** 0.026** 0.032***   
Mother has ever attended a school     0.199***  
Mother’s literacy      0.212*** 
Age of mother 0.005 0.008* 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.006 
Household head’s number of years of 
schooling 
   0.011   
Age of household head    -0.000   
Father is missing  -0.395**  -0.036 -0.367** -0.472*** 
Mother is missing 0.257   0.009 0.223 0.202 
       
Number of children 
Number of children 
0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 
Number of school-aged boys 0.010 0.022 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.024 
Number of school-aged girls -0.023 -0.017 -0.030 -0.016 -0.010 -0.012 
Number of adult men -0.041 -0.045* -0.047* -0.043* -0.040* -0.040* 
Number of adult women 0.013 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.001 
       
Monthly expenditures in adult 
equivalent (log) 
 
Monthly expenditures in adult 
equivalent (log) 
0.058 0.072 0.060 0.054 0.056 0.065 
Household has to fetch water 0.014 0.057 0.006 0.033 0.039 0.030 
Household does not have electricity -0.123 -0.173** -0.143* -0.188*** -0.185*** -0.196*** 
Area cultivated (log) 0.011 0.020 0.024 0.013 0.028 0.031 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) 0.030 0.010 0.027 -0.041 -0.035 -0.045 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.374 -0.286 -0.336 -0.389** -0.360** -0.386** 
       
 
Primary school in the village 
-0.027 -0.030 -0.043 -0.043 -0.027 -0.007 
Number of kilometers to secondary 
s l (log) 
-0.076** -0.067** -0.057 -0.064** -0.058** -0.068** 
Teachers per student in the closest 
primary school 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
       
 
Location Gae (base Ross Bethio) 
-0.102 -0.080 -0.086 -0.040 -0.024 -0.016 
Location Guede (base Ross Bethio) -0.190** -0.151* -0.174* -0.117 -0.122 -0.122 
Per entage of hous hold  wi  no 
electricity in the village 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Percentage of households with no 
direct access to water in the village 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Percentag  of school-aged children 
enrolled in a Koranic in the village -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.010** -0.011** -0.012*** 
Constant -3.797*** -3.611*** -3.979*** -3.154*** -3.214*** -3.151*** 
       




Appendix 4.5: Estimates with village fixed-effects 
  Girls Boys 
VARIABLES enrolled enrolled 
      
Age 1.143*** 0.938*** 
Age squared -0.084*** -0.065*** 
Age cubic 0.002*** 0.001*** 
Child of household head 0.103 0.017 
 
  
Father number of years of schooling 0.008 0.002 
Age of father 0.002 -0.006 
Mother number of years of schooling 0.008 0.036*** 
Age of mother -0.007** 0.004 
Father is missing 0.225 -0.280 
Mother is missing -0.278* 0.162 
 
  
Number of children -0.054*** -0.014 
Number of school-aged boys 0.001 0.034** 
Number of school-aged girls 0.004 -0.012 
Number of adult men -0.012 -0.031 
Number of adult women 0.021 -0.002 
 
  
Monthly expenditures in adult equivalent (log) 0.139** 0.055 
Household has to fetch water -0.060 0.049 
Household does not have electricity -0.142** -0.181*** 
Area cultivated (log) -0.058 0.037 
Ethnicity Pulaar (base Wolof) -0.095 -0.124 
Ethnicity Moorish (base Wolof) -0.737** -0.576*** 
 
  
Primary school in the village 0.004 -0.250 
Number of kilometers to secondary school (log) -0.274*** -0.150 
Teachers per student in the closest primary school 0.003 0.005 
 
   
Percentage of households with no electricity in the village 0.002 -0.001 
Percentage of households with no direct access to water in the village 0.001 0.001 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in a Koranic school in the 
village -0.008 -0.017* 
Constant -5.098*** -4.056*** 
   






Appendix 4.6: Hausman test of IIA 
The Hausman test compares the coefficients of a multinomial logit estimated with the two 
possible outcomes (i.e formal schooling and Koranic schooling where the base outcome is no 
schooling) and the coefficients of two multinomial logit models with only one possible 
outcome. More precisely the first model estimates a multinomial logit where the alternative 
outcome is formal schooling, the base outcome is no schooling and the children who do 
Koranic schooling are excluded from the sample. The second model estimates a multinomial 
logit where the alternative outcome is Koranic schooling, the base outcome is no schooling and 
the children who attend a formal school are excluded from the sample. 
Therefore, the test is made of two tests of equality of coefficients between coefficients 
estimated with the full model (i.e. the two alternative outcomes) and coefficients estimated 
with each of the restricted model.84 The null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients are 
the same. 
Results for girls’ sub-sample: 
Test of equality of estimated coefficients for the alternative formal schooling: 
Chi2 (28) =18.56 
Prob> chi2 = 0.9112 
Test of equality of estimated coefficients for the alternative Koranic schooling: 
Chi2 (28) =32.25 
Prob> chi2 = 0.2643 
Results for boys’ sub-sample: 
Test of equality of estimated coefficients for the alternative formal schooling: 
 




Chi2 (28) =13.93 
Prob> chi2 = 0.9877 
Test of equality of estimated coefficients for the alternative Koranic schooling: 
Chi2 (28) =19.58 
Prob> chi2 = 0.8794 
In all the cases, the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected. Thus, 
determinants of Koranic and formal schooling can be studied separately as the inclusion of an 












      
Father's schooling 0.0528 0.0358 
 (0.026)** (0.016)** 
Mother's 
schooling 0.0121 0.0283 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
Household size -0.0161 -0.0088 
 (0.006)*** (0.007) 
No older brother -0.0674 0.0556 
 (0.049) (0.042) 
No older sister -0.0032 -0.0426 
 (0.034) (0.048) 
Observations 244 266 
 Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level and presented in brackets. Additional controls include community fixed-effects. 
Appendix 5.2: Probability of ever going to school with correction of endogeneity of father 






      
Father's schooling 0.0075 0.0445 
 (0.100) (0.047) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.0412 0.2693 
 (0.038) (0.257) 
Boy 0.0032 -0.0126 
 (0.035) (0.031) 
Household size -0.0152 -0.0166 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
No older brother 0.0085 -0.0164 
  (0.033) (0.049) 
No older sister -0.0366 -0.0410 
  (0.036) (0.035) 
Observations 787 791 
 Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 




Appendix 5.3: Two-stage least-square estimates of level of schooling attained with the 










father’s and mother’s 
schooling 
        
Father's schooling 0.1136 -0.0386 0.0046 
 (0.237) (0.146) (0.376) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.0360 1.7034 1.6305 
 (0.097) (1.238) (1.329) 
Boy 0.2267 0.1887 0.1988 
 (0.091)** (0.122) (0.122) 
Household size -0.0221 -0.0489 -0.0451 
 (0.013)* (0.031) (0.031) 
No older brother 0.0959 -0.0942 -0.0844 
  (0.088) (0.217) (0.224) 
No older sister 0.0093 0.0443 0.0344 
  (0.100) (0.145) (0.158) 
Constant 2.0116 1.3574 1.3102 
 (0.409)*** (0.673)** (0.730)* 
    
Observations 808 812 806 
 Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 





Appendix 5.4: OLS estimates for level attained for various age samples 
  10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
          
Father's schooling 0.122 0.075 0.033 0.011 
 (0.038)*** (0.036)** (0.030) (0.014) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.033 0.071 0.046 0.059 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.052) (0.025)** 
Boy 0.226 0.200 0.126 -0.038 
 (0.088)** (0.088)** (0.066)* (0.041) 
Household size -0.022 -0.026 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.013)* (0.013)** (0.011) (0.007) 
No older brother 0.102 0.076 0.064 0.022 
  (0.088) (0.096) (0.075) (0.048) 
No older sister 0.016 0.091 0.150 0.035 
  (0.090) (0.083) (0.066)** (0.045) 
Constant 1.993 1.988 1.717 0.940 
 (0.248)*** (0.273)*** (0.228)*** (0.111)*** 
     
Observations 814 686 989 484 
R-squared 0.099 0.092 0.076 0.097 
 Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 





Appendix 5.5: Right-censored model estimates for level attained for various age samples 
  10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
          
Father's schooling 0.321 0.286 0.146 0.034 
 (0.093)*** (0.101)*** (0.080)* (0.053) 
Mother's schooling 0.139 0.322 0.319 0.271 
 (0.152) (0.164)** (0.123)*** (0.106)** 
Boy 0.217 0.277 0.069 -0.248 
 (0.170) (0.190) (0.141) (0.124)** 
Household size -0.079 -0.091 -0.068 -0.029 
 (0.029)*** (0.033)*** (0.027)** (0.021) 
No older brother 0.251 0.357 0.148 -0.030 
  (0.175) (0.220) (0.163) (0.139) 
No older sister -0.391 -0.254 0.022 0.084 
  (0.187)** (0.192) (0.150) (0.136) 
Constant 0.621 0.628 4.007 6.465 
 (0.044)*** (0.786)*** (0.045)*** (0.381)*** 
     
Observations 814 686 987 482 
 Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level and presented in brackets. Additional controls include community fixed-effects.  
Appendix 5.6: Probability of ever going to school for various age samples 
  10-21 10-18 7-18 7-11 
          
Father's schooling 0.075 0.048 0.022 0.013 
 (0.021)*** (0.019)** (0.013)* (0.015) 
Mother's 
schooling 0.023 0.034 0.048 0.064 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.021)** (0.027)** 
Boy -0.007 0.031 -0.001 0.050 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.034) 
Household size -0.014 -0.013 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.005)** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.006) 
No older brother 0.014 0.025 0.009 0.003 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.038) 
No older sister -0.047 0.003 0.032 0.036 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.036) 
     
Observations 793 666 998 490 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard 




Appendix 6.1. Difference in wives’ number of year of schooling after controlling for age 
  Number of year of schooling 













Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clusters at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** 
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